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Abstract
Corporate governance is a crucial issue that is being addressed widely by regulators, and
capital market participants around the world. Disclosure is identified as one of the challenges
facing the implementation of corporate governance especially in developing countries. The
current study aims to contribute to corporate governance and disclosure literature by
providing empirical evidence of the relationship between corporate governance, ownership
structure and the voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital market, namely Egypt.
The study assesses the extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories in the annual
reports of the most active non financial companies in the Cairo and Alexandria Stock
Exchange oyer four years that witnessed a remarkable initiatives to enhance transparency and
corporate governance. It employs a wider theoretical framework based mainly on the political
economic approach and benefits from institutional theory.
Using a sample of 182 annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies, the
findings indicate that while the extent of voluntary disclosure is low, there was a gradual
increase in the extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories over the examined
period. However, there is no significant difference between the voluntary disclosure over the
four years. This suggests that companies manage their voluntary disclosure policy which is
not a random practice but subject to certain influences.
The regression results indicate the board characteristics; board size and board composition;
do affect the extent of voluntary disclosure. Interestingly, the findings indicate that the
existence of family members on the board has a positive association with the extent of total
voluntary disclosure. This suggests that family led companies may have a litigation and
reputation cost concern. While the presence of foreign members on the board and board size
were found to affect voluntary disclosure positively, the percentage of nonexecutive directors
has a negative effect. It was found that government ownership has a marginally effect on
voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, the study provides evidence that the determinants of
voluntary disclosure vary among the different categories. There was no single variable can
explain the total voluntary disclosure and its categories. This highlights the need to analyze
the different categories of voluntary disclosure.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Background
Voluntary disclosure can be seen as a response to several factors such as changes in capital
markets, changes in business environments and/or globalization (Healy and Palepu 2001).
Currently. there is an increasing global concern about the issue of corporate governance in
general and disclosure and transparency in particular. One of the key reasons for such
concern is the scandals in a number of developed markets around the world. Disclosure
and transparency have been identified as reasons for these scandals. This raises questions
about the possibility of future similar scandals in emerging capital markets that arguably
lack institutions efficient enough to absorb the expected negative effects. Therefore a
number of emerging capital markets have started reform programmes lead by the
international capital provider, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World
Bank.
However, disclosure is identified as one of the biggest challenges facing the
implementation of corporate governance especially in developing countries (CIPE 2003).
Moreover, the poor levels of corporate disclosure have been identified as one of the factors
that have not only contributed to the Asian financial crisis but are also a stumbling block in
the regional economic recovery (Berardino, 2001 as cited in Gul and Leung, 2004).
Emerging capital markets have expressed their concern about such issues through their
regulators and governments. To legitimize themselves, the governments in countries with
emerging capital markets have announced that corporate governance and higher levels of
disclosure and transparency have the highest priority in their reform programmes. In this
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regard, a number of regulations and structures have been changed. For example, local
corporate governance codes, mostly based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development OECD principles, have been issued in many emerging capital markets
over the last few years. This raises a question about the relevance of such western concepts
to emerging capital markets that do not share the same characteristics as the developed
markets. However, it is essential to have a diagnostic view of the disclosure practices in
such emerging capital markets. The current research aims to address the voluntary
disclosure practices in an emerging capital market, namely Egypt.
1.2 The objective of the study
The current study concentrates on the non-financial listed companies in the Cairo and
Alexandria stock Exchange (CASE) as an emerging capital market. It aims to assess the
voluntary disclosure practices in corporate annual reports over a period of remarkable
initiatives, establishing the Egyptian institute of directors and issuing the Egyptian code of
corporate governance. In addition, it seeks to identify the determinants of voluntary
disclosure practice by examining its association with a number of corporate governance
characteristics, ownership aspects and firm characteristics. To achieve this goal, the
research has the following objectives:
•
•
•
To evaluate the extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories in corporate
annual reports.
To investigate whether there are significant differences in the extent of total
voluntary disclosure and its categories over the period of study.
To assess the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance,
ownership structure and firm characteristics.
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1.3 The importance of the study
The current study can be distinguished from prior studies in the following areas:
First the study contributes to two streams of literature, the disclosure literature and
corporate governance literature, by providing up to date empirical evidence on the
association between voluntary disclosure practices and corporate governance
characteristics in one of the Middle East and North African countries (MENA), Egypt,
where disclosure studies are relatively limited compared to developed countries and Asian
emerging markets (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). To the best of my knowledge, there is no
prior empirical study, at the time of conducting this study, concerning the voluntary
disclosure and its relationship with corporate governance in the Egyptian context. So, it
can be argued that the current study provides new evidence from a country that may be
considered as a representative of Arabic and African countries.
Secondly, the study contributes to the recent debate as to whether family led companies
provide more or less disclosure (e.g. Ajinkya et al, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005;
Ali et al. 2007 and Chen et al 2008). It investigate whether the existence of family
members on the board affects the extent of voluntary disclosure practices in corporate
annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
Thirdly, the study addresses voluntary disclosure practices over the period of considerable
changes in the business environment in general and the capital market in particular. The
period of the study has witnessed, among other changes, the first application of the new
listing rules and the issuance of an Egyptian corporate governance code.
Fourthly, the study extends the approach of Meek et al (1995) that is commonly cited in
disclosure literature by analyzing voluntary disclosure based on narrow groups of items
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instead of wider groups. It investigates overall voluntary disclosure and the different types
of voluntary disclosure: general information, financial information, non-financial
information, future information, corporate governance information, shareholder
information, and social responsibility information. Such analysis provides more
explanations and outlines the areas of possible improvements. It becomes more important
with longitudinal studies.
Fifthly. the current study recognizes the lack of a comprehensive theory that can fully
explain voluntary disclosure. It responds to the call to employ a wider theoretical view,
theoretical triangulation, by employing a theoretical framework that is based mainly on the
political economic approach: stakeholders, legitimacy, political costs theories; and the new
institutional theory. Such a framework may help to broaden the scope of analysis and
deepen it. The empirical section examines the applicability of such theories in emerging
capital markets.
Sixthly, the current study is considered to be a response to the call for more research to
examine factors that contribute to the change of corporate voluntary disclosure over time
by conducting a longitudinal study (e.g. Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). The study uses panel
data analysis which is rarely used in disclosure literature (Hassan et al., 2006). "Panel data
give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more
degree of freedom and more efficiency" (Gujarati, 2003, p.637). Longitudinal studies can
help to shed further light on the process whereby voluntary disclosure practices evolve
over time.
Finally, the current study employs two types of statistical analysis: parametric and non
parametric regression. Along with pooled Ordinary Least Square OLS and panel
4
Generalized Linear Model GLS estimation, the study employs more elaborate techniques,
namely censored-normal regressions (Tobit), and Quantile regressions, which are not
commonly used in the disclosure literature although they are more relevant to the
measurement method of disclosure extent.
1.... Research questions and hypotheses:
Disclosure and transparency is considered to be one of the crucial factors that underpin
emerging capital markets and economic development in general. To improve financial
reporting. it is important to study not only the extent and the trend of disclosure practices,
but also the factors explaining or influencing corporate financial reporting (Rizk, 2006). To
achieve the objective of the study the following research questions have been formulated:
1. To what extent do Egyptian listed companies disclose more information
voluntarily in their annual reports?
2. How do voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Egyptian
listed companies evolve over time?
3. What are the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports
of Egyptian listed companies?
The first two questions will be answered by applying a descriptive analysis of the total
voluntary disclosure and its categories in the annual reports over the period of the study.
The results of the checklist, the research instrument, will be analyzed on the three levels of
disclosure: total, category and item by item. Also these results will be analyzed year by
year to outline the trend of voluntary disclosure over the examined period. Statistical tests
will be employed to investigate whether there is a significant difference in the extent of
voluntary disclosure practices over the period of the study.
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To answer the third question, three main hypotheses related to corporate governance
characteristics, ownership aspects, and firm characteristics have been developed. These
hypotheses are as follows:
H.] there is all association between a number of corporate governance characteristics
and tile extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian
listed companies.
To test this hypothesis, the following sub hypotheses have been developed:
Hl.l there is a negative association between role duality and the level of voluntary
disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
H1.2 there is an association between the proportion of non-executive directors and
the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
H1.3 there is an association between the presence of family members on the board
and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian
listed companies.
H1.4 there is a positive association between the presence of foreign members on the
board and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies.
H1.5 there is an association between board SIze and the level of voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
The second main hypothesis is related to ownership structure:
H.2 there is an association between a number of ownership aspects and the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
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Three sub hypotheses can be developed under this hypothesis:
H2.! there is a negative association between block holder ownership and the level
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
H2.2 there is an association between governmental ownership and the level of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
H2.3 there IS an association between institutional ownership and the level of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
The third main hypothesis is about firm characteristics:
H.3 there is an association between a number offirm characteristics and the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
To test this hypothesis, seven sub hypotheses representing variables related to firm
structure, firm performance and the market have been developed:
H3.l.a there is a positive association between firm size measured by total assets and
the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
H3.l.b there is an association between gearing measured by the ratio of total debt to
equity and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies.
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H3.2.a. there is an association between profitability measured by return on equity
and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian
listed companies.
H3.2.b there is an association between liquidity measured by current ratio and the
level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies
H3.3.a there is an association between industry type measured by dummy variable
(l for manufacturing company, 0 for non manufacturing) and the level of voluntary
disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
H3.3.b there is a positive association between cross listing and the level of
voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
H3.3.c there is an association between audit firm and the level of voluntary
disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
1.5 Research Methodology
It is argued that multiparadigm approaches can generate more complete knowledge than
can any single paradigmatic perspective (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). The research philosophy
of the current study is based on the interpretivist - functionalist transition zone as a
multiparadigm approach. Such approach links both of interpretivist and functionalist
paradigms and provides an opportunity to benefit from a wider theoretical framework. It
allows for providing a descriptive analysis to voluntary disclosure practices in corporate
annual reports of Egyptian listed companies that lack prior studies. Furthermore, it allows
also to use the deductive approach to examine, empirically, the association between the
extent of voluntary disclosure and a number of corporate governance characteristics,
ownership aspects and firm characteristics.
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The deductive approach requires developing hypotheses based on a theory. The current
study employs a theoretical framework that benefit from integrating a number of disclosure
theories, based mainly on the political economic approach. Also it benefits from the
concept of isomorphism to explain how voluntary disclosure practices evolve over time.
As such, the study is considered to be an quantitative study. It measures the extent of total
voluntary disclosure and its categories in the corporate annual report based on a self
constructed checklist of voluntary disclosure items and using an un-weighted disclosure
index. The most active non financial listed companies in the Cairo and Alexandria Stock
Exchange (CASE) represent the sample population in the current study. The period of
study covers the four years from 2003 to 2006. The final sample consists of 64 companies
with 182 firm year observations.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
This section presents an overview of the structure of the current study. Chapter two
reviews the disclosure literature. It explores the relationship between voluntary disclosure
and the fairness in disclosure and justifies the use of annual reports in the current study.
The concept of corporate governance and its relationship to disclosure and transparency
has been outlined. Previous disclosure studies have been reviewed on three sub-sections:
traditional disclosure studies that explain variation in disclosure by firm characteristics,
disclosure studies that consider corporate governance characteristics as determinants of
disclosure, and the prior disclosure studies in the Egyptian context. This chapter ends with
an outline of the gap in the literature to which the current study aims to contribute.
Chapter three presents an overview of the Egyptian environment as the context of the
study. It aims to justify why the Egyptian context is considered to be excellent opportunity
to address the issue of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance. It starts with general
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information about Egypt. Then it provides a summary of the economic conditions and the
stages that Egyptian economy has been through. It also highlights the Egyptian capital
market and regulatory change; new listing rules and corporate governance code. A review
of the accounting profession and the financial reporting requirements that govern the
disclosure practices has been presented.
Chapter four outlines the theoretical framework used in the current study. It reviews the
different theories that can be used to explain the voluntary disclosure practices. The
chapter classifies these theories into five approaches: regulatory, pure economic, political
economic, socio economic, and cost benefit approaches. Based on this critical review, the
chapter ends with the proposed theoretical framework for the current study. It makes it
clear that there is no single theory can fully explain the voluntary disclosure practices.
Chapter five presents the bridge that articulates the theoretical section with the empirical
section of the current study. Research philosophy, ontological and epistemological
perspectives and research paradigm are outlined. It justifies using multiparadigm approach
in the current study. Then it moves to present the research design and research instrument.
The sources of data and the operational measures of the independent variables are
identified. The chapter shows how the disclosure checklist has been constructed. This
chapter ends with the statistical techniques used in the current study to carry out the
empirical section.
Chapter six is allocated to present the research hypotheses of the current study. The main
hypotheses have been developed based on the proposed theoretical framework in chapter
four, the evidence from prior empirical studies in chapter two, and the Egyptian context in
chapter three. The three main hypotheses are related to the association between voluntary
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disclosure and each of corporate governance, ownership structure and firm characteristics.
This chapter divides each of the main hypotheses into a number of sub hypotheses that will
be tested in the empirical section.
Chapter seven aims to answer the first two research questions: what is the extent of total
voluntary disclosure and its categories in the annual reports of the most active companies,
and how do voluntary disclosure practices evolve over time. It starts with discussion of the
reliability and validity of the research instrument, the disclosure index and continues to
provide a descriptive analysis to the results of the checklist designed to measure the extent
of voluntary disclosure; the dependent variable. Three levels of analysis are presented in
this chapter: the aggregate level, the category or type of information, and item by item.
Chapter eight aims to answer the third research question: the determinants of voluntary
disclosure practices. It starts with a descriptive analysis of the independent variables. Two
types of analysis are employed in this chapter, bivariate and multivariate analyses. It
summarizes the results of regression diagnostics before choosing the suitable statistical
technique. OLS and GLS regressions have been employed and Tobit and Quantile
regressions have been used to add robustness to the results. The chapter ends with a
discussion of the results and testing of the hypotheses developed in chapter six.
Finally, chapter nine presents a summary of the findings of the study and the contribution
s
to the knowledge. In addition it outlines the limitations and suggests a number of
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter Two: Disclosure and Corporate Governance:
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Disclosure is an important variable in any measurement of accounting quality (Marston
and Robson, 1997). The amount of research focusing on the central theme of disclosure has
been growing rapidly in recent years (Beattie 2005). It is argued that disclosure and
transparency. accountability, and corporate governance play an important role in gaining
the market confidence (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The previous chapter provided an
overview of the present study. The current chapter reviews the relevant prior studies
concerning accounting disclosure and factors affecting disclosure practice. It aims to
provide a clear idea about the prior studies and to link the current study with disclosure
literature. In particular, it aims to identify the nature of the gap to which the current study
aims to contribute to the literature by filling it. Moreover, this will add to the consistency
of the current study. Reviewing the literature is the base that will help to choose the
relevant theoretical framework to the study and to extract the research hypotheses and
methodology.
Section 2.2 and 2.3 outline the concept of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance.
Section 2.4 reviews the relevant prior disclosure studies that explain disclosure by firm
characteristics and those that address voluntary disclosure and its categories. The empirical
studies related to the relationship between corporate governance rules and the extent of
disclosure are reviewed in section 2.5. Prior disclosure studies in the Egyptian context are
reviewed in section 2.6. Finally, the gap which the current research can contribute to filling
is presented in section 2.7.
12
2.2 Corporate disclosure: overview
This section highlights the need of voluntary disclosure and its relation to the principle of
fairness in disclosure. It defines what is meant by voluntary disclosure in the current study.
In addition, it justifies using corporate annual reports in the current study.
2.2.1 Fairness in disclosure and voluntary disclosure
Disclosure is the process by which accounting measurements are communicated to their
intended users (Choi and Meek, 2008). However a number of questions, such as what
information is to be reported and to what extent, when, how and to whom must the
company disclose, need be answered. Disclosure can be classified into two types:
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. The former is governed by the disclosure
requirements that companies should comply with while the latter is subject to managerial
decision.
It is argued that the reliance on the disclosure requirements or rules has created some
limitations and unfairness in reporting and disclosure (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002). Therefore,
theorists and practitioners have begun to recognize the inherent shortcomings of traditional
reporting and have developed models for additional voluntary disclosure (Schuster and
O'Connell, 2006).
To eliminate this unfairness, the accounting profession now directs more attention to the
issue of financial reporting. One of the attempts of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) to improve financial reporting is the establishment of the
Jenkins Committee in 1991. In its report issued in 1995, five broad categories of
information have been proposed by the committee to be disclosed. These categories
include financial and non-financial data, management's analysis of the financial and non-
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financial data, forward-looking information, information about management and
shareholders and background about the company.
However. the Jenkins committee report focuses only on specific groups of users, investors
and creditors. This can be deduced from the title of the report: "The Information Needs of
Investors and Creditors". This may be consistent with the notion of agency theory that
shareholders are the main principal. But there are many users or stakeholders who are
interested in the firm and have information needs about the firm and its performance that
should be satisfied, such as employees, government, and society. Therefore, there is a call
for expanded disclosures that also include other information such as human resource and
social responsibility (for more details, see Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002).
Another example of the attention paid to the issue of voluntary disclosure is the
establishment of the Steering Committee in 1998, by the Financial Accounting Standard
Board FASB. One of the three reports of this committee was entitled "Improving Business
Reporting: insights into enhancing voluntary disclosure". The primary conclusion of the
committee is to allow investors and other financial statement users to see the company
"through the eyes of management" (Boesso, 2002).
Riahi-Belkaoui (2002) indicates that
"The principle of fairness in disclosure calls for an expansion of the
conventional accounting disclosures to accommodate all the other interest
groups, in addition to investors and creditors, that have a vested interest in the
affairs ofthe firm". (p.206)
As a supplier of the desired information, corporate management recognizes the demand for
information and has incentives to satisfy such a demand. In this regard, Schuster and
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O'Connell (2006) indicate that disclosing additional information voluntarily represents one
method that management can use to increase managerial credibility and to re-establish a
relationship of trust with their stakeholders.
The main theme of the current study is voluntary disclosure. While there are a large
number of studies which address voluntary disclosure, it can be said that there is lack of a
clear-cut definition of the term of voluntary disclosure. Debreceny and Rahman (2005:b)
state that:
"It is difficult if not impossible to provide a precise and universally accepted
definition ofvoluntary disclosure" (p.286)
The expression 'voluntary disclosure' indicates that this disclosure is discretionary and
subject to the decision of management. There is no formal obligation for the company to
disclose more information voluntarily. In other words, no legal or formal action will be
taken if a company does not disclose information more than the requirements. Meek et al
(1995) indicate that voluntary disclosures - disclosures in excess of the requirements -
represent free choices on the part of management to provide information that is considered
to be relevant to the users of annual reports.
Previous disclosure studies describe the term voluntary disclosure as items of information
that are disclosed over and above the mandatory requirements (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Ho and
Wong, 2001a; Barako et al. 2006). For the purpose of the current study, the researcher
follows the disclosure literature and defines voluntary disclosure in annual reports as
"Items of information, quantitative or qualitative, that companies disclose in
their annual reports above the mandatory requirements specified in accounting
standards and / or other regulations ".
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This definition will govern the process of choosing information items that will be included
in the instrument used to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure. Although other routes
for voluntary disclosure can be used, the current study focuses on the corporate annual
report as the main channel for transmitting information. The following section explains the
rationale behind using annual reports in the current study.
2.2.2 Rationale behind using annual reports
Many channels can be used for communicating between the company and the stakeholders.
The annual report is one of these channels which include also among others, websites,
press releases. conference calls. The annual report is considered to be the oldest way to
disseminate information to the stakeholders. Botosan (1997) argues that:
"Although the annual report is only one means of corporate reporting, it
should serve as a good proxy for the level ofvoluntary disclosure provided by
a firm across all disclosure avenues...the annual report is generally considered
to be one of the most important sources of corporate information". (pp. 330-
331)
Moreover, Choi and Meek (2008) state that:
"Annual report disclosure practices reflect managers' responses to regulatory
disclosure requirements and their incentives to provide information to
financial statements users voluntarily". (p. 156)
The current study focuses on the annual reports due to several reasons. The key reason is
related to the nature of the current study that is intended to be a longitudinal study, using
panel data for four years. Therefore, the annual reports represent the best available channel
and the most relevant one to the purpose of the current study. In general, annual reports are
16
more accessible for research purposes (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Online reporting or
using corporate website is considered to be sensitive to time. Information disclosed online
may be changed over short period of time. So online reporting may not be practically
relevant to the current study that covers the last four years at the time of conducting the
study. Moreover, the internet usage in developing countries is less than in developed
countries. So, the relative importance and credibility of annual reports in developing
countries may be more than other means of disclosure. In Egypt, the percentage of internet
usage is still low. it was 7% for the year 2006 (IWS, 2007). The other methods of
communications have the same problem.
Furthermore, the annual report is the oldest and the more familiar channel to disseminate
information to different users, especially in developing countries (Marston & Shrives,
1991). However, corporate voluntary disclosure of specific types of information, such as
management forecasts, is rare in some developing countries (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007).
A corporate annual report includes the auditor's report which adds credibility to the
financial statements and the notes that may include voluntary information in addition to the
mandatory one. In other words the credibility of the annual report may encourage
managers to use it to disclose more information voluntarily.
In addition, using corporate annual reports as the unit of analysis facilitates comparison
between companies that are required to submit these reports annually whatever the specific
events that may need to be disclosed immediately (Haniffa, 1999). Another feature of
examining corporate annual reports is the possibility to investigate large numbers of
companies. Moreover, comparing the annual reports of different companies over different
years may be easier than comparing the other means of disclosure. A large number of prior
disclosure studies used corporate annual reports, either in developed countries such as, UK,
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Firth, 1979: Sweden, Cooke, 1989; Japan, Cooke, 1991 and 1992; Australia, Gibson and
O'Donovan, 2007, or developing countries, for example, Hong Kong, Ferguson et al, 2002;
Malaysia, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 and 2005; Kenya, Barako et a1. 2006; China, Huafang
and Jianguo, 2007,' and Wang et al, 2008.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the annual report is an important channel of
communication with stakeholders (Chang and Most, 1985). The report is considered to be
the most important source of information for financial analysts and investors in developing
countries (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Also, there is evidence of a positive correlation
between the disclosure extent in the annual reports and the disclosure through other means
(Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan and Plumlee 2002). This may suggest
that companies coordinate their overall disclosure policy (Hussainey, 2004).
It is noteworthy that Marston and Robson (1997) indicate that there is no disclosure index
or other measurement instrument that has yet been designed which captures all the
disclosure routes, such as annual reports, press releases, and interim reporting.
As such it is clear that voluntary disclosure plays a crucial role to achieve fairness in
disclosure. It is commonly agreed that more transparent companies disclose more
information voluntarily. Disclosure and transparency issues have been identified as a
reason for the recent financial scandals around the world; e.g. ENRON, WORLDCOM. In
general, these financial scandals highlight the need for sound corporate governance
practices that include, among others principles, disclosure and transparency. Disclosure
literature has now extended to address the influence of corporate governance
characteristics on the extent of disclosure. Before reviewing the prior empirical studies, the
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following section presents an overview of the concept of corporate governance and its
relationship to disclosure and transparency.
2.3 Corporate governance and disclosure policy
Corporate governance is a crucial issue that is being addressed widely by regulators and
capital market participants around the world. Business environments face some problems
in accounting, auditing and corporate governance that have undermined the quality and
integrity of financial reporting (Imhoff, 2003). One of underlying questions in this regard
concerns the appropriateness of western concepts and systems in developing countries.
This question has been raised again with corporate governance. The question is whether
the code of corporate governance (principles) is suitable for (developing countries)
emerging capital markets. While much of the focus in corporate governance literature has
been on corporate governance systems in highly developed countries, there has been much
less discussion of corporate governance institutions in developing countries (Mueller,
2006).
2.3.1 Corporate governance: overview
There are many definitions of corporate governance. Generally these definitions can be
classified into two groups: narrow definition which focuses on corporate accountability to
shareholders (shareholder-oriented), and broader definition which focuses on corporate
accountability to stakeholders (stakeholder-oriented). Keasey et al. (2005) indicate that the
expression of corporate governance carries different interpretations and its analysis also
involves diverse disciplines and approaches. According to the second group, corporate
governance can be defined as follows:
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"the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies,
which ensure that companies discharge their accountability to all their
srakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas oftheir business
activity", (Solomon, 2007, p.14).
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and
controlled. The structure of corporate governance identifies rights and responsibilities lines
among different corporate participants and specifies the rules and procedures for making
decisions on corporate affairs. In addition, corporate governance ensures that all major
stakeholders receive reliable information about the value of the firm and motivates
managers to maximize firm value instead of pursuing personal objectives (Luo, 2005).
Mueller (2006) distinguishes between two types of corporate governance institutions:
institutions that are common to all companies in a country, such as law and legal
institutions, and institutions that differ from company to company within a country, such as
the number of members on the board of directors and the percentage of outsiders on the
board. Tricker (1984) suggests that corporate governance can be classified into four groups
of power: ownership power, corporate director's power, management power, and
institutional power.
Luo (2005) indicates that corporate governance works through three mechanisms: market-
based mechanisms (e.g. board composition, board size, market discipline, board
chairmanship, executive compensation, and interlocking directorate); culture-based
mechanisms (e.g. governance culture and corporate integrity); and discipline-based
mechanisms (e.g. executive penalty, internal auditing, conduct codes, and ethics
programmes). However, Imhoff (2003) indicates that accounting and auditing are
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components of the broader system of corporate governance, and can't be fixed in any
lasting way without substantive changes in the overall governance process. Gul and Leung
(2004) point out that recent trends in the literature suggest that the role of corporate
governance is best examined in the context of a "package" of corporate governance
mechanisms i.e. the role of two or more corporate governance mechanisms (See: Kosnik,
1987; Singh and Harianto, 1989; Rediker and Seth, 1995).
However, it should be noted that most corporate governance literature focuses on a market
based mechanism, the first mechanism of Luo' s classification. Anand (2005) points out
that the concept of corporate governance continues to expand. He indicates that most of the
corporate governance definitions speak only of the relationships between those who run the
company and those who invest or otherwise deal with it. Thus he suggests that a more
appropriate definition of corporate governance includes additional components such as
disclosure of board composition, including the number of independent directors on the
board; composition of various committees of the board, and separation of the chair of the
board and the CEO.
Table 2.1 shows the first corporate governance codes of practice or policy documents for
countries around the world. As can be noticed from the table, there has been an explosion
of corporate governance codes of practice over the last decade. Many of these codes are
voluntary codes proposed by institutions or bodies interested in improving the methods of
corporate management (Roberts et al., 2005). A large amount of corporate governance
literature addresses the effect of corporate governance practices, especially the attributes of
the board of directors and its committees, on firm performance and recently it was
extended to corporate disclosure policy.
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Table 2.1 Corporate governance diffusion: first codes of practice or policy documents
Year Countries
1992 UK
1994 Canada, and South Africa.
1995 Australia, and France.
1996 Spain
1997 Japan, The Netherlands, and USA.
1998 Belgium, Germany, India, Italy, and Thailand.
1999
Brazil, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal, South
Korea, GECD, ICGN, and Commonwealth.
2000
Denmark, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Romania, and The
Philippines.
2001 China, Czech Republic, Malta, Peru, Singapore, and Sweden.
2002
Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Slovakia,
Switzerland, and Taiwan.
2003
Finland, Lithuania, Macedonia, New Zealand, Turkey,
Ukraine, and Latin America.
2004 Bangladesh, Iceland, Norway, Slovenia, GECD.
2005 Jamaica, ICGN, and Egypt.
Source: adapted from Solomon (2007) p.188
2.3.2 Theoretical base of corporate governance
Theoretically, corporate governance has been explained and analyzed USing different
theoretical frameworks such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory.
There is some kind of relationship among these frameworks. However, Parum (2005)
indicates that corporate governance does not have an accepted theoretical base or
commonly accepted paradigm as yet.
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Reviewing corporate governance literature, it can be noticed that agency theory and
stakeholder theory are the dominant theories. Mueller (2006) points out that central to any
discussion of corporate governance is the question of how well a particular set of
institutions mitigates the various principal agent problems that arise in a firm. However, a
number of studies, such as Haniffa and Cooke (2005), use legitimacy theory to address the
potential effects of culture and corporate governance on social disclosure.
Agency theory is derived from the pure economic approach which suffers from some
limitations. It is based on the desire for income and avoiding loss. Consequently, it focuses
on profit maximization as a main goal of managers and ignores other goals. Also, this
approach concentrates only on two stakeholder groups, managers and shareholders, and
pays no attention to other interested parties in society, such as government, employees,
taxation authorities and consumer groups. Therefore, a number of authors argue that
corporate governance is too often viewed from a perspective that focuses solely on the
relationship between shareholders and managers. They believe that this perspective no
longer seems sufficient. Moreover, additional perspectives which consider other parties or
stakeholders and the great changes and complexity in business environments rna y be
helpful. (Van den Berghe, 2002 as cited in Parum, 2005). Consistent with this view,
Crowther and Jatana (2005) indicate that agency theory is considered to be a cause of
failure in corporate governance.
In this regard, it is possible that the reason for using different theoretical frameworks may
be the lack of a generally accepted definition of corporate governance and its components.
While agency theory may be suitable for narrow definition, stakeholder theory may be
relevant for broad definition. Moreover, the question of who is the principal is the source
of difference between agency and stakeholder theories. While the principal in agency
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theory is the shareholders, the stakeholder theory extends the concept of principal to
include other interested parties beside shareholders.
Because shareholders' interests can only be satisfied by taking account of stakeholder
interests, Solomon (2007) argues that theoretical frameworks that suggest companies
should be accountable only to their shareholders are not necessarily inconsistent with
theoretical frameworks that champion stakeholder accountability.
2.3.3 Disclosure and transparency
Disclosure lies at the centre of nearly all corporate governance statutes and codes. For
example. disclosure and transparency is one of the principles of corporate governance
issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
According to this principle, timely and accurate disclosure is required on all material
matters regarding the company, such as financial and operating performance, ownership
and voting rights, related party transactions, board composition and remuneration policy,
human resources and stakeholders, risk management, and governance structure (OECD,
2004). While few points of the required disclosure (related party and risk management) are
covered by accounting standards, most of these points highlight the importance of
voluntary disclosure.
Corporate governance rating systems, such as the Standard and Poor's corporate
governance rating, include transparency and disclosure as a key element in their rating
systems. It is commonly agreed that poor levels of corporate disclosure and lack of
transparency were the key reason of financial scandals around the world. Moreover
disclosure and transparency are the challenges facing the emerging capital markets and
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represent the key barriers of economic development (See: Berardino, 2001, eIPE, 2003,
Gul and Leung, 2004).
Dunstan (2003) shows four drivers of high quality, transparent and comparable financial
reports: reporting standards, corporate governance, external auditing, and enforcement. He
points out that all four aspects must operate together to ensure that high quality, transparent
and comparable financial reports are prepared. The first component, financial reporting
standards. represent the codification of financial accounting practices that entities are
required to comply with. The second is corporate governance mechanisms that provide the
internal control system ensuring that the entity discharges its responsibilities under the
applicable laws and regulations. The third is the external auditing process that represents
the mechanism through which an independent assessment of the firm's compliance is
attained. The final, and essential, mechanism is that of the regulators who enforce ultimate
compliance with the applicable laws and regulations. It is essential that all four
components of the infrastructure perform their respective roles for the quality of financial
reporting to be ensured.
One implication of the increasing attention to corporate governance is the growing amount
of academic research. Disclosure literature is one of the streams that has been extended to
investigate the association between corporate governance attributes and the extent of
disclosure. Recently, a number of disclosure studies examined the effect of a number of
corporate governance characteristics on the level of disclosure in developed and
developing countries. The next section reviews the relevant prior empirical studies. It starts
with empirical studies that assess the extent of disclosure and use firm characteristics as
main determinants of disclosure practice in developed and developing countries. Then it
will move to review studies that address the relation between corporate governance
25
characteristics and corporate disclosure. The pnor disclosure studies In the Egyptian
context are presented in a separate section.
2.4 Prior empirical studies assessing corporate disclosure and its
determinants-using firm characteristics
Corporate compliance with the requirements of accounting standards has been addressed
by a large number of prior studies that aimed to assess the level of compliance. The
majority of these studies use firm characteristics to explain the variations in the degree of
compliance. While some previous studies concentrate on compliance with both
measurement and disclosure requirements (e.g. Street and Gray 2002; Taplin et al 2002;
Samaha and Stapleton, 2008) other studies focus only on the compliance with disclosure
requirements (e.g. Cooke 1989; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2003). In addition, some prior
studies adopt a cross country approach (e.g. Barrett 1975; Barrett 1976; and Meek et al
1995) while others follow an intra country approach (e.g. Firth; 1980; McNally et al 1982;
Hossain et al 1994; Aljifri 2008). With regard to disclosure literature, several studies focus
only on the compliance with regulatory (mandatory) disclosure requirements (e.g. Tai et
aI., 1990; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Chen and Jaggi 2000; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2007),
while a number of disclosure studies focus on voluntary disclosure (e.g. Chow and Wong-
Boren 1987; Raffoumier 1995; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Barako et al 2006). However,
aggregated disclosure, mandatory and voluntary, has been examined in some studies (e.g.
Abayo et aI. 1993; Ahmed 1996; Marston and Robson, 1997).
A number of previous voluntary disclosure studies have focused on a specific type of
information. Examples of such studies include Adhikari and Duru (2006) who address the
voluntary disclosure of free cash flow information in the 10-K and 10-Q reports of samples
from the US, and Watson et al (2002) who address the disclosure of accounting ratios.
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The following sections review some pnor disclosure studies. Section 2.4.1 reviews
previous studies that focus on total voluntary disclosure while section 2.4.2 summarizes
prior studies that address the categories of total voluntary disclosure.
2.4.1 Empirical studies on total voluntary disclosure
Voluntary disclosure has been examined in a large number of empirical studies in
disclosure literature. The main point is to assess the extent of total voluntary disclosure and
to examine empirically its relationship with some firm characteristics that may explain its
variation among investigated companies. This section presents the selected studies in
developed and developing countries.
2.4.1.1 Prior studies in developed countries
In the United Kingdom, Firth (1979a) addresses the association between the extent of
voluntary financial disclosure in the annual reports of 180 companies for the year 1976 and
three firm characteristics: firm size, listing status and auditor type. The author uses
weighted disclosure index containing 48 information items. Univariate analysis was
employed. The firm size and listing status were found to be positively associated with the
level of voluntary disclosure. The results indicate that the audit firm is not associated
significantly with voluntary disclosure.
In another study, Firth (1980) examines the extent of the changes in voluntary disclosure of
companies at the time of raising finance. He uses six different samples of manufacturing
firms in UK. The first was for firms with new issues (40 companies), the second was for
small size firms with rights issues (60 companies) and the third was for large size firms
with rights issues (37 companies). The remaining three groups were used as control groups
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which contain the same number of companies: 40, 60 and 37 respectively. A weighted and
un-weighted disclosure index of 48 items was employed to measure the extent of voluntary
disclosure. The study concludes that the levels of voluntary disclosure by smaller sized
companies increase when raising new stock market finance, via new issues and right
Issues.
Using data from New Zealand, McNally et al. (1982) examine the association between
voluntary disclosure and five firm characteristics: size, profitability, growth, audit firm and
industry. The constructed index included 41 voluntary items were applied to 103 annual
reports for the financial year ended during 1979. The study employs rank order correlations
using Spearman and concludes that firm size is associated positively and significantly with
voluntary disclosure while the other characteristics were found to be insignificant.
In the case of Sweden, Cooke (1989) uses data from 90 non-financial companies to
examine corporate voluntary disclosure. He classifies the investigated companies into three
groups according to their listing status: 38 unlisted, 33 single listed on the Swedish Stock
Exchange (SSE), and 19 multiple listed. Using a disclosure checklist of 146 items, the
study provides evidence that the level of disclosure in the annual reports of the year 1985
differs significantly among the three groups. The regression analysis indicates that listing
status and firm size are positively associated with voluntary disclosure. The results suggest
that trading companies disclose information less than companies in manufacturing and
service sectors.
In 1991, Cooke condu cted a similar study with the annual reports of some Japanese
companies for the year 1988. He used the same criterion to classify the sample, 48
companies, into three groups: 13 unlisted, 25 listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
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and 10 multiple listed. Cooke (1991) examined the relationship between the extent of
voluntary disclosure and particular firm characteristics: firm size, listing status and
industry type. The study employs stepwise regression and concluded that firm size is the
best explanatory variable followed by listing status. Unlike Swedish manufacturing
companies, Japanese manufacturing companies were found to disclose more information
voluntarily than trading and services companies.
Focusing on an industry specific disclosure decision, Craswell and Taylor (1992) address
the decision of Australian oil and gas companies to disclose information in their annual
reports about estimated reserves. Using data from 86 companies working in the oil and gas
sector, the study applies univariate and multivariate analysis, the Probit model. Because the
study focuses on the specific item of disclosure, there is no checklist. The dichotomous
approach was used for this decision. The results indicate that the audit firm is associated
positively with the disclosure decision, while there is weak support for the effect of each of
leverage, firm size, cash flow risk, and the proportion of shares held by the top 20
shareholders, on the disclosure decision.
In Switzerland, Raffournier (1995) uses a disclosure index of 30 voluntary items to
investigate voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. The disclosure items
were derived from the Fourth and Seventh EU directives. Using the annual reports of 161
listed companies for the year 1991, the study examines the relation between voluntary
disclosure and some firm characteristics: size, leverage, profitability, audit firm, industry,
fixed assets, internationality level, and ownership structure. Univariate analysis and
stepwise regression used conclude that the firm size and internationality playa major role
in the disclosure policy of firms. The interesting point in this study is the use of ownership
diffusion as an explanatory variable of voluntary disclosure.
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Using a sample of 55 non-financial companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange
(NZSE), Hossain et al. (1995) address voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports and
examine empirically the effect of five firm-specific characteristics (firm size, leverage,
assets in place, type of auditors, and foreign listing status) on the total level of voluntary
disclosure. Based on agency theory, the study developed its hypotheses. Hossain et al
(1995) construct a checklist contains 95 information items and follow an un-weighted
approach to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure, the dependent variable. As with the
majority of disclosure studies they use OLS regression and conclude that firm size,
leverage. and foreign listing status have significant association with the level of
information voluntarily disclosed in the annual reports of investigated companies.
In France where the annual report was not mandatory, Depoers (2000) relies on agency
theory and limitations imposed by information costs to conduct a cost benefit analysis for
the voluntary disclosure practices in corporate annual reports. The study investigates the
effect of some economic determinants on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports of 102 listed companies on the Paris Stock Exchange for the year 1995. The author
uses checklist of 65 information items and follows an un-weighted approach to measure
the extent of voluntary disclosure. The economic determinants examined include firm size,
foreign activity, ownership structure, leverage, auditor size, proprietary costs related to
competition, and labour pressure. The results of multiple regression based on stepwise
procedure indicate that firm size, foreign activity and proprietary costs have significant
association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Depoers recommends future research to
investigate the interaction between voluntary disclosure and other non-financial agency
cost determinants such as corporate governance mechanisms.
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Firm characteristics as drivers of corporate disclosure are still the focus of great attention.
Gruning (2007) points out that analyzing the entire network of causal relations is necessary
in order to study the drivers of corporate disclosure. He argues that the driving factors do
not have singular impacts on disclosure only but are interrelated. Using sixty annual
reports from Germany and Poland, Gruning a employs structural equation model to
investigate interrelations between four firm characteristics as drivers of corporate
disclosure: firm size, cross listing, industry, and home country. The results of this study
show that the four characteristics are interrelated factors that affect corporate disclosure
quality. The firm size was found to have only an indirect effect on corporate disclosure. In
other words, firm size does not directly influence disclosure practice but that is mediated
by cross listing. Listing status was found to be the key element in understanding the
network of related drivers of corporate disclosure. Although Gruning (2007) highlights the
importance of the interrelation between the determinants of disclosure practice, the study
focuses only on four firm characteristics and ignores other determinants such as corporate
governance rules.
2.4.1.2 Prior studies in developing countries
Chow & Wong-Boren (1987) address the extent of voluntary financial disclosure practices
in the annual reports of Mexican companies. They examine the association between three
firm characteristics: firm size, financial leverage and assets in place; and the level of
voluntary disclosure. They measure voluntary disclosure by developing a checklist
containing 24 information items and employ both approaches of disclosure index:
weighted and un-weighted. Their sample consists of the annual reports of 52 Mexican
Stock Exchange listed firms for the year 1982. The results indicate that voluntary
disclosure varies widely among the investigated companies. The results of multiple
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regression indicate that firm size has positive significant association with the voluntary
disclosure scores, while gearing and assets in place were found to be insignificant
variables. The interesting point with this study is the evidence of significant positive
correlation between weighted and un-weighted scores. Such evidence has been used by the
supporters of un-weighted approach.
A number of disclosure studies address the relation between voluntary and mandatory
disclosure. Abayo et al. (1993) assess the quality of financial disclosure in the annual
reports of Tanzanian companies. They extend the attributes of disclosure quality to include
four measures: compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements, voluntary disclosure,
the type of the audit report, and timeliness in order to analyze the annual reports of 51
Tanzanian companies for the year 1990. Two disclosure indices have been constructed in
this study, a mandatory index with 88 items and a voluntary index of 44 voluntary items
according to user needs. Their findings indicate a poor quality of corporate disclosure,
mandatory and voluntary. The researchers explained these findings by the combination of
high compliance costs and the low non-compliance costs. In addition, the study reports
evidence of a weak positive association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
Moreover, they conclude a positive association between the type of audit opinion and the
timeliness of the corporate annual reports.
In Malaysia, Hossain, et al. (1994) address the association between the extent of voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports and some firm characteristics: firm size, ownership
structure, gearing, assets-in place, audit firm, and foreign listing status. They develop a
checklist of 78 information items and follow an un-weighted approach to measure the
extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 67 non-financial listed companies
for the year 1991 on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). The findings of the study
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indicate that both firm size and ownership structure have significant association with the
level of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. However, audit firm and gearing
were found to be significant variables in the univariate analysis.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) address the interrelationship
between the mandatory and voluntary disclosures in corporate annual reports. They
classify information items into three types: 23 mandatory, 18 items voluntary closely
related to mandatory, and 15 voluntary. Based on this classification, three disclosure scores
were computed from a sample of 68 Saudi Arabian companies (55 listed and 13 unlisted)
for the year 1996. The researchers employ Pearson's correlation coefficients and conclude
that there is no clear pattern of relationships between mandatory disclosure and the
different types of voluntary disclosure in the different industrial sectors. The authors
highlight the lack of high coordination between the board of directors and the management
in writing parts of the annual report.
Alsaeed (2006) assesses the level of disclosure in the annual reports of non-financial Saudi
companies and empirically investigates the impact of nine firm characteristics: firm size,
debt ratio, ownership dispersion, company age, profit margin, return on equity, liquidity,
industry type, and audit firm-on the extent of voluntary disclosure. He uses a checklist of
20 information items and follows the un-weighted approach to measure the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 40 companies for the year 2003. Multiple
linear regression analysis unranked OLS has been used and the results indicate that firm
size is the only variable that has significant positive association with the level of voluntary
disclosure while the remaining variables are insignificant in explaining the variation of
voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Saudi firms.
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Aljifri C~008) examines corporate disclosure in the annual reports of financial and non-
financial companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Using a sample of 31 companies
and an index of 73 information items, the study concludes that the extent of disclosure in
the UAE has significant association with the sector type (banks, insurance, industrial, and
service). Banks were found to disclose more than the other sectors. He indicates that the
reason is the significant role of the Central Bank's increasingly strict control of financial
institutions. Weak legal and institutional enforcement were suggested as reasons for the
insignificant difference in disclosures among the other sectors. Moreover, the study
suggests that the extent of disclosure in the UAE is driven more by regulations than by the
market since the size, gearing, and profitability, were found to have insignificant
association with level of disclosure. The study employs logistic regression (WLS).
2.4.1.3 Discussion
Concerning the determinants of disclosure level, the results assessmg the impact of
various firm characteristics on corporate annual report disclosures are mixed and provide
inconclusive evidence both in developed and developing countries. These characteristics
include size, listing status, leverage, profitability, industry, gearing, and type of audit firm.
Firm size and listing status are the most significant determinants of the level of disclosure
in corporate annual reports of developed and developing countries. The majority of prior
disclosure studies provide evidence of significant positive association between the extent
of disclosure and firm size. However, a limited number of studies report that firm size is
not related to the extent of disclosure (e.g. Malone et aI., 1993; Ahmed, 1996 and Aljifri
2008). On the other hand the disclosure literature reports mixed results concerning the
significance and direction of association between the extent of disclosure and other
examined variables in both developed and developing countries.
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Marston and Shrives (1995) reviewed the development and use of explanatory models in
32 disclosure studies and found that the results for studies that attempted to link disclosure
levels to leverage, profitability and audit firm were inconsistent. In this regard, Wallace et
al. (1994) indicate that this inconsistency may be realistic, they stated that:
.. The changing features ofprior studies, such as the number offirms included
in the sample, the type and number of firm characteristics examined, the
number of information items that formed the basis of the set of disclosure
indexes as dependent variable, the different statistical methodologies used to
analyze the data and the different settings (i.e., countries) of the study, have
jointly or severally contributed to the mixed results from these studies. As a
result, an investigation, in other settings, of corporate characteristics that
correlate with the extent ofdisclosure seems justified" (P.43).
A number of reviewed studies address both the mandatory and voluntary disclosure in
corporate annual reports. In this regard Kanto and Schadewitz (1997) indicate that while
disclosure literature provides plenty of evidence on the determinants of disclosure in
accounting reports, relatively few studies have focused on the differences between the
determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosures
Although disclosure changes over time, most of previous disclosure studies examine
disclosure at one point in time (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Tai et aI., 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls,
1994; Hossain et aI., 1994 and 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Ghazali and Weetman
2006). Therefore, suffering from bias may be one of the criticisms that face the results of
these studies (Hossain et al. 1994).
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A limited number of disclosure studies examine the extent of disclosure over a period of
time (e.g .. Marston and Robson, 1997; Watson et al 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman,
2003). However. most of these few studies select only two points of time, the first year and
the last year of the study period. The reason may be the availability of data (Marston and
Robson, 1997). These studies address the effect of specific changes in the business
environment such as new regulations. However, adopting a longitudinal approach covering
several years, study of the same companies may provide more explanations and a clearer
view about the trend of disclosure practice employed by companies. Marston and Robson
(1997) indicate that our understanding of disclosure decisions will be enhanced by
studying disclosure practice over time. Haniffa (1999) argued that the extent of disclosure
may not necessarily increase (especially for voluntary disclosure) unless some specific
events such as the introduction of new standards occur which in tum may force companies
to increase disclosure. The current study aims to investigate how the voluntary disclosure
practices evolve over a period of time in the Egyptian context.
Disclosure literature employs several theories as guidance in explaining disclosure
practices. Agency theory is frequently employed either alone or in conjunction with other
theories (Marston and Robson, 1997). However, many authors criticize the use of agency
theory especially with corporate governance and where a variety of stakeholders exist (see
chapter four). Nevertheless no one theory can fully explain disclosure practices and a
number of authors suggest that more work is needed to understand disclosure practices
(Hopwood 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Haniffa (1999) indicates that
disclosure theories seem fuzzy in the sense that all of them are logical and acceptable and
none could be voted as the best theory of disclosure. Chapter four reviews the most
common theories in the disclosure literature. It classifies these theories into five categories:
regulatory approach, economic approach (agency, signaling, and capital need theory),
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political economic approach (legitimacy, stakeholder, and political costs theory), socio-
economic approach (institutional theory), and cost-benefit approach (disclosure costs,
litigation costs, proprietary costs, and disclosure benefits). Identifying the relevant theory
depends on the emphasis of the study. Clearly there is overlap between these theories.
While some of these theories complement each other, such as legitimacy theory and
political theory. other theories seem to be competing, such as signaling and proprietary
costs theory.
However, reviewing these theories indicates that each theory considers disclosure from
different perspectives. While the economic approach focuses on parties related closely with
economic activities and assumes that individuals are motivated by economic self interest
only, the political economic approach focuses on those parties in addition to governmental
agencies and assumes that people are motivated by power and economic self interest.
Regarding the socio-economic approach, it assumes that people are motivated by societal
values so it considers all parties inside and outside the company. Nevertheless, there is an
overlap between the regulatory and cost benefit analysis approach on the one side and
other approaches on the other. However, it must be emphasized that choosing a theory
doesn't mean that it has some absolute superiority over other theories but it means that it is
suitable for the purpose of this research. In this regard, there is an urgent need to recognize
the effects of cultural on corporate governance and disclosure. So it can be argued that
there is a need for more research about disclosure and corporate governance using theories
such as stakeholder and new institutional sociology.
Methodologically, it is noteworthy that the majority of reviewed studies employ a self
constructed checklist and follow the un-weighted approach to measure the extent of
disclosure. However, the number of information items varies widely among the reviewed
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studies. Moreover, the majority of studies use OLS regression to examine the explanatory
power of the suggested determinants. However, caution must be taken in employing OLS
in disclosure studies since a number of its assumptions must be satisfied at first, otherwise
the results will be unreliable (Cooke, 1998). Regression diagnostic will be done and
presented in chapter eight of the current study.
2.4.2 Empirical studies on voluntary disclosure categories
It has been argued that analyzing the various sub-sections of disclosure provides an
opportunity to offer deeper insights into associations with different determinants of this
disclosure and to provide more specific theoretical explanations (Abd-Elsalam and
Weetman, 2007). Recently a number of disclosure studies have focused not only on total
voluntary disclosure but also on the categories of voluntary disclosure. These studies
follow Meek et al (1995) who classify total voluntary disclosure into three categories
according to the type of information: strategic, non financial, and financial information.
This section reviews prior empirical studies that address voluntary disclosure practice by
type of information.
Meek et al (1995) point out that existing empirical and theoretical literature have tended to
treat voluntary disclosures somewhat generically. They provide evidence of clear
differences across types of information as well as across countries. Using data from
different developed countries, Meek et al. (1995) examine factors influencing voluntary
disclosure practice in corporate annual reports. They address the association between
voluntary disclosure and some firm characteristics: size, leverage, multi-nationality,
profitability, country, industry type, and listing status. A self constructed checklist
containing 85 items was used to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports for the year 1989 of 226 multinational companies from the US (116), UK (64),
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France (16), Germany (12) and The Netherland (18). The study follows an un-weighted
approach to score the voluntary disclosure. The main feature in this study is classifying the
voluntary disclosure items, according to the type of information, into three main groups:
strategic. non financial and financial items. The results provide evidence that different
variables can be used to explain different types of voluntary disclosure. For example, firm
size was found to be a significant variable with total voluntary disclosure, financial, and
non financial information. But it was found to be insignificant with strategic information.
Also, listing status was important in explaining voluntary strategic and financial
information but was not significantly associated with non-financial information.
This study sheds light on the importance of analyzing voluntary disclosure by the type of
information. Such analysis of disclosure practice provides a great opportunity to regulators
and interested parties to gain more understanding of the motivations and determinants of
voluntary disclosure practices. This opportunity may be more important in the case of
emerging capital markets which seek more transparency.
Meek et al (1995) recommend recogrnzmg the importance of this refinement of the
analysis of voluntary disclosure behavior. They state (p.562) that:
"One reason for doing this is that the decision relevance of information
probably varies by type. For example, the strategic and financial information
categories have obvious decision relevance for investors. The non financial
information category is directed more toward a company's social
accountability, extending beyond the investor group to include other company
stakeholders as well. As a result, the variables affecting voluntary disclosure
choices may also vary by information type".
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In Hong Kong, Ferguson et a1. (2002) follow the model developed by Meek et al (1995) to
examine the level of voluntary disclosure practice of stated owned enterprises listed on the
stock exchange. The researchers examine the impact of international capital market
pressure on the voluntary disclosure of three types of information; strategic, financial and
non financial, in the annual reports of formerly wholly state-owned enterprises listed in
Hong Kong. They employ a cost benefit framework to develop the hypotheses and use a
disclosure checklist consisting of 93 un-weighted information items classified into the
three main groups. Their sample includes the annual reports of 142 non financial
companies for the year 1995/1996. The study examines the effects of firm size, leverage,
industry type, listing status, and firm type (local, H-share, Red Chip) on the extent of total
voluntary disclosure in each of the three categories. The findings of regression analysis
indicate that firm size is a significant variable with the total voluntary disclosure in each of
the three categories. However, the authors provide evidence from the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange that the level of disclosure by type of information varies considerably. This
evidence is consistent with the evidence from developed countries provided by Meek et al
(1995). Moreover, the study concludes that formerly wholly state-owned enterprises
disclose significantly more strategic and more financial information than other listed
companies.
Following the classification of Meek et al (1995), Chau and Gray (2002) address voluntary
disclose practices in corporate annual reports. They examine the association between
ownership structure (outsider ownership and family or concentrated ownership) and the
extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of manufacturing companies in two
Asian countries, Hong Kong and Singapore. They consider that the percentage of shares
owned by outsiders is the proportion of shares not held by insiders, namely directors and
dominant shareholders. Agency theory has been employed to develop their hypotheses.
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Using a disclosure index of 113 voluntary disclosure items - based on Meek et al (1995)-
and following an un-weighted approach, they examine 122 annual reports for the year 1997
(60 from Hong Kong and 62 from Singapore). In the regression model, firm size, leverage,
auditor type, profitability and multinationality have been added as control variables. The
researchers conclude that there is a positive association between wider ownership and the
extent of voluntary disclosure in both countries. In addition they indicate that the strong
prevalence of insider and family controlled companies in Hong Kong is likely to be
associated with lower levels of disclosure.
In Greece, Leventis and Weetman (2004) address voluntary disclosure practices in
corporate annual reports. They highlight the need to subdivide aspects of voluntary
disclosure and follow the approach of Meek et al (1995) to develop a self constructed
checklist of 72 information items. However, they use different labels for their categories:
corporate environment, social responsibility and financial information. Contrary to Meek et
al (1995) who classify information about directors as a non financial item, Leventis and
Weetman (2004) consider this item as strategic. Their sample consists of 87 annual reports
of non financial publicly traded companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange for the
year 1997. To score the voluntary disclosure an un-weighted approach has been employed.
Ranked regression has been applied to test the hypotheses related to seven firm
characteristics: firm size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, industry type, share return and
listing status. The findings show that the extent of voluntary disclosure in Greece is
relatively low (37.57%). Firm size was the only variable that was found to be significantly
associated with total voluntary disclosure and with each of the three categories. Gearing,
profitability and liquidity were insignificant variables whether with overall disclosure or
with any of the three categories. Other variables vary among the categories of voluntary
disclosure.
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In Malaysia, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) exarmne factors associated with voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports. They follow the approach of Meek et al (1995) to
develop a self constructed checklist to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the
annual reports of 87 non financial companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
for the year 2001. Their checklist consists of 53 information items classified into three
main categories: strategic, financial and corporate social responsibility. The researchers
follow an un-weighted approach and employ stepwise regression. Unlike prior studies that
use firm characteristics to explain voluntary disclosure and its categories, Ghazali and
Weetman (2006) examine the effect of ownership structure, board characteristics and
competitiveness. They assess firm size, profitability, gearing, and regulatory change. The
study concludes that firm size, measured by the number of employees, and profitability
have positive significant association with total voluntary disclosure and its categories
except corporate social responsibility information. Director ownership was found to have
significant negative association with total voluntary disclosure in each of the three
categories.
Another study that benefits from disaggregating the checklist is the study of Aksu and
Kosedag (2006) in Turkey. Based on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) methodology, the
researchers address the transparency and disclosure practices of the 52 largest and most
liquid firms in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The 2003 annual report and corporate
website have been examined for each of the 52 companies using a checklist consisting of
106 information items classified into three subcategories: ownership structure and investor
relations, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and management
structures and processes. To explain the extent of voluntary disclosure, the study examined
the relationship between voluntary disclosure and some firm-specific characteristics:
profitability, leverage, market capitalization, and market-to-book ratio. The findings
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indicate that the annual reports and websites are weak in terms of voluntary disclosure.
Firm size. profitability and market-to-book ratio were found to be significant variables that
can explain the differences in the overall voluntary disclosure and each of the ownership
structure and board and management categories, but not financial information. Also, the
regression findings indicate that leverage is an insignificant variable with overall voluntary
disclosure in the three subcategories.
Another study in Turkey, Agca and Onder (2007) addresses the voluntary disclosure
practice in corporate annual reports. Following the same classification of Meek et al
(1995), the researchers use a checklist consisting of 87 information items to assess the
extent of voluntary disclosure and to identify which of the following factors affect
voluntary disclosure: firm size, leverage, auditor type, ownership structure, profitability
and multi-nationality. They analyze the annual reports for the year 2003 of 51 non
financial companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The results of OLS
regression indicate that firm size, profitability and auditor type are significantly associated
with total voluntary disclosure. The results also indicate different determinants to different
categories of voluntary disclosure: firm size and profitability for strategic information, firm
size and auditor type for financial information and leverage for non financial information.
In a recent study, Wang et al (2008) examine empirically the determinants and
consequences of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Chinese listed companies.
They use an un-weighted disclosure index of 79 discretionary items and follow the model
of Meek et al (1995) to classify the checklist into three main groups: strategic, financial
and non-financial. Of 109 companies that constitute their sample, there were very few
numbers of firms that disclose non financial information. So they decided to omit the non-
financial information. The results indicate that overall voluntary disclosure has a
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significant positive association with the proportion of state ownership, foreign ownership,
firm performance (return on equity) and audit firm. The study finds that state and foreign
ownership significantly affect strategic information while there is no evidence of such a
relationship with financial information. Contrary to Ferguson et al (2002) who report that
firm size is associated significantly and positively with overall disclosure and all types of
disclosure, strategic, financial and non-financial information, Wang et al (2008) find firm
size associated positively with overall and strategic information only. Moreover, leverage
was found to be insignificant with all types of voluntary disclosure. Regarding the
consequences, the study finds no relation between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital.
In Italy, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) address the relationship between voluntary disclosure
and independent directors. They use a sample of 175 non-financial companies listed on the
Milan Stock Exchange in 2002. A weighted checklist of 74 information items classified
into six categories has been employed to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Unlike the previous studies, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) analyze voluntary disclosure
practices and its determinants on the level of six categories in addition to total voluntary
disclosure. The six categories are background information, summary of historical results,
segment information, key non financial statistics, projected information, and management
discussion and analysis. The findings of the study suggest that determinants of voluntary
disclosure vary among the six categories. The independent directors were found to be
significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure and with each of background
information, key non financial statistics, and management discussion and analysis.
2.4.2.1 Discussion
All the studies reviewed have followed Meek et al (1995) and address total voluntary
disclosure and its three categories. In this regard, it should be noted that the majority of
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these studies were in developing countries and adopt an intra country approach, while the
study of Meek et al (1995) was in developed countries and adopts a cross countries
approach.
Although all reviewed studies classify total voluntary disclosure into three main categories,
there are different labels for these categories. For example, while Meek et al (1995) use
strategic. financial and non financial information, Leventis and Weetman (2004) use
corporate environment, social responsibility and financial information and Ghazali and
Weetman (~006) use strategic, financial and corporate social responsibility.
Moreover, there is no agreement on the classification of some voluntary items. For
example. while Meek et al (1995) consider information about directors as non financial
information, Leventis and Weetman (2004) argue that this information is more closely
related corporate strategy so they classify it as a strategic information into the corporate
environment category. Also, the financial highlight statement was classified as financial
information in Ghazali and Weetman (2006) but was classified as corporate environment,
not financial information, in the study of Leventis and Weetman (2004). Furthermore,
some items in the non financial category in Meek et al (1995) are financial information,
such as amounts spent on training and the cost of safety measures. As such there is no clear
criterion to classify information items. It depends on the research context and the
researcher's choice.
However, all the reviewed studies in this section recognize the importance of analyzing the
categories of voluntary disclosure. Such analysis may be more important in longitudinal
studies that investigate the extent and trend of voluntary disclosure since it allows for
closer investigation of the disclosure practices of the different categories of information. In
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this regard, analyzing the checklist on the level of all sub categories - as in Patelli and
Prencipe (2007) - may be helpful in understanding the disclosure practices. The findings of
such an analysis may have some important implications for interested parties in an
emerging capital market especially in transitional economics. Once again the importance of
this analysis increases in a longitudinal study.
In relation to the determinants of voluntary disclosure and its categories, it should be noted
that firm size is the most significant variable when explaining total voluntary disclosure.
However, there are mixed results concerning the relationship between firm size and each of
the categories of voluntary disclosure. While Ferguson et al (2002) and Leventis and
Weetman (2004) found firm size significantly associated with each of the three categories
of voluntary disclosure, firm size could not explain the strategic information in Meek et al
(1995) and also was insignificant with non financial information and corporate social
responsibility, as in Chau and Gray (2002) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) respectively.
In addition, there are mixed results concerning the effect of other firm characteristics on
the extent of voluntary disclosure categories. This issue also raises a question about the
relevant theory that may be used to explain the variation in the extent of voluntary
disclosure categories. The results support the call to look for and employ a comprehensive
theoretical framework by combining some relevant disclosure theories. In this regard,
chapter four will review the most common theories employed in disclosure literature to
identify the relevant theoretical framework to the current study.
However, Meek et al (1995) indicate that additional factors other than firm characteristics
may influence voluntary disclosure. More recently a number of disclosure studies have
expanded to investigate the effect of corporate governance characteristics on the extent of
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voluntary disclosure. The following section provides an overview of these empirical
studies.
2.5 Prior empirical studies assessing the relation between corporate
disclosure and corporate governance
Recently, an increasing number of empirical studies have combined two streams of the
literature. corporate disclosure and corporate governance. However, it was argued that
prior disclosure research fails to explore corporate governance and cultural factors despite
their importance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). A number of studies have examined the
association between corporate governance characteristics and the level of disclosure in
developed and developing countries. Reviewing the prior empirical studies on corporate
governance and disclosure, studies are varied. While some studies focus on specific types
of disclosure such as share option disclosure, Forker (1992), and corporate social
responsibility, Haniffa and Cooke, (2005), others address the comprehensiveness of
information in financial disclosure, Chen and Jaggi (2000).
However. the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports has been investigated by large number of disclosure
studies around the world. Examples include Spain (Arcay and Vazquez 2005), Australia
(Collett and Hrasky 2005), Hong Kong (Chen and Jaggi 2000, Ho and Wong 2001; Gul
and Leung 2004), Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ghazali and Weetman 2006),
Singapore (Eng and Mak 2003; Cheng and Courtenay 2006), China (Huafang and Jianguo
2007), Kenya (Barako et al 2006), Ghana (Tsamenyi et al 2007), Taiwan (Guan et al
2007).
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Moreover, disclosure of corporate governance information in corporate annual reports has
been addressed by many researchers in developed countries (Anand, 2005). Examples
include Bujaki and McConomy (2002) in Canada, Parum (2005) in Denmark, and
Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) in the European Union. In addition Sheridan et al (2006)
examine the relationship between issuing corporate governance codes and the disclosure of
corporate news in the UK. The study provides evidence of an increasing flow of corporate
news following the publication of corporate governance codes in the1990s. However,
based on the request of the Inter-governmental Working Group of Experts on International
Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) in 2004, a series of annual reviews that
examine corporate governance disclosure practices around the world, especially
deyeloping countries, have been issued.
Corporate governance has been captured in disclosure literature by several variables or
characteristics of the board of directors and its committees. Examples include board
leadership and board composition (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak 2003);
independent non-executive directors (e.g. Chen and Jaggi, 2000); and audit committee (e.g.
Ho and Wong 2001; Carcello and Neal 2003; and Barako et al 2006). Although ownership
structure has been examined as an explanatory variable of disclosure level in prior
disclosure studies (e.g. Raffournier, 1995 in Switzerland and Depoers, 2000 in France), the
increasing attention to corporate governance has added to its importance. Several types of
ownership have been addressed, such as managerial ownership (Yuan and Xiao 2007 and
Guan et al 2007), institutional ownership (Haniffa and Cooke 2002), outside ownership
(Chen and Jaggi 2000), governmental ownership (Naser et al. 2002), and block-holder
ownership (Eng and Mak 2003). However, the evidence from prior studies is mixed. Table
2-2 summarizes some empirical studies. The following paragraphs present an overview of
the common attributes of corporate governance in disclosure studies.
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tdte discilationshio betthddTable 2.2 Stud" ~ I I I - ...,- -
Study Country Sample size Checklist items Independent variables Results
Size" industry membership, The emphasis on stakeholder
complexity, industry management, relevance of
Boesso and Italy and 72 Content analysis volatility, corporate intangible asset, market complexityKumar (2007) USA companies governance structure, and information needs affect the
stakeholder engagement, volume and the quality of voluntary
intangible assets. disclosure.
37 information Managerial ownership, Block holders ownership associateditem for the45 listed block holder ownership, negatively while institutionalGuan et al annual reportTaiwan institutional ownership, ownership and directors ownership(2007) company and 20 item for2003 directors ownership and associated positively with disclosure
the website
outside directors level.information
Role duality, independent Block-holder ownership, foreign
559 Listed 30 voluntary director, foreign listing, listing ownership and independentHuafang and block-holder ownership, directors associate positively withChina compames, items, un-Jianguo (2007) managerial ownership, state voluntary disclosure.2002 weighted
ownership, legal person While role duality is negatively
ownership. associated wit voluntary disclosure.
Positive association between board
Lim et al Australia 181 67 voluntary Ratio of independent composition and VD. Independent(2007) . items directors to total board size . boards disclose more forwardcompanies
looking and strategic information.
Independent directors, Independent directors were found tobe significantly associated with totalPatelli and ownership diffusion, firm175 listed 74 items in six voluntary disclosure, backgroundPrencipe Italy size, profitability,
companies categories information, key non financial(2007) leverage, and labor
statistics, and managementpressure. discussion and analysis.
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Ownership structure and firm size
Tsamenyi et al. 22 listed 36 information Ownership structure, associate significantly withGhana dispersion of shareholding, Corporate disclosure.(2007) companies items2001-2002 firm size, and leverage. Leverage was found to be
insignificant.
364 non 60 unweighted With low degree of competitionYuan and Xiao Managerial ownership, managerial ownership associatedChina financial information(2007) competition degree. negatively with voluntary
comparues items disclosure.
Barako et al Board composition, Board Voluntary disclosure associated
(2006) 43 listed 47 voluntary leadership, Board size, positively with audit committee,
Kenya companies items Audit committee. institutional and foreign ownership
1992-2001 Weighted scores Blockholder, foreign and but negatively with the proportion
institutional ownership. of non-executives.
Cheng and 104 listed Board size, Board independence has positive72 voluntary role duality, independent association with voluntaryCourtenay Singapore companies items directors and disclosure while role duality and(2006) (2000)
regulatory regime. board size are insignificant.
Ownership structure
(shares owned by top 10
shareholders, number of
shareholders, director
ownership, and Director ownership and theGhazali and 87 listed 53 voluntary governmental ownership) proportion of family members onWeetman Malaysia . disclosure items Family members on thecompanies
the board associated negatively with(2006) 2001 unweighted board, ratio of NED, role
voluntary disclosure.duality, market share,
concentration ratio, firm
size, profitability, gearing
and regulatory change.
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Role duality is negatively associated
Gul and Leung Hong 385 firm 43 voluntary Board leadership, expert with voluntary disclosures but this is
moderated by the expertise of non-(2004) Kong observations items outsiders
executives moderates the CEO
duality/
Industry, audit firm, size,
outside directors, Size, leverage, outside directors,profitability, governmentalEng & Mak 158 listed 46 weighted managerial ownership, andSingapore ownership, leverage,(2003) companies disclosure items governmental ownership were found
analyst following,
significant.
managerial ownership, and
block ownership.
Ownership structure, asset There is significant positive
association between disclosure andin place, size, profitability, Size, profitability, assets in place,industry, role duality,Haniffa & 138 listed 65 voluntary foreign investors, ownership by topMalaysia family members, auditCooke (2002) companies disclosure items ten shareholders, diversification.firm, listing status, cross
significant negative association withdirectorships, qualification industry, independent chair, and
of directors, complexity. family members on the board.
Family members, audit
Ho & Wong Hong 98 listed 20 voluntary committee, independent Family members, audit committee,. directors, role duality, size and industry were found(2001) Kong companies disclosure items
assets in place, leverage, significant.
industry, and size.
Size, liquidity, audit firm,
independent directors, Size, independent directors,Chen & Jaggi Hong 87 listed 30 weighted family company, gearing, profitability, non family, and(2000) Kong companies mandatory items outside ownership,
conglomerate were significant.profitability, sales, market
capitalization.
51
2.5.1 Board Characteristics
It is commonly argued that the board of directors has a pivotal position in the structure of
corporate governance. The directors are responsible for the governance of their companies
and therefore they are not only agents of a company, as a natural person, but they are also
its trustees (Crowther and Jatana, 2005).
Board leadership (Role duality) a large number of reviewed disclosure studies addresses the
relationship between corporate disclosure and role duality. The majority of these studies
are based on the perspective of agency theory. In other words, role duality may constrain
board independence and impair the board's oversight and governance roles which include
corporate disclosure policies. Forker (1992) indicates that separation of the roles of chair
and CEO may enhance monitoring quality and improve reporting quality.
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) recommends that large companies should separate
the roles of CEO and chairman. In the US, Imhoff (2003) suggests that SEC must prohibit
the CEO or any other past or current top manager of the corporation from acting as
chairman of the board of directors, from being involved in any way in the nomination of
directors, or from being responsible for setting the board's agenda and meeting
requirements.
Gul and Leung (2004) examine the relation between role duality and voluntary disclosure
in Hong Kong. Their study has been extended to address the effect of the expertise of non-
executive directors on the relationship between role duality and voluntary disclosure. They
control for managerial ownership and audit quality. The study indicates that there is a
negative association between role duality and voluntary disclosure. However, the study
pointed out that the expertise of non-executive directors moderates the negative association
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between role duality and voluntary disclosure. Gul and Leung (2004) argue that corporate
boards with a higher proportion of expert non-executive directors are expected to be more
effective in board monitoring and encouraging higher levels of corporate transparency.
They measure the expertise of outside directors in terms of whether the independent non-
executive directors hold outside directorships of other' 'unconnected" listed companies. In
this regard, the idea of recognizing the qualifications of members on the board is valuable.
However, it may be better to use proxies other than cross holding directorships to capture
the qualifications of non-executive directors.
However, the evidence from prior disclosure studies is mixed. Role duality was found to
have negative association with voluntary disclosure in Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002)
and Hong Kong (Gul and Leung, 2004). On the other hand, some studies conclude that role
duality is not associated with the level of voluntary disclosure (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005
in Spain: Cheng and Courtenay, 2006 in Singapore; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006 in
Malaysia).
Board composition (Non executive directors) Concerning financial reporting, outside
directors may encourage firms to disclose more information to stakeholders especially
investors. Outsider dominated boards are less likely to suffer from financial statement
fraud and more likely to issue consistently earnings forecasts (Beasley, 1996; Ajinkya et
al., 2003). Chen and Jaggi (2000) document a positive relationship between the proportion
of independent non-executive directors and inclusiveness of financial disclosure. They
point out that this relationship is weaker for family controlled firms.
The issue of independence of non executive directors has been addressed by Clifford and
Evans (1997) in the Australian context. The researchers indicate that board composition
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can be represented by three types of directors; insiders, grey area and outsiders. Not all non
executive directors are independent. The study found that 35% of non-executive directors
in the investigated companies were involved in transactions with their companies (i.e. gray
area directors) which potentially threaten their independence. As such, compliance with the
requirement or recommendation of having a non executive majority on the board does not
mean that the company will not be controlled by internal management.
In this regard Crowther and Jatana (2005) highlight the internecine nature of non executive
appointments. They state that these people know each other as directors of the organization
before they are appointed. Therefore their independence is subject to question. Moreover,
non executive members who have sat on the same board for a long period of time are more
likely to have established personal relationships with the managers (or the dominant
shareholder) that they should monitor (Patelli and Prencipe 2007). However, this criticism
is increasing in developing countries, such as Egypt, wher e there is no clear rule or
criterion for choosing independent non executive directors.
In Italy, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) provide evidence of a positive relationship between
the proportion of independent directors on the board (as an internal mechanism of control)
and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports (as an external mechanism). To
address the real independent directors they exclude from independent directors those who
have cross directorships, i.e. members on the board of other companies, in addition to those
who have been members of the same board for a long period of time.
Lim et al (2007) examine the association between board composition and voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports of 181 Australian companies. They develop checklist of 67
voluntary items and follow the classification of Meek et al (1995): strategic, non financial,
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and financial information. The authors employ two stage least squares regression. In the
first stage they estimate the relation between the ratio of independent directors to total
board size and firm characteristics that may be related to voluntary disclosure. In the
second stage they investigate the effect of board composition, captured by the fitted values
from the first stage, on the extent of voluntary disclosure. Their results indicate a positive
association between board composition and total voluntary disclosure. The study finds that
independent boards disclose more forward looking and strategic information
A udit committee According to the best practice of corporate governance, an audit
committee should be established in listed companies. The audit committee is a subset of
the corporate board of directors and has the responsibility of enhancing internal control
procedures, overseeing a firm's financial-reporting process, external reporting and risk
management of companies. It also plays an important role by facilitating communication
between the board, external auditors and internal auditors (Klein, 2002 and Chau and
Leung, 2006). Capital market authorities around the world require listed companies to
establish audit committees. It is commonly agreed that the audit committee has an
important role to play in ensuring the quality of financial reporting (Felo et al, 2003). Due
to the increasing awareness of the important role of audit committee, a number of
companies voluntarily created an audit committee to provide more effective
communication between the board of directors and external auditors (Rezaee 2002).
However, the existence of an audit committee does not ensure effective monitoring of the
corporate governance or enhancing the quality of financial reporting. A number of
important points such as the experience of audit committee members, their power and
independence should be considered to ensure the effectiveness of audit committee. In this
regard incorporating non executive directors (outsider) into an audit committee is essential.
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Generally there is a call for more research of the effectiveness of audit committee
(Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes, 2007)
Concerning disclosure literature, a number of studies examine the relationship between the
audit committee and the extent of disclosure. For example, Ho and Wong (2001) provide
empirical evidence of a positive relationship between corporate disclosure practices and
the existence of an audit committee. Barako et al (2006) document evidence of the
association between voluntary disclosure and the audit committee in Kenyan listed
companies. However. information about audit committee is considered to be an integral
items in any checklist developed to study corporate governance disclosure.
2.5.2 Ownership structure
The previous sections indicate that different aspects of ownership structure have been used
as explanatory variable of disclosure practices. It may be worth indicating that prior studies
have divided ownership structure into several categories such as institutional ownership
(Haniffa and Cooke 2002), outside ownership (Chen and Jaggi 2000), Governmental
ownership (Naser et al. 2002; Eng and Mak 2003), and block-holder ownership (Eng and
Mak 2003; Huafang and Jianguo 2007). Generally, the evidence from most of these studies
indicate that there is significant positive association between the extent of disclosure and
each of governmental, foreign, and institutional ownership. On the other hand there is
significant negative association with managerial ownership (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Eng
and Mak 2003).
The relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure has been examined in
prior studies. El-Gazzar (1998) argues that large institutional ownership may encourage
firms to disclose more information voluntarily. Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) address
interim disclosures in Finnish firms and provide evidence of negative association between
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institutional ownership concentration and disclosure. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993)
and Mitchell et al (1995) examine voluntary disclosure of segment information by
Australian companies and conclude there is only weak support for the positive relation
between ownership diffusion and disclosure.
Moreover, it is argued that managers in firms dominated by outside ownership will provide
voluntary disclosure to reduce monitoring costs by outside shareholders. Ruland et al.
(1990) assume that firms with a higher proportion of outside ownership release earnings
forecasts more than others. Their results indicate that as inside ownership increases, firms
are less likely to provide management forecasts of earnings.
Chau and Gray (2002) examine the association between ownership structure, outsider
ownership and family or concentrated ownership, and corporate voluntary disclosure in the
annual reports of industrial companies in two Asian countries, Hong Kong and Singapore.
They consider that the percentage of shares owned by outsiders is the proportion of shares
not held by insiders namely directors and dominant shareholders. They conclude that there
is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure in
both countries. In addition they indicate that in Hong Kong the strong prevalence of insider
and family controlled companies is likely to be associated with lower levels of disclosure.
Eng and Mak (2003) examine the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance
on voluntary disclosure using a sample consisting of 158 firms listed on the Stock
Exchange of Singapore at the end of 1995. The study uses managerial ownership (the
proportion of ordinary shares held by the CEO and executive directors), block-holder
ownership (the proportion of ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders), and
government ownership to assess ownership structure. Board composition is assessed by the
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percentage of independent directors. Their sample consists of financial and non-financial
firms.
Eng and Mak (2003) focus on voluntary disclosure of strategic, non-financial and financial
information in the management discussion and analysis in the annual report. They use an
aggregated disclosure score to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure. Results indicate
that there is an association between voluntary disclosure and ownership structure and
corporate governance. While lower managerial ownership and significant government
ownership are associated with increased voluntary disclosure, different types of block-
holder ownership (individuals, institutions/corporations and nominees) are not related to
disclosure. Contrary to evidence from prior studies, the study provides evidence of a
negative association between the proportion of outside directors and voluntary disclosure.
Also, the study concludes that there is a negative association between debt and voluntary
disclosure. The authors point out that this is consistent with debt being a mechanism for
controlling the free cash flow problem, so reducing the need for disclosure.
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) address the relationship between ownership and voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian companies. They outline several aspects of
ownership, ownership concentration (the 10 largest shareholders), number of shareholders,
director ownership and governmental ownership. They conclude that director ownership is
significantly negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. On the other
hand they report that other aspects of ownership are found to have insignificant association
with the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Using a sample of 45 listed firms in Taiwan in a single industry, Guan et al (2007) address
the relationship between disclosure level and some variables of ownership structure and
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board characteristics, namely managerial ownership, block-holder ownership, institutional
ownership, director ownership and outside directors. They employ a checklist of 37 items
for annual reports and 20 items for websites to measure the extent of disclosure. They
document evidence of negative association of block-holder ownership with the aggregate
disclosure, while institutional ownership and director ownership were found to be
positively associated with disclosure levels. The outside director factor was found to be
insignificant. Guan et al (2007) use a checklist of 57 items: 37 item for annual reports and
20 items for the website. They evaluate each item by two researchers independently with a
score range of a to 5 and to reduce the subjectivity they use the average of the two
researchers' scores.
Based on agency theory and proprietary costs, Yuan and Xiao (2007) investigate the joint
effect of managerial ownership and the degree of competition in the product market on the
extent of voluntary disclosure in China. Their findings indicate that managerial ownership
associated negatively with the extent of voluntary disclosure when the degree of
competition is low.
2.5.3 Discussion
It is expected that the increasing attention paid to corporate governance issues will be
maintained into the future and that corporate governance issues will grow over time in
importance (Solomon 2007). Because of a wide variety of corporate governance
interpretations, there is an urgent need for a clear definition to corporate governance and its
components, especially for developing countries that have different cultures and emerging
capital markets. In this regard it may be acceptable to use the broad definition. However,
the successful application of corporate governance in emerging capital markets or
developing countries needs to take into consideration the nature of different mechanisms
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and institutions, either on the macro or micro level, that govern the behavior of managers
as an agent.
In addition there is a need to use other theories beside agency theory to study the relation
between corporate governance and disclosure. Developing countries have some specific
features that must be taken into consideration. For example a large number of companies in
developing countries are family controlled. Ho and Wong (2001), and Haniffa and Cooke
(2002) provide evidence of a significant negative association between voluntary disclosure
and the proportion of family members on the board. Culture factors may help in
understanding corporate governance and disclosure practices. In addition to unfamiliarity
with corporate governance and audit committee in developing countries, there are
dominant board characteristics; such as role duality and board composition; that may affect
the applicability of corporate governance.
Although there is increasing attention to corporate governance around the world especially
in emerging capital markets, most prior studies were in Asian countries. There is a lack of
empirical studies concerning the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
disclosure in the Middle East and North Africa countries (MENA).
Most prior studies use a single point of time, one year; it may be helpful to address the
impact of corporate governance on disclosure over several years, especially in emerging
capital markets such as Egypt, to understand how it evolves over time. The following
section summarizes the prior disclosure studies in the Egyptian context.
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2.6 Prior disclosure studies in the Egyptian context
Although the increasing attention to transparency and corporate governance in Egypt as an
emerging capital market, the international published research on disclosure practice of
Egyptian listed companies is limited. However, a number of studies address disclosure
practices in the Egyptian context. This section reviews previous disclosure studies in the
Egyptian capital market in order to identify the gap that this current study aims to fill.
While most of these studies focus on mandatory disclosure (Dahawy et al 2002; Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman 2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2007), Hassan et al (2006)
address the mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices. Samaha and Stapleton (2008)
examine the extent of compliance with measurement and disclosure requirements. More
recently Rizk et al (2008) investigate one type of voluntary disclosure, corporate social
responsibility.
Dahawy et al (2002) highlight the conflict between lAS disclosure requirements and the
secretive culture in Egypt. They carried out an in-depth analysis of the financial statements
of three newly privatized Egyptian companies, two years prior to privatization and one
year after. The three companies operate in one sector, infrastructure sector. In addition, the
authors consider five international accounting standards, No.1, 5, 8, 21, and 25. The results
indicate that the extent of disclosure in the annual reports is considerably lower than the
lAS's requirements. Based on Hofstede's model (1984) and Gray's model (1988), The
study points out that Egyptian culture is characterized by statutory control; uniformity;
secrecy; and conservatism. The study concludes that Egyptian culture and socio-economic
factors had a significant effect on the implementation of lASs.
However, the study focuses on three privatized companies in one sector only, which raises
a question about the generalization of the results to the private sector and the Egyptian
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market as a whole. Moreover, the period after privatization, one year, may not be enough
to conclude that the non-compliance is due to cultural values. The efficient application may
be a function of other factors such as enforcement, accounting knowledge of the preparers
and auditors, and the familiarity with new requirements.
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) address the effect of relative familiarity and language
accessibility on the extent of mandatory disclosures in the annual reports of listed non
financial companies in Egypt when lASs were first introduced. They use sample of 72
companies for the year 1995/1996. Consistent with the results from other developing
countries. e.g. Wallace, 1987; Tai et al 1990; Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995, the study
indicates a lack of full compliance. Interestingly, the study concludes that the relative
familiarity and language barriers have had an impact on corporate disclosure practice.
However, the study focused only on mandatory disclosure not voluntary disclosure. In
addition it focused on one point of time, the first year of lAS's application. Nevertheless,
the results of this study raise questions about the effect of familiarity on each of corporate
governance, as a new concept, and voluntary disclosure practices in emerging capital
markets.
Hassan et al (2006) investigate disclosure practice and its determinants by non-financial
listed companies over the period 1995 to 2002 in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Using an
un-weighted disclosure index, the study addresses mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
The study indicates that disclosure level has increased gradually over the period of study.
It is the first study that examines the extent of voluntary disclosure of listed Egyptian
companies. The study considers mandatory items of information that show volatility in
disclosure over time to be voluntary disclosure. It uses a compliance ratio 78% as the cut
point. As such, the voluntary disclosure index used in this study is based on mandatory
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items with low compliance ratio and voluntary items of information. However, the low
compliance ratio of a mandatory item does not change the compulsory nature of this item.
Such cases of non compliance with mandatory rules may be considered as a form of
voluntary compliance not voluntary disclosure (Wallace and Naser, 1995). A voluntary
disclosure index based on such a procedure may explain the high voluntary disclosure
score (480/0) compared with other studies in emerging capital markets, such as 28% and
31.3% in the Saudi and Malaysian stock exchanges (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003 and
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2007) address the mandatory disclosure practices in a period
of complex changes. They use annual reports of non financial listed companies in Egypt
for the years 1991/92 (20 companies) and 1995/96 (72 companies) to examine the effect of
the complex regulatory changes occurring in Egypt in the first of 1990s especially issuing
the new capital market law in 1992. They use a checklist of 241 financial and non financial
mandatory items to measure the level of compliance with disclosure requirements. The
study classified the checklist items by the type of regulation mandating the disclosure and
by the location of items in the annual reports. The authors conclude that when introducing
new regulations a case of non full compliance is likely to occur. They find that the primary
problems lie in the aspects related to new regulation due to unfamiliarity.
However, samples used in this study may be not representative especially for the year
1991/92. On the other hand the authors highlight the importance of tailoring and analyzing
the sub sections of a disclosure checklist. They argue that research design should not be
excessively constrained by a desire only for replication and comparability with prior work,
especially when exploring issues specific to emerging markets.
Using a disclosure checklist generated by the CMA and the financial statements for the
year 2004 of actively traded companies, Dahawy and Conover (2007) investigate
accounting disclosure in companies listed on the Egyptian stock exchange. Their sample
was 15 companies. They find that the average of disclosure score was 61 % and they
explain the non compliance by cultural reasons.
However. this study use CMA' s checklist that contains a limited number of items. This
checklist does not include the disclosure requirements of lAS's that are mandated in Egypt
over the examined period. Moreover, the sample is too small and therefore it may be
difficult to generalize the results of the study. The study is an analysis of the disclosure of
the financial statements without an attempt to explain the variations of disclosure by some
explanatory variables such as firm characteristics and corporate governance rules.
Using the annual reports of 281 non financial companies for the year 2000, Samaha and
Stapleton (2008) address the level of compliance with the disclosure and measurement
requirements of Egyptian listed companies. The study developed a checklist of disclosure
and measurement based on a number of checklists developed by big audit firms and those
used in previous studies. Based on un-weighted indices, the study concludes that the
overall compliance is 50% for disclosure indices and 56% for measurement/presentation
indices.
Samaha and Stapleton (2008) noticed that the compliance level in some companies is high
especially when trading is active. They indicate also that some companies are prepared to
make voluntary disclosures to fall in line with lAS, even when this is not required by local
regulations. However, the study did not consider firm characteristics, such as firm size and
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cross listing, or corporate governance characteristics that might explain the variations in
the extent of compliance,
In a recent study, Rizk et al (2008) use a sample of 60 Egyptian manufacturing companies
to address the social and environmental reporting practices in the corporate annual report
for the financial year 2002. They employ an un-weighted disclosure index consisting of 34
information items. The study concludes that the extent of corporate social responsibility is
low. In addition, the nature of disclosures was found to be overwhelmingly descriptive.
Their findings indicate that industry membership is a statistically significant factor in
relation to the category of disclosure. In addition, Rizk et al (2008) found that government
owned companies disclose more employee related information than private companies. On
the other hand private companies were found to disclose customer related, environment
related, and community related information more than governmental owned companies.
Legitimacy theory was used in this study to explain these results. The authors argued that
increased environmental disclosure by private companies is a strategy employed by
Egyptian organizations to ensure/maintain their organizational legitimacy and perhaps
even to prevent additional regulations.
However, the study of Rizk et al (2008) is considered to be the first exploratory study of
corporate social responsibility reporting in the Egyptian context. While the study addresses
the effect of industry membership the sample did not include all sectors. It focuses on the
legal form of the company not the ownership percentages. In addition the study did not
attempt to explain the variations of such type of disclosure by some explanatory variables
such as firm characteristics and corporate governance rules.
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2.7 Conclusion: the Gap in the literature
Based on the above discussion, the following points can be identified:
While there are a large number of disclosure studies that assess the extent of voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports, the majority of these studies concern developed
countries and Asian countries. There is lack of voluntary disclosure studies in the Middle
East and North Africa countries (MENA).
The majority of disclosure studies cover a single point of time, i.e. one year only. Other
studies address disclosure over two points of time in order to assess the extent of
disclosure. However, a longitudinal study on a yearly basis that can trace disclosure
practices over a number of years may help to provide more explanation as to how
disclosure practices evolve over time. In addition, it will help trace the trends of disclosure
and the impact of culture and corporate governance against the backdrop of social and
economic development in the country (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).
Although there is increasing number of disclosure studies that follow the approach of
Meek et al (1995), there is no clear criterion for the classification of categories or the items
under each category. However, extending the approach of Meek et al (1995), by narrowing
the categories and by using more than the three categories, ma y help to explain the
disclosure practices and to provide a better understanding of the needs of several
stakeholders. Such extension is more important in the case of emerging capital markets that
seek to enhance market transparency.
Although there are an increasing number of disclosure studies concerning the Egyptian
capital market there is no study which investigates the extent of voluntary disclosure and
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its categories. In addition, none of the prior disclosure studies in the Egyptian context
examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on the extent of disclosure.
The current study tries to contribute to disclosure literature and corporate governance
literature through examining the voluntary disclosure practices in corporate annual reports
of Egyptian listed companies. The study is intended to cover four years that witnessed
increasing awareness of corporate governance and transparency in addition to some
initiatives such as establishing the Egyptian institute of directors and issuing the Egyptian
code of corporate governance. The rationale for using the Egyptian capital market and the
main changes over this period will be outlined in the next chapter that provides an
overview of the Egyptian environment.
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Chapter Three: The Egyptian Context
3.1 Introduction
To study an accounting issue, especially disclosure, in a specific country, it may be useful
to consider the nature of development and to get a brief insight into some aspects of the
environmental factors of this country. As indicated in chapter one the current study focuses
on the voluntary disclosure practices in the Egyptian capital market. Over the past few
decades, the business environment in Egypt, as one of the developing countries with an
emerging capital market, experienced a remarkable economic reform that affected
accounting practices and financial reporting. Accordingly Egypt provides a distinctive
opportunity to study the disclosure practices issue in emerging capital markets. The
purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the Egyptian environment and to
outline how Egypt is related to the current study. This chapter is organized as follows:
section 3.2 provides background information on the Egyptian context and outlines the
importance of Egypt in the Arab world and its international relationships. Section 3.3
presents the statutory framework in Egypt while section 3.4 summarises the different
stages of development in the Egyptian economy. The development of the Egyptian capital
market and corporate governance is presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6 sheds light on
accounting and financial reporting framework. The summary is presented in section 3.7.
3.2 Background information
Egypt is an Arabian country and one of the Middle East and North Africa countries
(MENA). It has a strategic location that links Africa and Asia. Egypt borders the
Mediterranean Sea, Libya, the Gaza Strip, the Red Sea, Sudan, and includes the Sinai
Peninsula. It is influenced by Europe, across the Mediterranean Sea. Egypt has a land area
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of about 1 million Kn1 and has a remarkable length of coastline, about 2450 km. In
addition it controls Suez Canal that links the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea and the
Indian Ocean (CIA, 2008Y. Such a strategic location is considered to be one reason to
carry out this empirical study in the Egyptian context, since Egypt could be representative
of Arab countries. African countries, and MENA countries. Egypt has been examined in
previous corporate governance studies in Arab countries (Harabi 2007), African countries
(Rwegasira, 2000 and Nganga et al 2003) and MENA countries (Saidi, 2004).
Figure 3.1 Egypt country map
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Egypt has the largest population in the region. Estimates from 2008 put the population of
Egypt at 81.7m. The main religion of the Egyptian people is Islam, with 900/0 of the
population being Sunni Muslims, while Coptic Christianity is the major non-Islamic
I https :llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.htmllast accessed on the 16th of June
2008
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religion practiced by approximately 10% of the population (CIA, 2008). Politically and
economically, Egypt plays an important and influential role in the Middle East and Arab
world. Regarding regulation, Egypt was the first Arab country to introduce commercial,
civil and other laws which go back to the late nineteenth century and to organise its own
national accounting profession and form its own institute of auditors. Furthermore, Egypt's
Stock Exchange is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world. (Abd-Elsalam and
Weetman, 2003)
'Egypt's economy has diversified beyond its traditional agriculture base, with the oil and
gas, consumer goods and pharmaceutical goods industries all now contributing
significantly to the country's economy. Tourism is Egypt's largest foreign exchange
earner. Over the last few years, Egypt has signed a number of agreements with the
European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). The EU is Egypt's largest
trading partner followed closely by the US. Along with these agreements, a large amount
of investment and aid has flowed into Egypt from both the EU and the US. Egypt is widely
regarded as the major political and cultural centre of the Arab and Middle East regions'
(NZTE, 2006).
The EU-Egypt Association Agreement came into force on June 2004. It includes
provisions for initiating free trade between the EU and Egypt. The UK is the largest
foreign investor in Egypt, with cumulative investments across a wide range of sectors
estimated at £10 billion. UK companies are increasingly looking to Egypt as a hub from
which to develop business in the region as a whole (FCO, 2008Y. The UK has identified
Egypt as one of the top 10 emerging markets, thus encouraging investors to invest in the
Egyptian market. Many investment and brokerage houses are operating now in Egypt,
2 Foreign & Commonwealth office http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-
north-africaiegypt?profile=intRelations&pg=4 last accessed on 16th June 2008
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including HSBC, Morgan Stanley, Citibank, Fleming, ABN-AMRO etc. (Abdel-Shahid,
2002).
Economically, it is significant that the Egyptian economy has been growing over the last
few years, and it is expected to continue. The real economic growth rose to 6.9% in the
financial year 2006 after the anaemic 3% during financial years 2001-2003. Total
investment is around 18- 19% of GDP, but private investment has been rising to over 12
percent of GDP. Foreign Direct Investment rose to $6.1 billion in 2006 (5.7% of GDP),
from $3.9 billion (4.40/0 of GDP) in 2005. Large capital inflows helped build foreign
exchange reserves to $29.6 billion as of July 2007. Despite these achievements the
Egyptian economy faces some problems and challenges, including high unemployment,
inflation and a budget deficit. While employment is growing, the unemployment rate
remains around 10%. Also, Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation has crept up since March
2006 to reach 12.40/0 in December 2006 - after falling for most of 2005 to some 3% in
December 2005 - before falling to 8.4% in June 2007. Moreover, the budget deficit
roughly reached 7.5% of GDP in 2007 (The World Bank, 2007?
These econorruc indicators, along with strong international relationships, highlight the
importance of changes made in recent years, outline the challenges that face the capital
market participants and call for more effort from the government and regulators. In this
regard the current study, investigating voluntary disclosure practices in corporate annual
reports over the period 2003- 2006, can play an essential role and may have some
important implications for emerging capital markets in general and the Egyptian capital
market in particular.
3 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEGYPT/Resources/EGYPT-ENG2007AM.pdflast accessed on 16th
June 2008
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Furthermore, the Egyptian culture adds to the importance of the current study, though it is
not a cross country study. It is commonly agreed that accounting and disclosure practices
are affected by national culture (e.g. Gray, 1988; Dahawy et al, 2002; Roberts et al, 2008).
Based on the Hofestedes (1980) societal values, Gray (1988) proposed and defined four
accounting values: professionalism versus statutory control; uniformity versus flexibility;
conservatism versus optimism; and secrecy versus transparency. While the first two values
are related with authority and enforcement of rules the last two values are more related
with measurement and disclosure. The secrecy versus transparency refers to the preference
for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of information about the business only
to those who are closely involved with its management and financing as opposed to a more
transparent, open and publicly accountable approach. In this regard, Egypt has been
characterized by a secretive and conservative culture (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007;
and Dahawy and Conover, 2007). In such type of culture a number of questions can be
raised about the disclosure practices in general and the voluntary one in particular. It is
interesting to address whether Egyptian listed companies disclose more information
voluntarily and which type of voluntary disclosure they focus on. Moreover, it will be
helpful to investigate the effect of corporate governance characteristics on voluntary
disclosure practices in such culture.
3.3 The statutory framework in Egypt
The legal framework that governs the Egyptian business environment includes several
laws. Like other developing countries there were western influences on the legal system.
Egypt has been influenced by both French and Anglo American laws, British and
American. The French influence was on companies' law 159/1981 which was based
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mainly on French civil law. On the other hand, the British accounting profession heavily
affected the Egyptian accounting practice through regulations; the Charter of Accounting
and Auditing professions of 1958 were affected by the British CA of 1948 (Abd-Elsalam,
1999). In addition, Capital Market Law (95/1992) was established based on the concepts
of Anglo-American common law.
The main laws governing the legal framework that impacts the concepts of corporate
governance in Egypt can be classified into two main groups: the first governs incorporation
of companies and the second governs listed companies (UNCTAD, 2007). Laws
governing incorporation of companies include (1) Companies' Law (159/1981), which
regulates joint stock companies, limited liability companies and partnerships limited by
shares; (2) Investment Law (8/1997) endorses investment in specific industrial locations or
economic sectors by offering specific income tax exemptions or tax free zones, and (3)
Public Business Sector Law (203/1991) governs the incorporation of public business sector
companies.
Laws governing public and private sector companies listed on the Cairo Alexandria Stock
Exchange (CASE) include (1) Capital Market Law (95/1992), the main law regulating the
Egyptian capital market in terms of monitoring the market status in general and
maintaining steadiness and growth, and (2) Central Depository Law (93/2000), which
maintains all registration, clearance and settlement procedures associated with trading
transactions to reduce risks associated with trading physical securities.
This variety of laws that govern companies in Egypt may affect corporate disclosure
practices, mandatory and voluntary, and could create a case of confusion for all
stakeholders especially managers and investors. However, the Egyptian government
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recognizes the need to have one comprehensive law instead of these laws that include some
conflicts that discourage more investment. Currently, the draft of the unified companies'
law is being discussed in the people's assembly. Studying the financial reporting practices,
including voluntary disclosure, of the listed companies may provide some important
implications for the Egyptian capital market and other emerging capital markets.
3.4 Economic development
Although this research focuses on the most recent period, from 2003 to 2006, it is helpful
to review the stages of economic development in Egypt through previous periods. In this
regard. four key points can be identified: the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the war of
October 1973~ the economic reform programme in 1991, and the 2001 initiative taken by
the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade (now the Ministry of Investment) to adopt the
best practices of corporate governance and to improve disclosure and transparency of the
stock exchange.
Before the Egyptian revolution in 1952 During this period Egypt was a British colony,
from 1882 to 1952. Cotton was the principal product and the private sector dominated the
economy. The Egyptian stock exchange was established in this period and was the first
stock exchange in the Middle East, starting with The Alexandria Stock Exchange in 1888
and followed by The Cairo Stock Exchange in 1903. Both of them were very active in the
1940s and The Alexandria Stock Exchange was ranked the fifth most active in the world
(Bremer and Elias, 2007). State intervention was limited to the provision of finance or
equity participation. Foreign capital was heavily committed to the banking and exporting
operations concerned with cotton and investment policies were liberal and investment laws
were enacted to attract foreign capital (Abd-Elsalam, 1999).
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Front 1952 to 1973 During this period the Egyptian economy was characterized by central
planning and nationalization. Socialist oriented policies were adopted and most foreign
investments were nationalized. The Egyptian government started a variety of big industrial
and agricultural projects which resulted in domination of the public sector (State Owned
Enterprises). The role of the private sector was diminished even in the banking and
exporting operations related to cotton. As a result of the new economic direction the
Egyptian stock exchanges were de-activated and stopped.
Front 1973 to 1991 After the war of 1973, an "open door policy" was adopted to attract
foreign investments. This policy is considered as a return to market economy that
encourages the flow of capital and technology by giving room to private sector alongside
the public sector to participate in economic development. Accordingly the Investment Law
no. 43 of 1974 "Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones'" was issued with some tax
exemptions. The Egyptian Capital Market (CMA) was established by presidential decree
no. 520 of 1979 in order to manage the stock exchange. In addition, the Tax Law no. 157
of 1981 and the Companies Act no. 159 of 1981 have been issued to encourage private
sector to form and list companies on the stock exchange. Considerable tax incentives have
been offered to listed companies; for example there was tax exemption equivalent to the
three months' deposit rate paid by the Central Bank on paid- up capital. These tax
incentives resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of listed companies over this
period but the majority of them were not traded (Bremer and Elias, 2007).
While this may be seen as a new stage of activation of the Egyptian stock exchange, there
was no great effect on the stock exchange activity that stayed insignificant until the early
1990s. In addition to the adverse effects of tax exemptions, the reasons include absence of
4 It was amended by law no. 32 of 1977 and replaced by law no. 230 of 1989.
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a governing securities law, inadequacy of financial disclosure, lack of protection of small
investors, and adverse economic conditions' (Ragab and Omran, 2006).
From 1991 to 2001 Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the Egyptian government
launched in 1991 a comprehensive Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment
Programme (ERSAP) (World Bank, 2002). The key elements of this programme include
the introduction of a privatisation programme, the gradual moving toward market
economics, the deregulation of interest rates and foreign exchange, and the introduction of
new capital market law (Rizk, 2006). As such 314 public sector companies were identified
for privatisation, partially or fully, and the Public Business Sector Law no. 203 of 1991
was issued to govern public sector companies with 51 % or more.
Moreover, the Egyptian government issued the Capital Market Law (CML) no.95 of 1992
which aimed at encouraging private investment, increasing investor protection, and
enhancing banks' role in stimulating capital markets through the establishment of mutual
funds (Ragab and Omran, 2006). This law and its Executives Regulation of 1993
introduced a comprehensive accounting disclosure package for the first time in Egypt
(Abd-Elsalam, 1999).
The comprehensive reform programme (ERSAP) has resulted in improvement in several
economic indicators. For example, there were increasing in foreign currency reserves from
about US $ 3 billion in 1990 to about US $ 21 billion in 1997, decreasing in budget deficit
as a percentage of GDP from about 18% in 1990 to about 1% in 1997, and decreasing in
external (foreign) debt from about US $ 49 billion in 1990 to about US $ 27 billion in
5 Egypt was placed among the most heavily indebted countries in the world when the foreign external debt
stocks increased to over $ 46 billion in 1986.
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19976 • Although the considerable economic progress in terms of creating macroeconomic
stability and establishing the basis for economic liberalisation and privatisation, progress
toward a market economy has remained relatively slow (ECA, 2004). However, the
Egyptian economy faced a series of crises and began to slow down since 1997. A
remarkable crisis was the liquidity crisis that is a result of external and internal shocks to
the economy, the Asian financial turmoil, the Luxor tourists' attack, the sharp drop of oil
price. and the attack of the eleventh of September (Hussein and Nos'hy, 2001).
From 2001 till now Due to the liquidity crisis and the decline in the growth rate over the
first three years of the new millennium, the Egyptian government decided to float the
Egyptian pound in 2003. This decision helped in mitigating the severity of the problem.
However, Egypt was aware that the successful economic reform programme depends on
the existence of sound financial regulatory framework, availability of credible corporate
information, and adoption of internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards
(World Bank, 2002). Therefore, there was increasing awareness and interest in upgrading
the legal and institutional structures to world standards. Egypt started to give due
importance to the subject of corporate governance in 2001 with an initiative taken by the
ministry of economy and foreign trade that started to install an organizational and
supervisory framework that governs the private sector performance in the context of
Liberalized markets (Fawzy, 2003 and Nganga et al, 2003). In this regard Egypt adopted
several initiatives to restructure the capital market authority and the stock exchange and to
reform corporate financial reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as accounting and
auditing standards and practices.
6 Egypt was rewarded US $7 billion write off of its debt to USA after the Gulf War.
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3.5 Egypt's Stock Exchange and Corporate Governance
As indicated previously the Egyptian stock exchange - Cairo and Alexandria Stock
Exchange (CASE) - is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world and the first to be
established in the MENA region. It experienced stagnation for almost 40 years through
nationalization and were revitalized in 1992 as one entity with two trading floors.
Securities are automatically registered in both exchanges and listing fees are mutually
divided (Fawzy, 2003; and Sourial, 2004). Currently, CASE is the only Arab stock
exchange with full membership of the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE).
CASE is a governmental body under the supervision of The Capital Market Authority
(CMA). It is managed by board of directors comprises eleven members: the chairman who
is named by the Prime Minister, six members representing trading companies, two
members representing banks, one member from the Central Bank, and one member from
CMA. In addition there are four non-voting members. CASE is responsible for monitoring
compliance with the listing rules, but it does not have investigation powers. CMA has the
power to veto CASE board decisions. (World Bank, 2001, Fawzy, 2003, and Abdel-
Shahid, 2003)
Due to privatisation and the reform program the CASE witnessed an increasing number of
listed companies since 1992. The total number of listed companies in 1997 was 654 and
increased to 1151 in 2002. The CASE achieved remarkable progress over the nineties.
Therefore it was included in the global Emerging Market Investible Index since 1996 and
in Morgan Stanley Index in 2001.
As the first Arab country to be assessed, The World Bank and the IMF reviewed in 2001
the corporate governance practices in Egypt against the OECD principles of corporate
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governance: rights of the shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, disclosure and
transparency, role of stakeholders and responsibilities of the board of directors. The results
indicated that 650/0 of the principles were applied in Egypt. The assessment identified the
following areas to be strengthened: disclosure of ownership and control structures;
disclosure of financial and non-financial information; training and capacity building for
regulators and the private sector; role and effectiveness of shareholders' meetings;
practices of boards of directors; professional conduct of auditors (World Bank, 2001).
To ensure the proper application of corporate governance principles, the CASE issued in
August 2002 the new listing rules and gave listed companies one year as a transitional
period. The new rules emphasize timely disclosure of corporate actions, financial
statements (annual and quarterly) as well as material events by issuers, prohibit insider
trading, encourage good corporate governance practices by issuers, require audit
committee, and impose, for the first time, penalties on issuers in case of failure to disclose
on time. The penalties include aggressive fines and suspensions from trading which
encourage many illiquid companies to delist. (Abdel-Shahid, 2003, Fawzy, 2003, and
UNCTAD, 2007)
As a result of the new listing rules, there was considerable decrease in the number of listed
companies. Most of the delisted companies were small companies and closely held
(Mustafa, 2006). At the end of 2007, there were 435 listed companies, down from 1,151 at
the end of 2002. However, there was significant increase in market capitalization during
the same period from LE 122 billion to LE 768 billion. The CASE was the world's best
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performing emerging markets exchange in 2004 and 20057 (ICC, 2006). Table 3.1 presents
the main indicators of Egyptian stock exchange over the period 2001 to 2007.
Table 3-1 Main indicators of Egyptian Stock Exchange over the period 2001 to 2007
Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total volume in (billion) 1.3 .9 1.4 2.4 5.3 9.1 15.1
Total value traded (LE billion) 31.8 34.2 27.8 42.3 160.6 287.0 363
Total number of transactions
1.1 0.8 1.2 1.7 4.2 6.8 9(million)
Average daily value traded (LE
129 137 114 170 645 1,176 1,488
million)
Number of trading days 246 249 244 249 249 244 244
Number of listed companies 1,110 1,151 978 795 744 595 435
Number of traded companies 643 671 540 503 441 407 337
Market capitalization end of year
112 122 172 234 456 534 768
(LE billion)
Market capitalization as % of GDP 30% 29% 35% 43% 74% 80% 105%
Source: CASE, Stock Market Annual Report (2007)
Furthermore, the CASE formed the exchange's Investor Relations and Corporate
Governance Committee, which is made up of representatives from the top ten CASE-listed
companies that are the best in disclosure and act as the blue chip companies to their peers.
The committee plays a communications and advisory role, and also sponsors events and
publications. It may be worthwhile to mention that most of the exchange's efforts to
promote transparency and corporate governance have been aimed at the top companies that
make up the CASE 50, which account for 80 per cent of trading volume. For example there
was a meeting with all of the CASE 50 companies to explain the role of audit committees
7 Newsweek magazine named it one of the world's ten best stock markets for 2005.
80
in good corporate governance. Some of these initiatives have subsequently been extended
to the CASE 100 companies, which account for nearly all of the exchange's trading. (ICC,
2006)
As a result of the legislative reforms, the World Bank, in March 2004, updated its
evaluation of the application of corporate governance principles in Egypt from 65% in
2001 to 850/0 of the OECD principles. This re-assessment indicates that Egypt is
continuously improving in the area of corporate governance (World Bank, 2004, and
UNCTAD,2007).
However, board responsibilities and disclosure and transparency were identified to be two
areas of weakness in corporate governance in Egypt (Fawzy, 2003; and Bremer and Elias,
2007). In his report 2004, the World Bank pointed out that annual and quarterly reports
miss some nonfinancial disclosure such as forward-looking information, risk factors and
governance. The report also noticed the slow adoption of audit committee. Regarding the
board structure, it was noticed that the chairman and CEO are same person (role duality),
the lack of rules that govern member's independence, and the relatively limited
accessibility of information by non executive directors. Table 3.2 presents summary of
observance of OECD corporate governance principles.
The report recommended that non financial disclosure requirements should be explicitly
laid out in law or listing rules and immediate attention should be paid to corporate
governance disclosure issues. Moreover, the report recommended drafting a code of
corporate governance, adopting the rule of 'comply or explain', and considering the
concept of 'independent director'.
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Such results and recommendations highlight the importance of addressing the association
between disclosure practices and characteristics of the board. The current study aims to
investigate the association between voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports and
board characteristics, its composition, leadership, and size.
The Egyptian Institute ofDirectors (EIoD)
One of the important Egyptian initiatives to strengthen corporate governance was the
establishment of the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) in 2003. EIoD is the first
institute dealing with corporate governance in the Arab region. It aims to spread awareness
and to improve good corporate governance practices not only in Egypt but also in the
MENA region. According to the Presidential decree no. 23112004, the institute is
responsible for educating and promoting the principles of corporate governance. It operates
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Investment and collaborates with many leading
international organizations such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation
(IFC), and Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). (UNCTAD, 2007)
The Institute organizes conferences, sermnars and training sessions on corporate
governance, targeting different categories including directors, auditors and accountants,
businessmen, and anyone interested in knowing more about corporate governance. EIoD
jointly with IFC offer a number of training programmes such as the 'certified director
programme' which is accredited by the Institutional Shareholder Services, fundamentals of
corporate governance, corporate governance in family-led companies, and corporate
governance for state owned enterprises. (Bremer and Elias, 2007)
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Table 3.2 Summary of observance of OECD corporate governance principles
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EIoD annOlUlces that membership will be available to different types of members such as
founding members, sponsors, corporate, and individual members that are interested in the
application and enhancement of good corporate governance practices in Egypt and the
MENA region. In addition, the membership extends to non-Egyptians who are attracted by
the Egyptian market and/or would like to benefit from the leading role Egypt has
undisputedly taken in governance and business practices.
Egypt Code of Corporate Governance As a response to the recommendations, the EIoD,
with support from the World Bank and the IFC, issued the Egyptian Code of Corporate
Governance for listed companies in October 2005. The code presents guidelines and
standards of corporate governance and written in Arabic and English. The code is divided
into nine related chapters that cover the following: scope of implementation, general
Assembly, board of directors, internal audit department, external auditor, audit committee,
disclosure of social policies, avoiding conflict of interest, and corporate governance rules
for other corporations.
These guidelines are to be primarily implemented in joint-stock companies listed on the
stock exchange, especially those undergoing active trading operations, financial
institutions in the form of joint stock companies, and companies that use the banking
systems as a major source of financing. However, companies are not required to apply
these rules of corporate governance. The code itself states that:
"These rules should be considered an addition to the corporate-related provisions
stated under various laws - especially the Law on Shareholding Joint Stock
Companies, Partnerships, and Limited Liability Companies issued by virtue ofLaw
#159/1981; the Capital Market Law issued by virtue of Law #95/1992 and the
executive regulations and decrees regarding their implementation. Yet, what makes
these rules unique and different from all others stated under the abovementioned
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lows is that the rules governing corporate governance are neither mandatory nor
legally binding,' rather, they promote and regulate responsible and transparent
behavior in managing corporations according to international best practices and
means that strike equilibrium between various party interests". (pA)
Moreover. the Egyptian code of corporate governance doesn't follow the rule of "Comply
or explain" though it was recommended by the World Bank and is followed in other
countries such as UK and Malaysia. As such the Egyptian code of corporate governance
suffers from lack of enforcement that may affect its implementation.
In July 1006, the EIoD issued guidelines of corporate governance of State Owned
Companies. The code introduces the principles of governing State owned companies by
presenting an organizational and legal framework within which such companies should
operate. In addition, the code focuses on the actions of the State as a regulator versus its
role as an owner. It also presents the principles for equitable treatment of all shareholders,
including the State as a shareholder, conflict of interest issues, disclosure and transparency,
and responsibilities of the board of directors. (UNCTAD, 2007)
In addition to training courses for directors of listed and unlisted companies, EIoD
organizes an annual disclosure award for the best annual report and the best website. This
competition began in 2006 to promote world-class standards in corporate reporting and
transparency. It is noteworthy that the winners in 2006 and 2007 are the same. The EIoD
stated that' the 30 companies ofCASE had participated in the competition and the results
were unexpected, as, it was observed that a lot of companies didn't implement or were
committed to the transparency & disclosure principle. While other companies were
adopting the principles for a great extent that commensurate the international principles '8
8 www.eiod.org/eiod-team/winner-en.htmllast accessed on the 16th of June 2008
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However. these results raise a question about the characteristics of companies with higher
level of disclosure. The current study attempts to answer this question.
To strengthen the boards of directors in regional companies and to ensure that corporate
governance principles will be applied properly, the Institute issued , in May 2007, a manual
for audit committees and launched a national campaign to update the corporate governance
code issued in October 2005 for listed companies. (UNCTAD, 2007)
As a response to the increasing awareness of corporate governance, CMA, in 2005,
changed its organizational structure to allocate a separate sector focused on corporate
finance and corporate governance. The new structure is shown in figure 3.2
Figure 3.2 organization structure of CMA
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3.6 Accounting profession:
Egypt has a history in the field of financial management and accountability, it was the first
country in the region to organize its own national accounting profession and form its own
institute of auditors. The Charter of Accounting and Auditing profession was issued in
1958. (World Bank, 2002)
The accounting profession evolved over time according to the economic development.
Over the period of nationalization and central planning, accounting information was
required for planning purposes. Therefore, the Central Auditing Organization (CAO)
became the public organization authorized to audit the public sector companies, and the
Uniform Accounting System (UAS) was issued in 1966 to govern the financial reporting of
public sector companies. With the growth of foreign investment in Egypt during the period
of open door policy, the number of accounting firms increased and the big audit firms
returned to work in Egypt. To be linked with international accounting agencies, The
Egyptian Society of Accountants and Auditors became a member of the IASC In 1980 and
in 1983 it became a member of the IFAC. In 1987, The Egyptian Institute of Accountants
and Auditors was established under the umbrella of the Ministry of Finance to Issue
Egyptian standards which were issued as recommendations. (Abd-Elsalam, 1999)
The Permanent Committee for Standards of Accounting and Auditing was established by
the ministerial decree 478/1997 in May 1997. It is chaired by the chairman of Capital
Market Authority and composed of nine members representing the major accounting
associations, the CAO, the CMA, the Central Bank of Egypt, and the General Authority of
Free Trade and Investment. Although official responsibility for setting accounting and
auditing standards rests with the Permanent Committee, the Egyptian Society of
Accountants and Auditors in practice has the main responsibility for drafting accounting
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and auditing standards. International accounting and auditing standards that are applicable
to the Egyptian situation were selected and translated to Arabic language.
The Ministerial Decree 50311997 was the first to introduce Egyptian Accounting Standards
(Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003). 19 Egyptian Accounting Standards (EAS) were issued
in 1997. One year later, in 1998, Egypt issued additional three accounting standards. To be
in harmony with the revised lAS, the Ministry of Foreign Trade issued, in 2002, (by
Ministerial Decree No. 345) three new Accounting standards. The first of these new
standards concerns with disclosure, titled "the presentation of financial statements". This
standard replaced three Egyptian accounting standards related to financial reporting, and
became effective from January 1, 2002. The purpose from these standards is to improve
and enhance the quality of financial reporting and transparency.
In October 2000, Egyptian Standards on Auditing (ESAs) were issued by the ministerial
decree no. 625. This decree mandate ESAs to audit financial statements issued after
September 30, 2000. International Standard Auditing (ISAs) will be applied to auditing
issues not covered by the ESAs. Only, six Egyptian Standards on Auditing had been issued
by the ministerial decree. It can be noticed that Egyptian Standards on Auditing focus only
on reporting issues and do not cover other areas of International Standards on Auditing
(ISA). However, ISA should be followed in the absence of Egyptian auditing standards.
To monitor audit quality and practices, practitioners committee within the Syndicate of
accountants was created by the Presidential Decree 323/2002. Its purpose is to establish a
strong monitoring and enforcement mechanism for improving the quality of audit.
As a response to the recommendations of the World Bank's Report (World Bank 2002),
the ministry of Foreign Trade issued a new accounting standard, in 2004, concerning the
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code of ethics for professional accountants and auditors. However, the new Egyptian
accounting standards (35 standards prepared according to international standards) were
issued, in 2006, by the ministerial decree no. 243/2006 to replace the old Egyptian
accounting standards.
From the above discussion it can be noticed that Egyptian government is aware about the
importance of strengthening the Egyptian accounting and auditing standards and make
them in line with international standards. However, we can notice that there was no change
in the mandatory disclosure requirements over the investigated period of the current study;
from 2003 to 2006. Therefore the extent of voluntary disclosure practices in each of the
four years can be measured with the same disclosure checklist that will be presented in
chapter five.
3.7 Conclusion
It is commonly agreed that corporate financial reporting as an accounting topic IS
influenced by a number of socioeconomic factors. This chapter presented an overview of
the contextual factors that justify the Egyptian context as an opportunity to address the
voluntary disclosure practices in emerging capital markets. It started with background
information, location; population; economic indicators; international relationships; the
influential role in the region, that underlines how Egypt is a good representative of the
MENA countries; where there is a lack of disclosure studies as indicated in chapter two. In
addition, the Egyptian culture; secretive and conservative; enables the research to analyze
and interpret the voluntary disclosure practices over the investigated period.
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The chapter continued with a review of the economic development stages and highlighted
the Egyptian economic reform programme and its effect on the capital market. The chapter
indicated the Egyptian government's commitment to enhance transparency and corporate
governance practices in the Egyptian stock exchange. It presented the Egyptian initiatives
to restructure its institutions and regulations which have been recognized by the World
Bank and international organizations. Such initiatives motive the research to address the
voluntary disclosure practices in Egypt. Also they provide opportunity to examine the
relationship between voluntary disclosure practice and corporate governance
characteristics which represent a recent stream of disclosure literature, as indicated in
chapter two. Finally the chapter reviewed how the accounting profession and financial
reporting framework have been evolved in Egypt.
Given the abovementioned analysis of the Egyptian business environment it would stand to
reason that a reasonable extent voluntary disclosure and corporate governance practices
could be expected from the most active Egyptian listed companies. Before presenting the
research methodology in chapter five, the next chapter clarifies the theoretical framework
of the current study.
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Chapter Four: The Theoretical Framework
4.1 Introduction
The preVIOUS chapters outline the subject matter of this study which is the voluntary
disclosure practice and its association with corporate governance. As indicated in chapter
two, there is a need for more research on the disclosure policy and corporate governance
practices in emerging capital markets in general and MENA in particular. Chapter three
presented an overview of the Egyptian environment as a context of the study where there is
a lack of published research about the voluntary disclosure practices. Before developing
the research hypotheses and carrying out the empirical section, the current chapter aims to
present the theoretical base of the study.
Academic thought in the accounting area was based largely on research which relied
primarily on neo-classical economic analysis, particularly, the neoclassical theory of the
firm that assumes economic rationality and market equilibrium. This theory was developed
to help economics predict behavior at the industry and market levels of analysis, not to
explain the behavior of managers (Scapens, 1984; 1994).
To overcome this criticism, a number of researchers use costly contracting economics,
agency theory, while others employ transaction cost economics. Both of them
acknowledge the importance of analyzing the nature of institutional aspects when studying
economic activities. While the first think about institutions as instances of market-like
contracting among individuals, the second considers institutions as alternatives not
instances (Ibid). Scapens and Arnold (1986) point out that although these theories
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recognize institutional variables, they still retain the core assumptions of neoclassical
economics.
A number of researchers in accounting literature, e.g. Hopwood (2000), indicate that there
is a need to use a different or broader view to study accounting topics. They support
explaining observed practices by examining their role within the broader organizational,
social, political and cultural dimensions in which accounting information is used. In this
regard. the institutional economics framework is considered to be an economic approach
that seeks to introduce into the analysis such social, political and cultural dimensions
(Scapens, 1994).
In the context of disclosure, as an accounting topic, it can be noticed that disclosure
literature employs several theories as guidance in explaining disclosure practices. There is
no comprehensive theory of disclosure and more work is suggested and called for to
understand disclosure practices (Hopwood 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia,
2001).
Regarding corporate governance, the case is the same as with disclosure. Different
theoretical frameworks; such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory;
have been used to explain and analyze corporate governance practices. It is argued that
corporate governance does not have an accepted theoretical base or commonly accepted
paradigm as yet (Parum, 2005). Reviewing corporate governance literature, it can be
noticed that agency theory and stakeholder theory are the dominant theories. Mueller
(2006) point out that central to any discussion of corporate governance is the question of
how well a particular set of institutions mitigates the various principal agent problems that
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arise in a finn. However, legitimacy theory was used to address the potential effects of
corporate governance and culture on social disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).
The current chapter alms to provide a critical review of the most common theories
employed in disclosure literature. For the purpose of the study, the most common theories
can be classified into five categories: regulatory approach; economic approach; political
economic approach; socioeconomic approach and, cost - benefit approach. Regulatory
approach is presented in section 4.2. Agency theory; signal theory and capital need theory
represent the economic approach in section 4.3. The political economic approach:
legitimacy, stakeholder, and political costs theories; is reviewed in section 4.4. Different
types of institutional theory are summarized in section 4.5 and followed by the cost benefit
approach in section 4.6. Finally, summary and conclusion will be presented in the last
section which provides the rationale beyond choosing the theoretical base in the present
study.
4.2 Regulatory approach
Two competing theories of accounting regulation can be identified: public interest theory
and private interest theory. Public interest theory assumes that regulation is needed to
correct the imperfections of the free market system and benefit the general public. On the
other hand private interest theory argues that regulation primarily results in assistance of
the profession, so it is a response to the need of special interest groups. While the first
theory considers regulation as a way to improve social welfare the second theory thinks
about regulation as a method to maximize the wealth of specific interest groups. (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2002)
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Taylor and Turley (1986) indicate that accounting regulation tends to impose constraints
upon preparation, content and form of external financial reports by bodies other than the
preparers and users of these reports. Advocators of regulation think about accounting
information as a public good and argue that without regulation the management may
misuse disclosure. On the other hand opponents of regulation argue that managers have
incentives to disclose information, e.g. to send messages to others, accordingly there is no
need for a regulation to mandate disclosure requirements (Ross, 1978 as cited in Lev and
Penman, 1990: Dye. 1990).
Although it is commonly agreed that information can be viewed as a good which has costs
and benefits. there is no agreement about the view of accounting information as a public
good. Some authors indicate that corporate information has the characteristics of public
goods which are: indivisibility; all users can use it without any effect on the quantity of
other users; and non-excludability; it is available for all users even who have not paid for it
(Coffee, 1984 as cited in Vlachos 2001).
On the other hand, a number of authors point out that accounting information combine
features of private and public goods. Using information by an investor to get a specific
benefit may reduce the probability of achieving the same benefit from the further using of
this information by other users (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In addition, Davis and
Menon (1987) indicate that it seems reasonable to presume that both public and private
interest considerations are present in any decision to institute regulation.
According to Vlachos (2001), it seems that the case for regulation is stronger for two main
reasons. The first is the failure of the opponents of regulation to develop a convincing case,
supported with empirical evidence, which is free from exceptions or restrictive
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assumptions. The second reason is the existence of some form of regulation in all capital
markets. Vlachos illustrates that the degree of regulation in each market depends on the
form of its efficiency as well as an array of other social, political and other environmental
factors. Scott (2003) classifies the governmental involvement into two groups; the direct
one through the laws and compulsory disclosure requirements and indirect involvement
through creation of securities commissions.
Taplin et al (2002) indicate that one crucial component of accounting regulation is the
profession's compliance with the industry rules. Non-compliance with accounting rules
puts more pressure and responsibility upon the regulatory enforcing function. They cite
Walker (1985) that without enforcement the production of accounting rules will be nothing
more than symbolic behavior unless it is accompanied by some program for monitoring
compliance with those standards, and for imposing sanctions for non-compliance.
Taplin et al (2002) conclude that the high levels of non-disclosure of compliance leads to a
call for more government direct intervention in the accounting regulatory process,
particularly with the need for more extensive disclosure of compliance with accounting
rules. Such direct intervention is consistent with public interest theories of regulation. A
number of authors support the view of continuing government involvement in accounting
regulation because a government is in a much better position to enforce compliance with
accounting standards than any professional accounting agency (Walker 1990, and Taplin et
aI2002).
Marston and Shrives (1991) distinguish between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. They
point out that the required disclosure is laid down by statute, professional regulations and
the listing requirements of Stock Exchanges. So, the extent to which companies comply
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with legal and regulatory requirements depends on the strictness or laxity of the
government professional and other regulatory bodies. Shaffer (1995) argued that the
possibility of benefiting from such compulsory disclosure requires a minimum of three
conditions: existence of a genuine economic problem, greater disclosure plays an important
role to solve this problem, and a basis for believing that requirements will succeed in
increasing the overall amount of relevant information.
However, Inchausti (1997) indicates that there are two types of pressures to which
accounting information is subject. The first is market pressure and the second is the
pressure from regulatory bodies. In this regard, a space for manager's incentives to
disclose more information voluntarily can be noticed in both perfect and imperfect
markets.
According to the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1980), developing countries are
classified as countries with strong uncertainty avoidance, large power distance and
collectivism. Gray (1988) developed hypotheses linking Hofstede's cultural dimensions to
accounting values. One of these hypotheses, specifically secrecy and transparency, is
related to disclosure issue; developing countries are classified as secretive. Thus it can be
said that the need for disclosure regulations in developing countries, which have emerging
capital markets, is greater than developed countries. In other words the governmental
intervention through accounting and disclosure regulation may be necessary to ensure the
minimum amount of information for public, by providing a disclosure pattern, and to add
some reliability of financial reporting. Such a pattern of disclosure will make companies
more familiar with disclosure requirement and provide the base or the threshold for the
voluntary disclosure.
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As indicated in chapter two, a number of prior disclosure studies have addressed the
relation between the level of disclosure and the change in regulations that affect corporate
disclosure decision. However, Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) provide evidence that the
formation of a new regulatory body had insignificant impact on the level of disclosure in
Saudi companies.
From the above discussion, it can be noticed that the regulatory approach, governmental
intervention, is more related to mandatory disclosure than voluntary. However, Dye (1986)
argues that increasing mandatory reporting requirements increases the incentives for
voluntary disclosure. Since the current study focuses only on voluntary disclosure practices
and covers a period without a significant change in mandatory disclosure requirements, the
regulatory approach is considered to be irrelevant for the purpose of the study.
4.3 Economic approach
Economic approach focuses on the goal of profit maximization and concentrates on the
interests of two parties only, shareholders and managers. Three disclosure theories can be
classified under this approach, agency theory, signaling theory, and capital market theory.
4.3.1 Agency Theory
One of theories that have been used widely in disclosure literature is agency theory. It has
been used in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational
behavior, and sociology (See: Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result of the separation between
ownership and management or control, agency theory has been used to explain the
relationships within organizations. The theory focuses on the relationship between two
contracting parties, the principal (owners) and the agent (managers). Such relationship
involves delegation some decision making authority to managers (Jensen and Meckling,
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1976). Therefore, managers have power to use the resources and consequently have all
information about the company. On the other hand owners; resources providers, have the
power to hire managers and need information to evaluate the performance. As such there is
a problem of information asymmetry. It is assumed that individuals are effort averse and
act in self- interest to maximize their benefits. So, the theory indicates that there is an
interest conflict; or lack of goal congruence; between agent (managers) and the principal
(owners); agent may take decisions that maximize their benefits but not necessarily
maximize the benefits of owners. Such confli ct requires a number of mechanisms to
measure and monitor the agent's behavior and, therefore, leads to agency costs
In the context of disclosure, information asymmetry has been identified as one of the
motivations of voluntary disclosure decision (Healy and Palepu, 2001). It can be noticed
that disclosure is one of monitoring devices used to reduce agency costs (Craswell and
Taylor 1992). The two parties may use the level of disclosure as a way to mitigate the
severity of the problem of information asymmetry. Managers have an incentive to signal
that they are acting in the interests of owners. On the other hand, owners try to encourage
and sometimes force managers to disclose more information.
Based on agency theory, many hypotheses have been developed in disclosure literature.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed out that there is a higher potential for interest conflict
between owners as a principal and managers as an agent in a widely held company. The
greater the size of the company the greater the agency costs. Therefore, agency theory
predicts a positive relationship between company size and disclosure. In the same way, the
theory predicts a positive relationship between disclosure and each of gearing, listing
status, and auditor quality. Chapter six will discuss this issue further. Examples of
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disclosure studies that employed agency theory in explaining the variation in disclosure
practices include Cooke, 1989; Ruland et al, 1990; and Hossain et al, 1994.
However, a number of authors criticize the assumption of agency theory that individuals
act in self- interest to maximize their benefits. They indicate that there is an overestimation
of motivating managers to act in the owners' interests. Moreover, there are internal and
external pressures that direct the performance of managers to serve the interests of owners
in addition to their interests. Consequently, it may help to reduce agency costs, or at least,
to mitigate the severity of the problem. Managers' reputation and the threats of bankruptcy
and takeover (the managerial labor market) constitute examples of this pressure. (Fama,
1980: Eisenhardt 1989; Ashton, 1991)
Moreover. agency theory ignores the fact that managers have significant motives to
conceal adverse information or artificially enlarge the firm's short term results in order to
maximize their benefits related to these short term results (Vlachos, 2001; Ghazali, 2004).
Demski (1974) suggests that managers may also have incentives to disclose more
information to differentiate themselves from more poorly run companies. Coffee (1984)
pointed out that agency theory ignores the fact that some managers have strong incentives
to withhold positive information. Ockabol and Tinker (1993) indicate that this theory fails
to account for non-financial motivations for suppressing disclosure.
Because of shareholders' interests can only be satisfied by taking account of stakeholder
interests, Solomon (2007) argue that theoretical frameworks that suggest companies should
be accountable only to their shareholders are not necessarily inconsistent with theoretical
frameworks that champion stakeholder accountability.
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It is widely accepted that disclosing more information voluntarily may improve the quality
of the annual report (Healy and Palepu, 2001; and Watson et al.; 2002). Given that
managers aim to reduce agency costs using disclosure, the agency theory can explain why
managers wish to improve their disclosure quality. Consequently, it can be expected that
voluntary disclosure practice will be associated with some variables such as ownership
structure, attributes of board of directors and firm characteristics.
4.3.2 Signaling theory
As indicated before, information asymmetry is one of the problems in business
environment. The concept of signaling was developed in 1973 by Spence; based on the
seminal paper of Akerlof in 1970. Signaling is a general phenomenon applicable in any
market with information asymmetry. The theory shows how asymmetry can be reduced
when the party with more information signals it to others (Morris, 1987). Similar to agency
theory, the signaling theory recognizes the separation of ownership and management and
recognizes that the market pressures motivate managers to disclose information. Managers
have more information about the company than others such as owners and investors. To
distinguish themselves from other companies, managers may desire to send signals to
interested parties; owners, investors, and governmental agencies. In this regard disclosure
is considered to be one of the means that can be used.
Not only companies with good news have incentives to signal others but also companies
with bad news or no information. Managers of companies with bad news may have
incentives to disclose the bad news to reduce the reputation costs that may be incurred if
they do not disclose this news in the relevant time (Skinner 1994). Also, companies with
no information may wish to distinguish themselves from companies with bad news.
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Furthermore, companies have incentives to continue with disclosing information to avoid
the adverse understanding if they do not disclose (Ross, 1979).
Verrecchia (1983) indicate that a manager's decision to disclose or withhold information
depends upon the effect of that decision on the market, the price of a risky asset. The
manager decides either to withhold or release this signal on the basis of the information's
effect on the asset's market price. He pointed out that there is an equilibrium threshold
level of disclosure. The manager exercises discretion by choosing the point, or the degree
of the information quality, below which he withholds his information, and above which he
discloses.
However, the signal must be credible; otherwise the subsequent disclosures will be
considered as incredible. Furthermore, the signal must not be easily copied by poor quality
sellers (managers). Verrecchia (1990) showed how a change in the quality of information
received by a manager affects the manager's threshold level of disclosure. He indicated
that there is a negative relation between information quality and the threshold level of
disclosure. The higher the quality of the information the lower the threshold level of
disclosure.
The assumption of signaling theory that individuals are acting in their own-self interest, as
in agency theory, has been criticized. Also, a number of authors criticize the assumption of
equal distribution of power. They argue that it is not individuals who exercise power but
institutions (Gray et al 1996 as cited in Watson et al. 2002). Furthermore, Newman and
Sansig (1993) draw attention to the difficulty of the signaling process when many parties
or multiple users are involved.
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Moreover, Ockabol and Tinker (1993) indicate that there is a question whether non
disclosure means bad news especially in a highly competitive environment. Non disclosure
in this case aims to protect the company from adverse effects not to hide or mitigate the
severity of bad news. Dye (1985) pointed out that even a company with good news may
choose to withhold information. On the other hand a company with bad news may choose
to disclose this news if the company is worried about the competitors' reaction to this
information. A number of authors indicate that the reason of non disclosure may be that
managers do not have information to disclose (Penno, 1997) or uncertainty about the effect
of disclosure on the manager's performance (Nagar, 1999).
The interaction between agency theory and signaling theory:
Morris (1987) concludes that agency theory and signaling theory are consistent and there is
a considerable amount of overlap exists between them. Because they do not share the same
necessary conditions, they are not equivalent, nor does one theory imply the other. He
points out that the sufficient conditions of both are consistent. The two theories recognize
rational behavior; information asymmetry (the necessary condition of the signaling theory)
is implied in agency theory; quality can be defined in terms of agency theory variables; and
signaling costs are implicit in some bonding devices of agency theory. He suggests more
research is needed to combine both theories to get more general meta-theory which might
improve the prediction of accounting choices.
4.3.3 Capital need theory
According to this theory, the main motivation for disclosure is the need to raise capital at
the lowest possible cost. To get capital more cheaply, either in the form of shares or loans,
companies employ disclosure as a means to help in reducing investor uncertainty, and
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information asymmetry. Alexander and Archer (1995) indicate that the mam role of
financial reporting is to reduce information asymmetries in capital markets, and so it may
improve the market efficiency. There is doubt about the sufficiency of mandatory
disclosure to acquire the cheapest capital (Core, 2001). Disclosing less information or non
disclosure may be more expensive (Meek and Gray, 1989). Investors may ask for
information risk premium (Barry and Brown, 1986; Merton 1987; and Suwaidan, 1997).
More disclosure reduces the cost of capital, reduces information risk, and improves the
share price (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Cooke, 1993; Hossain et al. 1994; Botosan,
1997. Sengupta, 1998; Healy and Palepu, 2001). In other words, companies compete with
each other on the extent of information disclosed and other incentives to get capital with
lowest cost (Meek et al.; 1995).
4.3.4 Evaluation of economic approach
Agency theory, signaling theory and capital market theory all are derived from the pure
economic approach. This approach suffers from some limitations. It is based on the desire
for income and avoiding loss (Bedford, 1973 as cited in Haniffa 1999). Consequently, it
concentrates on profit maximization as a main goal of managers and ignores other goals.
Also, this approach concentrates on only two parties of stakeholders; managers and
shareholders; and pays no attention to other interested parties in the society, such as
government, taxation authorities and consumer groups. Moreover, the economic domain
cannot be studied in isolation from the political, social and institutional framework within
which the economic action takes place (Gray et al.; 1995).
Crowther and Jatana (2005) criticize agency theory and consider it as a cause of failure in
corporate governance. Among the three main criticisms, there may be no relationship
between the principal and agent. They indicate that there is no requirement or even
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expectation that a shareholder will remain shareholder for extended period of time. In
addition managers under share option schemes may be considered also as principals.
Therefore Crowther and Jatana argue that the foundations of corporate governance in this
environment; the reliance upon agency theory as a mechanism for managing a business;
are problematic.
However. the criticism; no relationship between the principal and agent; highlights the
wider concept of stakeholder theory. Even if there is no requirement that the shareholder
will keep shares for extended period of time; there are other stakeholders that represent the
principal under this theory. Moreover, when a shareholder sells his shares he will convert
from shareholder to stakeholder and will stay as a principal.
Abdelsalam (1999) pointed out the applicability of disclosure theories in developing
countries. She indicated that the most common disclosure theories were originated in
western countries which have environmental factors different from developing countries.
In addition, these theories have been based on the assumption of efficient capital markets.
She concluded that both theoretical models of agency and capital needs appear to be
applicable to the findings of developing countries studies, but the applicability of signaling
theory is not clear due to several reasons such as: investors may be less sophisticated or
unavailability of data. However a large number of disclosure studies in developing
countries utilized these theories. In addition, there is an accelerated direction in most of
developing countries toward market economy and globalization.
Due to the limitations of economic approach, a number of studies employ the political
economic approach which takes into consideration the relation with society and other
institutions.
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4.4 Political economic approach
The political economic approach considers the issue of distribution power and wealth in
society. So, it recognizes the interaction between society, politics, other institutions and
economic aspects. This approach does not concentrate on managers and owners only but
considers other parties such as society, government, and other institutions. In an
accounting context it is assumed that accounting and financial reporting in a country is
affected by its environment (Cooke and Wallace, 1990). The prominent disclosure theories
derived from this approach are legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and political costs
theory. The following paragraphs highlight the main points under each of these theories.
4.4.1 Legitimacy theory
Organizations operate in society and their actions affect and are affected by a number of
environmental factors. Legitimacy theory is based on the notion that organization has a
social contract; with its society; where it agrees to act according to socially desired actions
(Guthrie and Parker, 1989). That means organization's actions are monitored by the public.
Legitimacy theory argues that organizations can only continue to exist if the society
recognizes it as acting within acceptable value system (Rizk, 2006). Based on this theory,
organizations aim to get social approval, in other words to legitimize their actions. (Patten,
1991; Mathews, 1993; Reich, 1998 and Deegan, 2002)
To legitimize its actions, company has four ways or strategies: (Lindblom, 1994 as cited in
Rizk, 2006) First, educate and inform its relevant stakeholders about changes in the
company's performance, secondly, change the perceptions of the relevant stakeholders but
not change its actual behavior, thirdly, manipulate perception by deflecting attention from
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the issues of concern to other related issues through an appeal, and lastly, change the
external expectations of its performance.
Watson et al, (2002) pointed out that two of Lindblom's strategies may be relevant to
disclosure of accounting ratios. First, disclosure of ratios may help educate and inform
users about changes in the organization's performance (Lindblom's first strategy). Second,
it may help deflect attention away from other areas (Lindblom's third strategy).
It can be noticed that disclosure can play an important role in each of these four strategies.
By disclosing more information voluntarily, managers can communicate with the society
and its stakeholders. As such, managers will try to legitimize corporate activities and at the
same time to legitimize their managerial positions. Legitimacy theory has been employed
in disclosure literature to explain disclosure practice. Due to the idea of societal
acceptance, the majority of disclosure studies addressing environmental and social
disclosure draw on this theory. The evidence provided from these studies support the idea
of using disclosure as a means for legitimacy (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992;
Deegan and Gordon, 1996, Deegan, 2002; Deegan et aI, 2002; O'Donovan, 2002;
O'Dwyer, 2002).
Although this widespread in environmental and social disclosure, a number of studies
conclude that legitimacy theory was inadequate to fully explain social reporting behavior
(Guthrie and Parker, 1989; O'Dwyer, 2002; as cited in Ghazali, 2004). Moreover, it may
be difficult to measure or qualify the concepts of society's values and ethics when forming
testable hypotheses. However, the social values in which a company exists affect the
manner used by company to operate and report its performance (Gray et al.; 1995).
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Therefore, it is assumed that considering social and political environment may be helpful
to address the motivation for corporate social choices (Adams et aI., 1998).
4.4.2 Stakeholder theory
While agency theory concentrates only on the relationship between managers (agent) and
shareholders (the principal), stakeholder theory considers the relation between managers
and all stakeholders (the principal); such as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers,
and government. Based on stakeholder theory, a variety of stakeholders are involved in the
organization and each of them deserves some return for their involvement. (Crowther and
Jatana, 2005)
Stakeholders can be classified into two categories: the first is a primary stakeholder group
which includes those who are essential to the continuation of the company, such as
shareholders, employees, suppliers, investors and the government. The second is a
secondary stakeholder group which includes those who are not essential to the survival of
the company, but they affect or are affected by the company; such as the media (Rizk,
2006).
According to this theory, managers should assess the importance of every group of
stakeholders and try to satisfy them. For the purpose of benefit maximization, managers
must work on behalf of all stakeholders not only the shareholders. Consequently,
shareholders will benefit, as the main stakeholder, on the long run. However, there are
contradicting views on this theory.
On one hand, Sternberg (1997); a proponent of agency theory; criticizes stakeholder theory
based on some points. The author argues that this theory is incompatible with business and
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also with corporate governance. It rules out the objective of business which maximizes
long term owner value. Also, the theory implies that a company should be accountable to
everyone not to their owners and encourages managers to violate their prior obligations to
owners, In addition, Sternberg indicates that balancing stakeholder benefits is an
unworkable objective and unjustified. Moreover, stakeholder theory undermines private
property and accountability.
On the other hand. Turnbull (1997) points out that there are some empirical evidences that
do not support the first two criticisms of Sternberg. On the contrary, Turnbull argues that
stakeholder relationships can legitimate and protect private property, agency, and wealth.
However. three aspects of stakeholder theory can be identified, descriptive; instrumental
and normative (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The first; descriptive; is used to describe
and explain specific firm characteristics and behaviors such as how board members
consider the interests of corporate constituencies, i.e. stakeholders. The second;
instrumental; concerns with the connections between stakeholder management and the
achievement of corporate objectives such as profitability. The third one; normative; is used
to interpret the function of the corporation and the related moral and ethical guidelines.
Donaldson and Preston (1995) state that:
"Stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified in the management literature
on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity. These
three aspects of the theory,· although interrelated, are quite distinct,· they involve different
types ofevidence and argument and have different implications" (p.65).
Under both agency and stakeholder theories, managers as an agent should act on behalf of
the principal; whether shareholders or all stakeholders. Hill and Jones (1992) have
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constructed a paradigm based on both of agency and stakeholder theories. They called it
stakeholder-agency approach. They indicate that this approach can be viewed as a
modification of agency theory; which assumes efficient markets and rejects the idea of
power differentials between managers and stakeholders; to accommodate theories of
power; resource dependence theory that assumes inefficient markets which recognize the
existence of unequal resource dependencies between managers and stakeholders.
Voluntary disclosure can be used by managers to communicate with stakeholders and to
acquire their support (Watson et al, 2002). The different stakeholders have different
priorities (Wolfe and Puder, 2002), and need different information. Moreover their ability
to get information is different. So, the effective use of disclosure policy, especially the
voluntary one, may help in building the trust with the shareholders and other stakeholders.
In this regard Rowley (1997, p.907) states that:
"Firms do not respond to each stakeholder individually but instead must answer
the simultaneous demands ofmultiple stakeholders JJ
To deal with this issue, managers should consider a number of points such as information
cost and competition degree. In addition, the power held by a stakeholder will affect the
disclosure decision (Mitchell et al, 1997). That means managers must make a balance, or
tradeoffs between the stakeholders' information needs. Rizk (2006) indicates that,
stakeholder theory may be particularly relevant in developing countries, transitional
economies and highly regulated industries. To address the voluntary disclosure practice,
one should consider the different types of voluntary disclosure which may aim to satisfy
the stakeholder's information needs.
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-t.-t.3 Political costs theory
According to political costs theory companies that are more sensitive to political pressures
will adopt accounting choices that reduce expected political costs (Watts and Zimmerman
1978). A number of studies employ political costs theory to explain voluntary disclosure.
Based on this theory it is assumed that there is positive association between disclosure and
sensitivity to political pressures. Although Watts and Zimmerman (1978) acknowledge
company size as a noisy proxy for political sensitivity, a number of studies use company
size as a proxy for political costs. However, some studies indicate that industry sensitivity
may be a proxy for political costs (Patten, 1991; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; and Patten
and Nance, 1998)
Milne (2002) reviews social and voluntary disclosure studies that have relied on positive
accounting theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1978), as a theoretical base. He notes that none
of the studies provide the full arguments of Watts and Zimmerman as they relate to
discretionary management behavior. There were no studies employs all three hypothesized
predictors of behavior (the bonus plan hypothesis, the debt/equity hypothesis, and the
political cost hypothesis). Most of them only use the size or political cost hypothesis, and
therefore they must be considered weak tests of the original argument. Moreover, Milne
indicates that none of the studies take the opportunity to examine management behaviors
other than the chosen disclosure variable that one might expect to exist if self-interested
income reducing strategies were being adopted as hypothesized.
According to Milne (2002), the arguments related to the purpose of voluntary disclosures
are not consistent among the positive accounting literature. For example, Belkaoui and
Karpik (1989) and Panchapakesan and McKinnon (1992) indicate that there is no direct
role for social disclosures. They consider disclosure as by-product of social responsibility
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expenditures, which in turn are argued to result in reported income reductions. However
other studies (e.g. Deegan and Hallam, 1991; Lemon and Cahan, 1997; Jantadej and Kent,
1999) focus on disclosure itself as management behavior. But they fail to argue how such
disclosures relate to reductions in profits. Consequently, they move away from Watts and
Zimmerman's (1978) original arguments and extend the notion of political costs. They
shape their arguments with other social theories of disclosure and so fail to rule out,
alternative explanations. Moreover, they fail to convince or provide any evidence on how
such disclosures might serve as a lobbying device.
Gray et al. (1995) and Milne (2002) indicate that positive accounting studies have little to
offer to our understanding of firms' social disclosure behavior. While Gray et al. (1995)
focus on the assumptions of these studies to reject their arguments, the Milne (2002)shows
that positive accounting theorists have failed to offer any substantive evidence to support
the view of using annual report social disclosures by managers to maximize their own
wealth interests.
Milne (2002) conclude that in almost all cases the empiricists setting out to examine
positive accounting theory as a basis for social disclosure behavior have failed to follow
the arguments of Watts and Zimmerman's original thesis. Furthermore, the studies have
failed to generate adequate tests of the arguments they do present.
4.4.4 Evaluation of political economic approach
From the above discussion it can be noticed that each of legitimacy theory, stakeholder
theory and political theory provide an explanation to disclosure practices but also each of
them suffers from some limitations. While legitimacy theory explains and predicts that
companies use disclosure to legitimize their business, it is insufficient to fully explain the
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disclosure practices. Rizk (2006) questioned about the applicability of legitimacy theory to
developing countries that have low level of social disclosure. On the other hand,
stakeholder theory implies that managers identify the importance of stakeholders based on
their power. In this regard, it may worth to mention that Gray et al (1995) indicate that the
social disclosure literature has not developed the distinctions between legitimacy,
stakeholder and political economy theories as far as it might. They state that:
"The essential problem in the literature arises from treating each as competing
rheories of reporting behavior, when stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are better
seen as two (overlapping) perspectives on the issue which are set within a framework of
assumptions about political economy .....Therefore the differences are in levels of
resolution of perception rather than arguments for and against competing theories as
such" (Gray et al, 1995, p.52)
Deegan (2002) highlights the links between legitimacy theory and other theories such as
stakeholder theory and institutional theory. Moreover, he points out the benefits of
employing more than one theory.
Bedford (1973), as cited in Haniffa 1999, suggested that the structure of accounting should
extend into the fields of psychology, sociology, ecology, anthropology, political science
and biology in order to provide realistic bases for accounting disclosure. Hopwood (2000)
indicates that the institutional and social aspects of financial accounting are still relatively
unexplored. He argues for the importance of research that can provide more adequate
insights into the wider institutional and social positioning of financial accounting. The next
section addresses institutional theory, as an example of socioeconomic approach, in more
detail.
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Rizk (2006) indicate that the notion of legitimacy is also central to institutional theory due to the
overlapping nature of many theories. Under this theory, organisations will change their structure
or operations to conform to external expectations about what forms or structures are acceptable
or legitimate. Contrary to legitimacy theory, wherein there is perceived to be an ability of
managers to alter perceptions of legitimacy, perhaps through disclosures, under institutional
theory managers are expected to conform with "norms" that are largely imposed upon them
(Deegan. 2002). The next section summarize the different types of institutional theory.
4.5 The socioeconomic approach:
There is an increasing interest in institutional theory. It has been widely utilized in social
sciences in general and in accounting literature in particular (Scott, 1995). Institutional
economics is concerned with studying an economic phenomenon within its entire
surrounding environment which includes social, cultural, political, ideological, religious,
civilization, technological factors. In other words, institutional theory considers that the
economic system is a subsystem of the larger societal or cultural system. It acknowledges
that people are influenced by, and function in, an evolving cultural process (Gruchy, 1984;
Scapens, 1994).
The focal point of institutional theory is that an organization's survival requires it to
conform to social norms of acceptable behavior as much as to achieve levels of production
efficiency (Hussain and Gunasekaran 2002). Fogarty (1996) indicates that the key attribute
of institutional theory lies in its ability to highlight the distinction between what
organizations actually accomplish and what their structures suggest to the external
environment they should accomplish. However, institutional theory has different types
which are summarized in the following paragraphs.
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4.5.1 The different types of Institutional Theory
In recent years, various types of institutional theory have been used to gain insights into
organizational change and accounting practices. These include: old institutional economics
(OlE) which is concerned with the institutions that shape the actions and thoughts of
individual human agents, new institutional economics (NIE) (transaction cost), which is
concerned with the structures used to govern economic transactions; and new institutional
sociology (NIS), which is concerned with the institutions that shape organizational
structures and systems. It might be helpful to outline the nature of these three types of
institutional theory.
4.5.1.1 Old Institutional Economics (DIE)
The OlE; the most established and oldest type of institutional theory; considers individuals
as a cultural product affected by their institutional and cultural situations, therefore it is
important to add other dimensions (anthropological and evolutionary) to the economic
dimension. aIE theory is a thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is
embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of people (See: Furubotn and Richter,
2000; Scapens, 1994; Hodgson, 1993; Ahmed and Scapens 2000; Dequech, 2002).
Bums (2001) indicates that this theory explicitly rejects the assumptions of given (rational-
optimizing) individuals, and thus, there is a clear overlap between OlE and NIS. The old
institutionalists claim that the individual is a product of his social environment and that
"economic man" is not necessarily a universal phenomenon (Olsson, 2000). OlE focuses
on the dynamics of the change process rather than the outcomes of a change event (Bums,
2001). Consequently, OlE emphasizes on studying economic activities as part of a holistic
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ongoing process of change. Thus the adoption of new structures, systems and behavior in
organizations, such as International Accounting Standards and their disclosure
requirements, would be strongly influenced by politics, society, and the cultural
environment.
This theory makes the 'institution' the unit of economic analysis and provides a potentially
useful basis for understanding the institutionalized character of organizational routines and
rule-based behaviors. In this approach, human beings, organizations, and the economic
system itself are regarded as part of a larger social system. However, there is no universal
definition of the term of institution (See Bums and Scapens, 2000; and Yazdifar, 2003).
Scapens (1991) indicates that OlE theorists argue that the adoption or rejection of changes
should be studied in relation to historical, cultural, social and political issues that are
relevant to comprehend organizational change in its full complexity. The implementation
of new systems, such as new disclosure requirements or code of corporate governance, will
succeed to the extent that there is broad congruence between the new systems (rules) and
existing routines and institutions in companies (Yazdifar, 2003). That is, the successful
implementation or rejection and resistance to a new system or practice depends on whether
the norms and values underpinning this adoption are in accordance with the norms and
values of actors who are going to adopt, implement and use it.
It can be noticed that routine, rule, and habit concepts play an important and basic role in
old institutional economics (Bums and Scapens 2000, and Dequech 2002). All of these
concepts may be applicable to the disclosure policy that governed by disclosure
requirements (rules) and determined by the culture (habits) of the preparer of financial
reporting.
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However, OlE is criticized as its focus is primarily on the micro (individuals, groups and
organizations) rather than the macro-level institutions. Moreover, the concern expressed
regarding limitation of OlE is its insufficient attention to environmental pressures
(Yazdifar, 2003).
Burns (2000; 2001) argues that OlE is more suitable for studies of processes of change and
resistance to change within organizations. In particular the theory is effective in
investigating the role of power, politics and vested interests in change.
4.5.1.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE)
Furuboton and Richter (2000) indicate that the central message of New Institutional
Economics (NIE), also called the New Theory of Organization, is that institutions matter
for economic performance. In other words, a distinguished feature of this theory is its
insistence on the idea that transactions are costly. The analysis using this theory is based on
the elementary insight that the creation of institutions and organizations, and their day-to-
day use, requires the input of real resources. Essentially, this theory recognizes transaction
costs. The basic elements in the literature of NIE are transaction costs, property rights, and
contractual economics.
In addition, to explain the determinants of institutions and their evolution over time, the
purpose of NIE includes evaluating the impact of institutions on economic performance,
efficiency, and distribution. The relationship between institutions and economic growth is
mutual. i.e., institutions have a profound influence on economic growth, and, economic
growth often results in a change in institutions (Nabli and Nugent, 1989).
Ahmed and Scapens (2000) point out that while this approach seeks to broaden the domain
of economic analysis by examining transactions and governance structures internal to the
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firm, it does not recognize the impact of the broader econormc, political and social
institutions which can be important In understanding the development of accounting
practices. Robins, (1987) points out that New Institutional Economics has been criticized
for failing to recognize the importance of the institutional environment. Also, Martinez and
Dacin (1999) argue that transaction cost economics cannot explain all organizational
actions and outcomes because efficiency is not the overriding imperative guiding
organizational and individual decisions.
However, NIE faces some basic problems in its theoretical framework. According to
Hopper and Armstong (1991) these problems are as the following:
• The lack of precise definition of the term "transaction costs"
• The failure to consider links among product markets, power and
organizational forms.
• The failure to consider the influence of social and political processes on the
development of firms.
• The failure to consider the potentially exploitative nature between capitalist
firms and their employees.
A number of studies indicate that one of the defining characteristics of NIE is that
institutions act primarily as constraints upon the behavior of given individuals (Khalil,
1995; Hodgson, 2000).
From the above discussion, it can be observed that NIE does not provide a full explaining
of accounting practice in its broad perspective. Consequently, in the context of disclosure,
we can conclude that NIE may be not suitable for studying disclosure practices especially
in developing countries. There are two reasons for this conclusion, the first due to the
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difficulty to define and identify transaction costs in developing countries, and the second is
the availability of other theories that may help in understanding disclosure practices.
4.5.1.3 New Institutional Sociology (NIS)
While recognizing the social and cultural basis of external influence on organizations is
one of the contributions of institutional theory, neo institutionalists moved beyond
recognition to describe the processes by which practices and organizations become
institutions (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). NIS focuses on change at an extra-organizational
(or macro) level and primarily focuses on the 'legitimation' of organizational structures,
forms and processes in society. It is suggested; based on institutional theory, that social
legitimacy is considered to be an input to the organizational transformation process, see
figure 4.1, along with other resources (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006, p.88).
Figure 4-1 social legitimacy as an organizational resource
Inputs--------.
Raw materials
Labour
Capital
Equipment
Social Legitimacy
Transformation Process
-----..~ Outputs
Source: Hatch and Cunliffe (2006, p.88)
Based on NIS, organization success is defined by the extent to which an organization
embodies society 'ideals' concerning norms of rational behavior. Furthermore, more
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societal legitimacy is said to be achieved through conforming to society norms. Such
legitimacy, which affects an organization's structure, defines an organization's domain of
activity, and is the main factor for survival and growth (Yazdifar, 2003; Meyer et al.,
1993). According to Hussain and Hoque (2002) NIS has contributed significantly to the
understanding of relationships between organizational structures and the wider social
environment in which organizations are situated.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) suggest that, as a result of institutional pressures,
organizations will adopt similar characteristics through the desire to organize themselves in
a manner that is similar to other organizations in the same environment. In other words,
organizations are subject to rules and regulations to which they must conform to ensure
their legitimacy, in order to have access to resources and ensure their survival. These rules
and regulations do not necessarily ensure they continue to operate efficiently (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1983).
Such process is called isomorphism and captures the process of homogenization".
"Isomorphism" is loosely synonymous with "convergence". It is a key element of NIS
theory. This assumes that organizations adopt (or "morph" to) structures and management
practices which are considered legitimate and socially acceptable by other organizations
regardless of their actual usefulness. (Saudagaran and Diga, 1997; Rodrigues and Craig
2006).
While actions may be repeated because explicit rules or laws; legal and political
influences, activity patterns is supported by norms, values and expectations; cultural
influences, and by a desire to look like others; social influences (Hatch and Cunliffe,
2006). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identify three mechanisms through which
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institutional isomorphic change occurs: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and
normative isomorphism.
The first mechanism, coercive isomorphism, stems from political influence and the
problem of legitimacy. It is the response to "both formal and informal pressures exerted on
organizations by other organizations [and impinging external factors e.g., government
policy, regulation, supplier relationship] upon which they are dependent and by cultural
expectations in the society within which organizations function.
The second mechanism, mimetic isomorphism, occurs when organizations face uncertainty
and model themselves on other organizations. Organizations will tend to copy those
organizations in their organizational field that are perceived to be more legitimate or
successful or those outside their organizational field that are similar to themselves in
complexity.
The third mechanism, normative isomorphism, anses when professionals operating in
organizations are subject to pressures to conform to a set of norms and rules developed by
occupational/professional groups. In this form of isomorphism, Bums (2000) indicates that
firms feel obliged to adopt structures and processes that have been advocated by dominant
professions and professional bodies.
In the context of disclosure practice, coercive isomorphism can be represented by the
pressures exerted to comply with disclosure requirements. Coercion takes place through
mechanisms of authority, legitimation and the power to compel organizations to comply
with the mandatory disclosure requirements.
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Mimetic isomorphism will take place when an organization perceives that increased
disclosure, especially voluntary disclosure, will contribute and result in an improvement in
its image and its competitive position. It may be helpful to emphasize that mimetic
isomorphism is a process of change initiated internally by the organization. As a
consequence, it may be expected that the number of organizations that disclose more
information voluntarily will increase over time.
Regarding normative isomorphism, it can be noticed that disclosure practices are subject to
pressures to conform to a set of norms and rules; accounting standards, new listing rules,
corporate governance code; developed by occupational/professional groups. Generally,
firms feel obliged to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements that have been
advocated by dominant professions and professional bodies.
Institutional theory, specifically (NIS), has been applied in a number of financial reporting
studies for example; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; Brands, et
al 2005; and Rodrigues and Craig, 2006). Carpenter and Feroz (2001) employ institutional
theory to explore how institutional pressures exerted affects the adoption of generally
accepted accounting principles for external financial reporting by public sector entities.
The authors argue that institutional theory is complementary to economic theory in general
and resource dependency theory in particular.
Also, Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) use institutional theory to investigate managers'
responses to derivative financial instrument disclosure requirements. They indicate that
managers respond in a manner that can be explained by legitimacy and institutional
theories and the maintenance of the managers' and their firms' financial reporting
reputations to deal with societal pressures to make derivative activities more transparent.
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Their results imply that legitimacy and institutional theories provide a plausible
explanation as to what impulse prompted managers' responses.
Rodrigues and Craig (2006) use institutional theory as one of three complementing lenses
to assess international accounting harmonization. They deploy an innovative analytical
approach (including Hegelian dialectic, isomorphism and Foucault) to explore and improve
understanding of the processes, effects and likely future progress of the convergence of
national accounting standards with international financial reporting standards. They
indicate that new institutional theory is useful in explaining developments in international
accounting over time.
Recently, a number of disclosure studies use institutional theory; to explain the voluntary
disclosure practices on the internet. For example, Xiao et al (2004) employ the concept of
isomorphism in examining the determinants of voluntary internet based disclosure in
China. In addition, Bonson and Escober (2006) use institutional theory to address the
variation in information disclosed by companies in European Union countries on their web
pages.
In addition, institutional theory has been applied to Financial accounting standards setting
by the FASB (Fogarty, 1992), the changing process of standard setting and regulation in
UK (Radcliffe et al. 1994). Moreover, Fogarty (1996) discusses the institutional theory and
the insight it provides into the accounting profession's self regulation actions. In
developing countries in transition, AI-Twaijry et al (2003) use institutional theory to
address the development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia while Hassan (2008) relies on
institutional theory to address the development of accounting regulations in Egypt.
122
4.5.2 Evaluation of NIS4
There are a number of criticisms made of NlS, Ahmed and Scapens (2000) argued that
while this approach focuses on how institutionalized rules, values and expectations
influence the firm, it does not explore how the firm shapes the institutionalized rules,
values and expectations. Uzzi (1996) argued that although the concept of embeddedness is
useful for understanding the sociological failings of standard neoclassical schemes, it does
not explain concretely how social ties affect economic outcomes.
Yazdifar (2003) classifies the problems that face NlS in three groups: the first is the
neglecting of power issues and actors' interest-based behavior. The second is incapacity to
explain processes of organizational change. The third is the lack of consideration of
internal generation of institutionalized forms. He points out that these criticisms indicate
that the theory suffers from 'inadequate consideration of the relationship between
environment/institutional determinism and cultural and political factors within
organizations. He cited with Scott (1987) that NlS needs to be complemented by other
perspectives.
To overcome the criticisms and to get better understanding of economic activities in a
broader perspective, there is an increasing convergence and integrative efforts, in the
organizational literature, among these theoretical approaches. Yazdifar (2003) indicates
that there have been lesser signs of convergence between new institutional sociology (NlS)
and old institutional economics (OlE). He argues that an institutional perspective
incorporating both NlS and OlE expands the levels of analysis encompassing both extra-
(macro) and intra-(micro) organizational factors and consequently enhanced our
understanding to conceptualize organizations actions and practices. He believes that the
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two theories can be complementary and that neither can independently fully explain
organizational behavior.
In the context of disclosure, it can be argued that institutional theory can improve our
understanding of disclosure practice whether mandatory or voluntary. The compliance with
mandatory disclosure requirements, as new systems or rules, will increase to the extent that
there is broad congruence between the new systems (rules) and existing routines and
institutions inside companies. On the other hand, the concept of isomorphism will help in
understanding the voluntary disclosure practices. In general, new institutional sociology
(NIS) may provide an extension to the disclosure literature and enhances the knowledge
about disclosure on the micro and macro level. It may be worth to refer here to the overlap
among institutional theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory (Deegan, 2002). The
processes of legitimation through isomorphic mechanisms, the quest of social legitimacy,
and power and institutional theory constitute the institutional theory framework (Hassan,
2008).
4.6 Cost - benefit analysis approach
As illustrated earlier, accounting information can be viewed as an economic good that
subject to demand and supply. Accordingly, there are costs and benefits from producing
accounting information. The cost benefit analysis of disclosure must be taking into
consideration in addressing the disclosure decision especially by management as a
producer (Bhushan and Lessard, 1992). It should be mentioned that there is no agreement
about specific measures of the monetary value of costs and benefits from disclosure and as
such it is difficult to quantify most of disclosure's costs and benefits. Moreover, one of the
problems, and may be the biggest one, is isolating changes in behavior arising only from
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disclosure (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994 and Gray et al, 1984). The following paragraphs
summarize the potential costs and benefits from disclosure.
4.6.1 Disclosure costs
To prepare financial reporting, compames expend economic resources. However, it is
commonly agreed that disclosure costs can be classified into two groups, direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs involve the value of resources used in gathering, developing,
processing, auditing, and dissemination accounting information. On the other hand,
litigation costs, proprietary costs, and political costs are examples of indirect costs. In this
regard it may be necessary to emphasize that the cost object here is the annual report.
Therefore cautions must be taken regarding the classification of some items such as costs
of preparing information for managerial purposes and other committed costs. The internal
organizational structure of the company and the harmony between internal and external
needs of information may affect the direct costs of disclosure. The advancement in
information technology helps in reducing the cost of preparing and dissemination
accounting (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). Consequently, it can be expected that companies
will tend to disclose more information. While the direct costs of disclosure may be more
important in developing countries (Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1995); the indirect costs
may be more significant than direct costs in developed countries, (Gray and Roberts,
1989).
Abayo et al. (1993) provide another classification of disclosure costs. They point out that
there are costs of compliance and noncompliance with disclosure requirements. While
compliance costs relate to training and updating knowledge of those applying the
regulation, noncompliance costs originate from two sources: market pressures and
government-imposed sanctions or administrative pressures.
125
Litigation costs One of the disclosure costs that companies may face is litigation costs.
When users of financial reporting consider disclosure as misleading they may take legal
reactions that result in litigation costs. Accordingly, companies may use disclosure to
protect themselves from possible future lawsuit and avoid or mitigate the litigation costs. A
number of studies use litigation costs to explain the disclosure decision, but the empirical
evidence is mixed. While some authors (Waymire, 1984; Lev and Penman, 1990) indicate
that companies may be hesitate to provide information about bad news since users may
take unfavorable reactions, others (e.g. Skinner,1994) using litigation costs to predict that
companies have incentives to disclose voluntarily bad news information. Skinner (1994)
indicates that market reaction to bad news is greater than market reaction to good news. He
argues that there is incentive for management to disclose bad news to reduce litigation
costs. However, Francis et al (1994) and Skinner (1997) did not find evidence that
voluntarily and early disclosure as a defensive mechanism may deter shareholder lawsuits.
Proprietary costs The nature of competition is important in determining the level of
disclosure. The disclosure of proprietary information can lead to proprietary costs and can
be harmful if competitors use it to get benefits on the account of the company (Verrecchia,
1983). The proprietary costs of disclosure increase in more competitive industries.
Therefore it is expected that companies in less competitive environment, less proprietary
costs, will disclose information more than companies in highly competitive environment.
In contrast, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) argue that competition through threat of entry
may encourage voluntary disclosure. They indicate that disclosing more information is
expected under competitive pressures. In other words the higher entry costs leads to
decrease in the probability of entry. Nevertheless, the majority of information disclosed in
annual reports is intended to general users and generally does not include the relevant
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information that competitors seek (Gray et al, 1984). In this regard it may be helpful to
differentiate between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The severity of competitive
disadvantage may be higher under voluntary disclosure than mandatory disclosure. Also,
the same point may be used to explain the variation in the level of compliance with
mandatory requirements.
4.6.2 Disclosure benefits
It is commonly agreed that companies can gain a variety of benefits from disclosure.
Reducing uncertainty about the financial position of companies is one of the main benefits
that may be considered as the source of other benefits such as reductions in the cost of
capital, agency costs and political costs. Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) examine the
perception of three different groups; corporate managers, financial analysts, and portfolio
managers; about corporate disclosure. They found that the all three groups ranked
increased credibility as the main benefit from improved disclosure. However, the results
show that the other potential benefits have received different ranking from the three
groups. Other potential benefits include increased share value, increased number of patient
investors, increased analyst following, improved access to capital, increased price/earnings
ratios, decreased share volatility, increased share liquidity, improved relations with
supplier, and reduced political regulatory intervention.
Vlachos (2001) classifies benefits from disclosure into two categories, internal benefits and
external benefits. The former includes reduction in the company's cost of capital, reduction
in agency costs, reduction in political costs, and other benefits such as; enhance corporate
reputation and public image, allay the fears of investors and lenders about repayment
obligations, and stability in share prices. On the other hand, external benefits include
increase in business investment, efficiency in capital markets, and enhanced liquidity of
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capital markets. Gray and Roberts (1989) present ranking for factors that constrain and
benefit voluntary information disclosure according to their empirical results. While the first
rank of constraining factors was given to cost of competitive disadvantage, improved
image/reputation of company was the first of factors benefiting voluntary disclosure. It
may be helpful to indicate that there is agreement between studies about the main benefits
of disclosure but there is variation about the ranking of these benefits. The reason for this
variation may be the variation of respondents groups and the differences in the economic
circumstances in the year when studies were conducted.
At the end of this part, it can be noticed that most of the benefit of disclosure are the
reduction in indirect costs. That may be because most of indirect costs are opportunity
costs. In this regard, it may be helpful to emphasize that it is difficult to measure indirect
costs and benefits of disclosure in terms of monetary units.
Having discussed the most common theories in disclosure literature, the next section
presents the theoretical framework employed in the current study. It is presented in Figure
4.2.
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Figure 4-2 The theoretical framework
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4.7 Summary and conclusion
This chapter summarizes the dominant theories that have been used in disclosure literature.
The discussion has shown that there is no one theory can fully explain disclosure practices.
Moreover, it is clear that there is overlap among these theories. Some of these theories
complement each other such as legitimacy theory and political costs theory. Some of them
can be regarded as competing theories such as signaling theory and proprietary costs.
Moreover, reviewing these theories indicates that each theory takes a look at disclosure
from different perspective. While the economic approach focuses on parties related closely
with economic activities and assumes that individuals are motivated by economic self
interest only, the political economic approach focuses on those parties in addition to
governmental agencies and assumes that people are motivated by power and economic self
interest. Furthermore, the socioeconomic approach assumes that people are motivated by
societal values so it considers all parties inside and outside the company. Nevertheless, it
can be noticed that there is overlap between regulatory approach and cost benefit analysis
approach on one side and other approaches on the other side.
The current study addresses the voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of the
most active Egyptian listed companies. The annual report is prepared for general purposes,
i.e. it is not directed to a specific user. Therefore it can be used by several stakeholders not
only shareholders. Moreover, the study assesses the total voluntary disclosure and its
categories; not only one type of voluntary disclosure such as forward looking information
or social information. Consequently, the regulatory approach that related more with
mandatory disclosure is irrelevant to the study. In addition, the study doesn't focus on the
economic consequences of disclosure practices. Therefore cost benefit approach will not be
used as a theoretical base of the study.
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Moreover, the economic approach that based on assumptions of efficient market, profit
maximization and self interest is considered to be not appropriate for the purpose of the
current study. Although the inherent limitations of each of legitimacy, stakeholder and
political theory, these theories are not competing but overlapping and can complete each
other. Therefore it was decided to use the political economy approach as the appropriate
theoretical base for the present study. Figure 4-2 shows the theoretical framework of the
study.
As indicated in the previous chapter, the context of the current study is Egypt which has a
secretive and conservative culture in addition to its own institutions. The study follows the
recent trend in disclosure literature, as indicated in chapter two, which considers corporate
governance variables among the determinants of disclosure decision. Corporate
governance is a recent concept in Egypt and the Egyptian companies may be unfamiliar
with it. In this regard institutional theory can playa central role in explaining the extent of
voluntary disclosure. As indicated through this chapter, there is overlap between
institutional theory and legitimacy theory. As such, the main theories that the current study
is based theoretically on are stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, political costs theory
and new institutional sociology theory (See figure 4.2). However, it must be emphasized
that choosing these theories does not mean that they have some absolute superiority over
other theories. These theories are relevant to the purpose of the present study. To sum up,
given the lack of a comprehensive theory and responding to the call for employing a wider
theoretical framework; theoretical triangulation or more than one theory, the current study
employs the political economic approach and institutional theory; new institutional
sociology NIS; as the theoretical base to develop the research hypotheses. The next chapter
presents the research methodology while the research hypotheses will be presented in
chapter six.
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The current study investigates the voluntary disclosure practices in Egyptian capital market
as an emerging market. The previous chapters present the theoretical section in this study;
reviewing the relevant literature in chapter two, overview of the Egyptian context in
chapter three and outline the appropriate theories to the study in chapter four. Based on the
proposed theoretical framework and the literature, the empirical section in the present
study aims to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure and its trend over the period of
study. It aims also to examine the relationship between voluntary disclosure - as dependent
variable- and a number of explanatory variables. The current chapter outlines the research
method and the procedures employed to carry out the empirical section. Section 5.2
outlines the research philosophy. The research approach is presented in section 5.3. While
section 5.4 provides details of the research design, section 5.5 describes the research
instrument and the definitions of the independent variables. Statistical methods employed
to test the hypotheses are presented in section 5.6, followed by the conclusion in section
5.7.
5.2 Research Philosophy
The research process involves a number of steps or procedures that should be followed to
conduct research. Each of these steps requires rational decision making choices. Saunders
et al (2007) indicate that the steps of research process can be viewed as layers of a research
onion. The research onion consists of six layers namely, research philosophies, approaches,
strategies, choices, time horizons, techniques and procedures. Figure 5-1 shows the
research onion. There are important layers of the research onion need to be peeled away
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before deciding about data collection and data analysis. Questions of research method are
of secondary importance to questions of ontology, epistemology, and paradigm applicable
to the research (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; and Saunders et al, 2007). Based on this
classification of the steps of research process, this section sheds light on the first layer of
the research onion of the current study; research philosophy. The following sections
provide overview of the remaining layers .
Figure 5-1: The research onion
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The term research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of
that knowledge (Saunders et aI, 2007). The research philosophy adopted by researchers
contains important assumptions about the way in which they view the world. Research in
social science, including accounting, is based on assumptions about the nature of social
science and the nature of society. The assumptions about the nature of social science are
related to the ontological perspective, epistemology perspective, human nature and
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methodology. Two extreme positions can be identified on each of these assumptions, based
on the subjective and objective dimension. These positions are presented in figure (5-2).
The assumptions about the nature of society can be classified in terms of regulation, and
radical change dimension. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979)
Figure (5-2) The subjective - objective dimension
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As indicated before, four assumptions are related to the nature of social science; ontology,
epistemology, human nature and methodology. As shown in figure (5-2), the subjective -
objective dimension can be used to distinguish the extreme positions of each assumption.
The first assumption, Ontology, concerns with the very essence of the phenomena under
investigation. Two contrast positions can be identified, Nominalism and Realism. While the
former considers that the social world external to individual recognition is made up of
names, concepts and labels that give a structure to reality, the later involves that this social
world is a compound of real, factual and tangible structures. In other words, the question is
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whether the reality is external to the individual cognition or it is a product of individual
cognition. The realists believe that the social world exists independently of an individual's
appreciation of it. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979)
The second assumption is Epistemology which concerns what constitutes acceptable
knowledge: the grounds and the nature of knowledge. In general, two contrasting
epistemological positions can be identified, Anti-positivism and Positivism. Positivist
epistemology seeks to explain and predict what happens in the social world; based on the
traditional approaches that dominate the natural sciences; by searching for regularities and
causal relationships between its constituent elements (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). On the
other hand, Anti-positivism is an epistemology that advocates that it is necessary for the
researcher to understand the differences between humans as social actors. Anti-positivists
argue that generalisability is not of crucial importance (Bryman and Bell, 2003 and
Saunders et al, 2007). Burrell and Morgan (1979: p.5) state that:
"For the anti-positivist, the social world is essentially relativistic and can only
be understood from the point of view of the individuals who are directly
involved in the activities which are to be studied. Anti-positivists reject the
standpoint of the 'observer', which characterises positive epistemology, as a
valid vantage point for understanding human activities. They maintain that one
can only 'understand' by occupying the frame ofreference ofthe participant in
action. One has to understand from the inside rather than the outside. From
this point ofview social science is seen as being essentially a subjective rather
than an objective enterprise. Anti - positivists tend to reject the notion that
science can generate objective knowledge ofany kind"
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The third assumption is related to the human nature debate that concerns with the
relationship between human beings and their environment. The two extreme positions in
these debate are voluntarism and determinism. Under the former position, humans are
completely autonomous and free willed. On the other hand, determinist view postulates
that humans and their activities are completely determined by the situation or environment
in which they are located.
The last assumption is related to the methodology debate which concerns with the methods
used to investigate and learn about the social world. Ideographic and Nomothetic are the
contrast positions in this debate. The ideographic approach assumes that one can only
understand the social world by obtaining first hand knowledge of the subject under
investigation. It implies the analysis of the subjective accounts that one generates by
participating or getting inside the situations. On the contrary, the nomothetic approach
emphasizes the importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and technique and
involves a rigorous and scientific testing of the hypotheses. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979 and
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002)
5.2.2 The nature of society
There are two contrast positions related to the nature of society; the sociology of radical
change and the sociology of regulation. The former focuses on radical change to explain
society. "it looks towards potentiality as much as actuality; it is concerned with what is
possible rather than with what is; with alternatives rather than with acceptance of the
status quo" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.17). On the other hand, the sociology of
regulation seeks to explain society in terms of its unity and cohesiveness. It concerns with
the need for regulation in human affairs and asks why the society is maintained as an entity
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and tends to hold together; order and stability. Contrast to the radical change, the sociology
of regulation concerns with the actuality and the status quo.
Saunders et al (2007) indicate that the radical change in the area of business and
management adopts a critical perspective on organisational life. It relates to a judgment
about the way organisational affairs should be conducted and suggests ways in which these
affairs may be conducted in order to make fundamental changes to the normal order of
things. On the other hand, the regulatory perspective is less judgmental and critical. They
state that:
"Regulation seeks to explain the way in which organisational affairs are
regulated and offer suggestions as to how they may be improved within the
framework of the way things are done at present. In other words, the radical
change dimension approaches organisational problems from the viewpoint of
overturning the existing state ofaffairs; the regulatory dimension seeks to work
within the existing state ofaffairs "(p.112).
5.2.3 Research paradigm
Based on the two dimensions; the subjective - objective dimension and regulation, and
radical change dimension; Burrell and Morgan (1979) distinguish between four research
paradigms for the analysis of social theory; Radical humanist, Radical structuralist,
Interpretive, and Functionalist. Figure (5-3) shows the four research paradigms. These
paradigms can be used to differentiate between four visions of accounting research (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2002).
The radical humanist paradigm represents the subjective and radical change standpoints.
Based on the above discussion, this paradigm adopts a critical perspective on
137
organisational life and is concerned with changing the status. In addition it implies the
subjectivist approach of social science; nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism and
ideographic. On the other hand the radical structuralist paradigm tends to the objectivist
approach to social science; realism, positivism, determinism, and nomothetic. However, it
shares the radical humanist paradigm in seeking for fundamental change to the existing
state. The current study is concerned with the status quo of the voluntary disclosure
practices in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies. It is not
concerned with achieving fundamental change. Therefore the radical humanist and radical
structuralist paradigms are considered to be irrelevant to the current study.
Figure 5-3 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory
The sociology of radical change
Subjective
Radical humanist
Interpretive
Radical structuralist
Functionalist
Objective
The sociology of regulation
Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.22
The interpretive paradigm represents the regulatory approach which seeks to explain the
social order; organisational affairs; and offers suggestions for improvement by discovering
irrationalities. Its concern is to understand and explain what is going on not to achieve
change. However, this paradigm tends to the subjectivist approach of social science; the
nomalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideological positions.
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In accounting it would aim to understand the subjective experience of individuals involved
in the preparation, communication, verification, or use of accounting information.
However, the interpretive paradigm suffers from a number of limitations; it postulates that
an observer can understand social action through sheer subjectivity and without
interference: it fails to be an inquiry of change; and it creates the illusion of pure theory by
using a monological line of reasoning (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002).
The functionalist paradigm represents the regulatory standpoint and the objectivist
approach. This paradigm aims to explain the existing state of social order, the facts and
causes of the social phenomena. The key assumption the researchers would be making
under this paradigm is that organisations are rational entities, in which rational
explanations offer solutions to rational problems. (Saunders et al, 2007) In this regard, the
functionalist paradigm is considered often to be problem-oriented in approach, concerned
to provide practical solutions to practical problems (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Riahi-
Belkaoui (2002) states that:
"The functionalist view in accounting focuses on explaining the social order, in
which accounting plays a role, from a realist, positivist, determinist and
nomothetic standpoint. It is concerned with effective regulation on the basis of
objective evidence" ( p.259)
The functionalist paradigm is the dominant paradigm in the business and management
research (Saunders et al, 2007). In accounting context, Riahi-Belkaoui (2002) indicates that
the functionalist view characterizes what is generally considered as mainstream accounting
research. Its main assumptions include the separation between theory and observations that
used to test the theory, employing the hypothetic - deductive approach and quantitative
methods in collecting and data analysis.
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However, a number of authors point out that a uniquely correct perspective can not exist.
They criticize the classification of the four paradigms as separate and mutually exclusive
domains and highlight the difficulty of identifying where one paradigm ends and another
begins. Therefore they argue that a multiple perspectives, a pluralistic, view becomes a
necessity for achieving any sort of comprehensive view. (See Brochner, 1985; Gioia and
Pitre 1990; and Jackson, 1999)
According to Gioia and Pitre (1990), transition zones can be seen between the four
paradigms. Due to the blurred nature of these transition zones, it is possible to construct
bridges that link apparently disparate concepts together in these zones. As such these
transition zones constitute multiparadigm approaches. They state that "multiparadigm
approaches offer the possibility of creating fresh insights because they start from different
ontological and epistemological assumptions and therefore can tap different facets of
organizational phenomena and can produce markedly different and uniquely informative
theoretical views of events under study" (p.591). Figure 5-4 presents the transition zones
(shaded areas) between the four paradigms.
The current study aims to address the voluntary disclosure practices by the most active
Egyptian listed companies in their annual reports. It tries to provide understanding and
rational explanation of the status quo of such practices. In addition it aims to explain the
variation in the extent of voluntary disclosure by a number of potential determinants.
Specifically it investigates the association between voluntary disclosure and three groups
of determinants; corporate governance characteristics, ownership structure, and firm
characteristics. Therefore, the transition zones with radical humanist and radical
structuralist that share the value for activism and change (Gioia and Pitre, 1990), are
considered to be irrelevant to the purposes of the study. On the other hand the transition
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zone that links both of interpretivist and functionalist paradigms provides an opportunity to
benefit from the wider theoretical framework indicated in chapter four. Moreover, it allows
for providing a descriptive analysis to voluntary disclosure practices by Egyptian listed
companies that lack prior studies. Chapter seven will present this analysis to answer the
first two research questions. Furthermore, the interpretivist - functionalist transition zone
allows also to use the deductive approach to develop and test the research hypotheses to
answer the third research question (see chapter eight).
Therefore and based on the above discussion, it was decided that the interpretivist -
functionalist transition zone as a multiparadigm approach is the suitable research
philosophy to the current study. The following sections outline the research approach and
research design.
Figure 5-4 The transition zones between the Burrell and Morgan's four paradigms
The sociology of radical change
Subjective
Radical humanist
Interpretive
Radical structuralist
Functionalist
Objective
The sociology of regulation
Source: adapted from Gioia and Pitre (1990): the shaded areas represent the blurred transition zones
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5.3 Research approach
The second layer in the research onion according to Saunders et al (2007) is the research
approach. In general, there are two main research approaches to choose: the deductive
approach and the inductive approach. Deduction is "the process by which we arrive at a
reasoned conclusion by logical generalization of a known fact" On the other hand
Induction is "a process where we observe certain phenomena and on this basis arrive at
conclusions" (Sekaran, 2003, p.27). In other words the deductive approach is moving; or
start; from a theory, the hypothesis is developed based on this theory and then a research
strategy is designed to test this hypothesis; using data collected. On the other hand, under
the inductive approach data is collected and analyzed and then a theory is developed as a
result of the conclusion from data analysis (See: Bryman and Bell, 2003; Sekaran, 2003).
Saunders et al (2007) indicate that deduction owes more to positivism and induction to
interpretivism / anti positivism. In addition, Bryman and Bell (2003) indicate that
deductive approach; testing of theory; is related to quantitative research that follow
objectivism! realism and positivism as ontological and epistemological positions
respectively. In contrast, the inductive approach; generation of theory; is related to
qualitative research that follow Constructionism / Nominalism and interpretivism as
ontological and epistemological positions.
As mentioned earlier, The current study is based on the interpretivist - functionalist
transition zone. It doesn't aim to develop a theory but it seeks to describe the voluntary
disclosure practices in the annual reports and to investigate the relationship between the
extent of such disclosure and a number of determinant variables. Therefore, the deductive
approach is considered to be more suitable to the present study. the deductive approach has
been employed heavily in the disclosure literature (for example, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002;
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Eng and Mak, 2003, Ghazali and Weetman, 2006, and Barako et al, 2006). This approach
involves five sequential stages: These deducing a hypothesis from the theory; expressing
the hypothesis in operational terms; testing the operational hypothesis; examining the
specific outcome of the inquiry (confirms the theory or indicates the need for
modification): and finally modifying the theory, if necessary (Saunders et al, 2007).
Based on the theoretical framework presented in chapter four - in addition to the evidence
from previous disclosure studies reviewed in chapter two and the features of the Egyptian
business environment outlined in chapter three - the current study developed a number of
hypotheses that will be tested using the research design and the empirical data. The
following section presents an overview of the research design.
5.4 Research design
The purpose of the study, the unit of analysis, sampling design, and time horizon are
examples of the choices related to research design. Descriptive studies are undertaken to
understand the characteristics of organizations that follow certain common practices (see
Sekaran, 2003).
The purpose of the current study is twofold; to investigate the level of voluntary disclosure,
its content and trend over the period of study, and to identify its determinants. The first
objective of the study is to look into the voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports
of the most active non financial listed companies over a period that witnessed issuing the
Egyptian corporate governance code for the first time. The study investigates voluntary
disclosure practices (what is the extent and how it evolves over time). Moreover, the study
aims to identify the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the Egyptian context. This will
be done by formulating and testing a number of hypotheses in the empirical section; as a
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deductive approach. The study follows the recent direction in disclosure literature that
extends the potential determinants to include corporate governance characteristics beside
firm characteristics and ownership aspects.
As such, the current study follows the positive accounting theory (PAT) that seeks to
determine a theory that explains "what is" rather than "what should be" and to determine
the various factors that may influence rational factors in the accounting field. (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986; and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002)
The current study is a single country study; it focuses on the voluntary disclosure practice
in the annual reports of the Egyptian listed companies. As indicated in chapter two, the
majority of single country disclosure studies employ cross sectional analysis and focus on
the disclosure practice in a specific point of time (one year) (for example, Haniffa and
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak,2003, Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). A few studies address the
voluntary disclosure practices over a period of time (such as Barako et al 2006, Hassan et
al, 2006). The present study is considered to be a longitudinal study; it examines voluntary
disclosure practice over a period of time using up to date data; the recent years at the time
of conducting the study. In other words, we use panel data analysis to benefit from the
cross sectional and time series analyses. The reason for this is to investigate whether the
total and the categories of voluntary disclosure practices differ over years. Furthermore, it
will help in determining the significant variables that explain the variation in the extent of
total and categories of voluntary disclosure among the investigated companies. This type
of analysis is helpful to all parties interested in financial reporting especially in emerging
capital markets and developing countries. It provides a diagnostic view of the information
disclosed voluntarily in the annual reports and may help in improving the mandatory
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disclosure requirements (Dye, 1986). It sheds light on the aspects or types of information
that may need more disclosure and more attention from the capital market authority.
The unit of analysis refers to the level of aggregation of the data collected during the
subsequent data analysis stage (Sekaran, 2003). The most active Egyptian listed companies
are used as the unit of analysis in the present study. These most active companies are
chosen for some logical and practical reasons. The most active companies are more likely
to disclose more information voluntarily and to apply the best practice of corporate
governance. These companies are assumed to be more readily attracting the interest of
investors and other stakeholders and more willing to volunteer to disclose additional
information (Eng and Teo, 1999; and Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Moreover, these
companies constitute the main driver for the Egyptian stock exchange and play an
important role in the economic reform programme and the recent initiative of corporate
governance (See: Abdel-Shahid, 2003). In addition, the required data about these
companies is more available than non active companies.
As such, the sampling design in the current study is judgement sampling that involves the
choice of subjects who are most advantageously placed or in the best position to provide
the information required. Generally, this type of sampling design is used when a limited
number or category of people have the information that is sought. In such cases, any type
of probability sampling across a cross-section of the entire population is purposeless and
not useful (Sekaran, 2003, and Blumberg et al. 2005).
"Judgement sampling, though restricted in generalizability, may sometimes be
the best sampling design choice, especially when there is a limited population
that can supply the information needed. " (Sekaran, 2003, p.279)
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In Egypt the concept of corporate governance is relatively new. Although all listed
companies are encouraged to follow the best practice of corporate governance, corporate
governance principles are expected to be applied in the most active companies, especially
in the first years of local code. The Egyptian corporate governance code (See appendix 2)
recognizes this issue and states that
"Guidelines are to be primarily implemented in joint-stock companies listed on
the stock exchange, especially those undergoing active trading operations JJ
(P.5)
Therefore, the sample population in the current study was decided to be the active
companies in Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange. Since 2003, the CASE issues the
annual disclosure book of the most active companies which contains information about the
fifty most active companies in the Egyptian stock exchange according to trading value.
Four issues are available at the time of conducting the current study.
The period examined in the current study covers four years from 2003 to 2006. One of the
reasons for choosing this time period is to study how voluntary disclosure practices evolve
over a recent period of time with no changes in mandatory disclosure requirements. As
indicated in chapter three, the last change in mandatory disclosure requirements was in
2002, the new listing rules. Other reasons include the increasing awareness of corporate
governance and transparency and the new initiatives in the Egyptian capital market over
this period, establishing the Egyptian institute of directors in 2003 and issuing the Egyptian
code of corporate governance in 2005, not mandatory. In addition, the examination of the
annual reports for the year 2006 provides chance to assess the effect of issuing the
Egyptian code of corporate governance, 2005, on the extent of voluntary disclosure.
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To carry out the empirical section and test the hypotheses of the current study, the annual
reports of the most active companies in Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) in
each of the four years have been set as a target. These companies were identified according
to the disclosure books published by the Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE)
which include the fifty most active companies.
The top 50 Companies represent a considerable portion of the Egyptian capital market
activity. These companies constitute about 60%, 64% and, 70% of the Egyptian market
capitalization in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively. Moreover, these companies represent
730/0 of trading volume and trading value for the financial year 2005. In 2006, the 50 most
active companies represent 81% of trading value and volume. Table 5.1 provides summary
for the trading aggregate for the 50 most active companies. Moreover, the top 30
Companies represent 81% of the traded value amount in 2005. (CASE, 2005)
Data collection There are different sources of data related to the Egyptian listed
companies. These sources include Capital Market Authority (CMA), Cairo and Alexandria
Stock Exchange (CASE), Egypt for Information Dissemination (EGID), Misr for Clearing,
Depository and Central Registry, Central Bank of Egypt, Information and Decision
Support Centre (lDSC), Central Auditing Organization (CAO), Fiani and Partners
Company and the listed companies themselves. To carry out the empirical section of the
current study, annual reports of target companies are required to be collected to assess the
extent of voluntary disclosure (the dependent variable). We mean by annual report the
financial statements; balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, changes in
owners' equity; notes, auditor report and the report of board of directors. Not all of the
mentioned sources provide the complete annual reports, most of them provide summary of
the financial statements and some financial ratios and historical data. The most relevant
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sources for the required data are companies themselves and the CMA. However, all listed
companies are required to submit their annual reports to the capital market authority which
is responsible for checking these annual reports and has the right to force the listed
companies to amend their annual reports to comply with the disclosure requirements.
These annual reports are filed with the Capital Market Authority (CMA); the department of
electronic archive in CMA scans the whole annual reports. Consequently, Capital Market
Authority (CMA) is considered to be the most suitable source for annual reports of listed
companies. Previous disclosure studies in Egypt use CMA as the main source for annual
reports (e.g. Abd-Elsalam, 1999; and Hassan et aI., 2006).
The total number of companies included in the four disclosure books is 77 companies; 13
are financial companies and 64 non-financial companies. Following the majority of
disclosure literature (e.g. Cooke,1989, Wallace et al.; 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995;
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) financial companies; e.g. banks,
insurance companies, and leasing companies; were excluded from the sample due to the
different requirements of disclosure and corporate governance. Hence their annual reports
may be not comparable to those of other companies. Table 5.2 presents the total number of
investigated companies. However, the most active companies differ from year to year due
to merger, new listing, delisting, and the trading activity. To get more understanding to the
discretionary disclosure policy, it was decided to collect the four annual reports of each of
non financial companies included in any of the four issues of disclosure book. The
researcher has contacted CMA asking for the annual reports of the most active non
financial companies for years from 2003 to 2006.
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Table 5-1 Trading aggregates for the 50 most active companies
Market
Trading Value Trading Volume
(LE billion) (Million Shares)
Capitalization
(LE billion)
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
50 most active companies 103 211 3075 6290 291 374
Total Market (Stocks) 142 260 4190 7745 456 534
50 most active companies
as % of Total market 73% 81% 73°;" 810/0 64% 700/0
Source: CASE, annual report (2006)
Table 5.2 Selection of companies
The most active companies in disclosure books No.
Total number of companies 77
(-) Nurnber of financial com panies 13
Total number of non financial companies 64
* Source: The disclosure books, CASE
A number of collected annual reports were incomplete; some without the report of board of
directors or contain just a summary of this report, and others without notes. So it was
decided to exclude these incomplete annual reports. Hence, a total of 182 annual reports
were complete and useable to carry out the empirical section of the current study. These
182 firm - year observations cover the four years; 46, 45, 46 and 45 observations for the
four years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively. The sample include 27 companies with
four observations, 11 companies with three observations, 15 companies with two
observations and 11 companies with one observations. Table 5.3 shows the total number of
,.
company - year observations examined in the current study while table 5.4 shows the
sector representation of selected companies. As such the final sample consists of 64 non-
financial companies, with 182 observations, which span 15 different sectors.
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Table 5.3 Total number of company-year observations
2003 2004 2005 2006 Total observations
The most active Companies 50 50 50 50 200
(-) Financial Companies 7 9 10 11 37
Non-financial Companies 43 41 40 39 163
Total investigated observations 46 45 46 45 182
Table 5.4 Sector representation of selected companies
No. of Co.
Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 0;"
Building Materials & Const. 12 12 10 9 43 23.63
Chemicals. 4 4 5 5 18 9.89
Communications Industry. 3 3 3 3 12 6.59
Electrical Equipment & Eng. 2 2 1 2 7 3.85
Entertainment. 3 2 2 2 9 4.95
Food & Beverage. 4 3 5 4 16 8.79
Health & Pharmaceuticals. 2 2 2 2 8 4.40
Housing & Real Estate. 5 5 6 6 22 12.09
Media. 1 1 1 1 4 2.20
Mills & Storage. 4 5 2 1 12 6.59
Mining & Gas. 1 1 2 2 6 3.30
Textiles & Clothing. 3 4 5 6 18 9.89
Others: Utilities, Retails &, In. Tech. 2 1 2 2 7 3.85
Total 46 45 46 45 182 100
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Comparing with previous studies, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) use sample of 87 annual
reports of Malaysian companies; Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 104 companies in
Singapore; Tsamenyi et al (2007) use sample of 22 companies in Ghana and Agca and
Onder (2007) address 51 listed companies from Turkey.
The prior studies in Egyptian context use several number of companies, Omran and Ragab
(2002) 46 companies; Hassan et al (2006) 77 companies; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman
(2007) 1'2 companies, and Rizk et al (2008) 60 companies.
Corporate governance data and ownership structure data have been collected from Egypt
for Information Dissemination (EGID) and the four disclosure books issued by the CASE.
EGID is an information provider which was established in June 1999 as a private and fully
owned subsidiary of the CASE.
5.5 Variables and research instrument
This section presents the variables considered in the current study and the measures used to
capture these variables. The dependent variable in this study is the extent of total voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports (TVDS). The following paragraphs justify and
outline the research instrument; disclosure index; used in the current study to measure the
dependent variable. Then the definitions and measurement of independent variables will be
presented.
5.5.1 measuring the extent of disclosure: overview
The terms of disclosure and transparency have been widely used in the business
environment due to their increasing importance to a broad range of corporate stakeholders.
In this regard, it is widely accepted that the corporate annual report is the main disclosure
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vehicle and an important source of information for stakeholders especially in developing
countries (Cooke, 1991; Hossain and Adams, 1994; Botosan, 1997; Marston and Chrives,
1991; Ho and Wong, 2001; Hooks et al, 2000). As indicated in chapter two, a large number
of disclosure studies have addressed the disclosure practices; mandatory and voluntary; in
corporate annual reports (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Cooke, 1991; Wallace and Naser, 1995,
Barako et al.: 2006; and Wang et al.; 2008).
Gray and Haslam (1990) report that there is "no one single, agreed framework within
which to conceptualise, articulate and collect empirical evidence about the external
reporting activity oforganisations" (P.53) Consequently, they suggest the content analysis
approach to make a systematic enquiry into the contents of annual reports. To develop such
theoretical concept and operational measure of the extent of disclosure, Patton and Zelenka
(1997) suggest four possible approaches as follow:
• Evaluating the extent and quality of a company's disclosed information based on
the decision usefulness of information items as determined by a normative decision
model,
• Evaluating a company's quality of disclosure based on a group of knowledgeable
analysts' evaluation of the annual report,
• Assessing the extent of the market reaction to the disclosure of information, and
• Assessing the Extent of compliance with a set of legal or GAAP requirements.
They indicate that the first three approaches are problematic because there isn't any
generally accepted valuation model for the first approach, the probability of the bias of
analysts for the second and irresolvable issues in selecting "an event window" for the
analysis. So, they prefer to adopt the fourth approach which is more related to mandatory
disclosure.
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However, three approaches can be used under content analysis, depending on who is
involved. The first is the sender approach; asking managers or prepares for a self
evaluation of corporate disclosure. The second is the receiver approach; asking financial
analysts and other agents for an evaluation. The third is the third party approach,
performing content analysis by someone who is neither addresser nor addressee (Gruning,
2007).
It can be argued that the sender approach is not feasible especially in the context of
voluntary disclosure. However, it may be helpful in other context such as mandatory
disclosure. The other two approaches have been used in disclosure literature. Examples of
accounting studies that use the receiver approach include Botosan and Plumlee, 2002~
Hope 2003, Bushman et al. 2004, Cheng and Courtenay, 2006. The common analysts
ratings used in this approach include The Association for Investment Management and
Research (AIMR), the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR),
and the Standard and Poor's Transparency and Disclosure Rating (Gruning, 2007).
However, Botosan (1997) indicates that the analysts ratings; e.g. AIMR and CIFAR; tend
to be limited to the largest most heavily followed firms in an industry. Moreover, Luo et al.
(2006) point out that such ratings are considered to be noisy proxies for voluntary
disclosure because they represent analysts' perception of total disclosure. Due to the
criticism of the receiver approach, most of disclosure literature used the third approach.
The disclosure index, as a third party approach, is the dominant method to assess the extent
of corporate disclosure (Gruning, 2007).
For the purpose of analyzing companies annual reports, Beattie et al. (2004) indicate that
content analysis can be done as a manual analysis or computerised analysis. In this regard,
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computerized or automated content analysis provides opportunity to investigate large
samples and to save time and cost. In addition, it has better reliability and validity and may
replace the disclosure index in the future (Gruning, 2007). A number of previous studies
have employed such approach, for example, Hussainey, 2004; Aljifiry and Hussainey,
2007.
On the other hand, using computerized content analysis may reduce the subjectivity but
doesn't remove it. The researcher still has to prepare a list of terms and synonyms that may
be used. However, the most important point may be the extent of improvement that this
method provides over the results of manual content analysis. In addition, this approach
requires the availability of annual reports; or the mean of disclosure; in the same language;
English in most cases. This is not the case in many countries.
The current study investigates the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of
the most active Egyptian listed companies. Based on the above discussion, the analysts'
ratings will not be employed in the present study because such ratings are not available in
the Egyptian context. Moreover, the majority of Egyptian listed companies prepare their
annual reports in the Arabic language. Therefore using the computerised or automated
analysis is unrealistic. Consequently, the manual analysis using disclosure index; self
constructed disclosure checklist; is the relevant method to the current study. The following
paragraphs outline what we mean by a disclosure index and how to construct it.
5.5.2 Disclosure index:
As indicated previously, one of the research instruments that have been used in prior
disclosure studies is the disclosure index which has been used heavily in the literature after
Cerf's study in 1961(Marston and Chrives, 1991; Hussainey, 2004). The researchers have
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used disclosure indices to assess, compare and explain differences In the amount of
information disclosed in corporate annual reports.
Coy and Dixon (2004) point out that a disclosure index is commonly applied in accounting
research, particularly in studies that examine annual reports; it is being used to provide a
single figure summary indicator either of the entire contents of reports of comparable
organizations or of particular aspects of interest such as voluntary disclosure and
environmental disclosures.
An index comprises numbers that encapsulate, in single figures, objects in the
set that one wants to measure and that are capable of measurement. Each
number in a valid and reliable index is reached uniformly by determining
scores for each of, possibly, many component items, which have been identified
as relevant to the set and the purposes of the index. This component- item
scores are then combined in a meaningful way in order to ascertain the index
number for each object in the set '. (Coy and Dixon 2004, p.82)
Disclosure studies that employ disclosure index can be classified based on the extent of
content analysis into two types: a partial content analysis and a holistic content analysis. In
a partial content analysis, researchers identify a list of disclosure topics, while in holistic
content analysis researchers investigate the whole annual report to construct their
disclosure index (Beattie et al. 2001 and Hussainey, 2004). The current study focuses on
the whole annual report to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. The disclosure index
is a ratio of the actual disclosure scores awarded to a company to the maximum possible
disclosure required or expected (Cooke, 1989 and Hodgdon, 2004).
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How to construct disclosure index?
In order to construct a disclosure index, there are three steps must be taken. The first is
developing a checklist or scoring sheet; by selecting informational items to be included in
this checklist. The second is to score the items and the third is to compute the disclosure
index. The three steps involve some practical problems that may affect the reliability and
validity of the disclosure index e.g. using partial scores, weighted scores, and scoring
inapplicable items (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The following paragraphs deal with these
steps.
1) Developing the checklist:
The first and important step is the selection of items that might be expected to be reported
in corporate annual reports. However, Wallace (1988) indicates that there is no general
theory on the items that should be selected to assess the extent of disclosure. Moreover, the
relevant literature shows that there is no commonly used theory to determine the number
and selection of items for a disclosure index (Hooks et al 2000). As indicated in chapter
two, the content of and number of items in a disclosure index have varied from one study
to another. The selection depends on the focus of the research (Wallace and Naser 1995).
The majority of disclosure studies base their selection of items on many sources such as
previous studies, laws and regulations, recommendations from specialised professional
organisation, and comments from the users of annual reports.
The present study follows the pnor disclosure studies and develops self constructed
voluntary disclosure index to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports
of the most active non financial Egyptian listed companies. To develop the checklist a
number of steps have been taken as follow:
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• It starts with preparing a preliminary checklist that contains the expected voluntary
information items. The literature concerning voluntary disclosure in corporate
annual reports and voluntary items recommended for disclosure by professional
organizations are used to develop such checklist. As indicated in chapter two, there
was lack of prior studies about the voluntary disclosure practices in the Egyptian
context at the time of conducting the current study, except Hassan et al (2006).
While the previous disclosure studies in the Egyptian context focus on mandatory
disclosure. Hassan et al (2006) address mandatory and voluntary disclosure using
checklists developed from the checklist of CMA and CIFAR. However, their
checklist of voluntary disclosure; 26 items; includes mandatory items that show
volatility in disclosure over time (See section 2.6). As such the preliminary
checklist was mainly developed based on the prior voluntary disclosure studies;
especially in emerging capital markets and developing countries.
• To ensure that the preliminary checklist includes only voluntary disclosure items, it
is reviewed against the mandatory disclosure requirements in accounting standards,
company act and other laws, in addition to the listing rules in the Egyptian capital
market.
• Since the current study covers four years the attention has been paid to any new
requirement during the examined period to ensure that the checklist is relevant to
the four years. The main feature was the issuing of Egyptian code of corporate
governance which is considered as guidance not mandatory and does not follow the
rule of comply or explain (See chapter three).
• As one of the steps used to achieve the validity of the research instrument, three
Egyptian academics have been asked to refine the preliminary checklist, two of
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them have auditing experience with Egyptian listed companies. The reliability and
validity of the research instrument will be presented in more details in section 7.2.
• Additionally to ensure that the final checklist includes the voluntary items that are
important and relevant to the Egyptian environment, the checklist was then updated
following a pilot study of annual reports of ten companies for the first and last year
of the examined period, 2003 and 2006. These ten companies were selected
randomly from different sectors in the sample population, the most active non
financial companies 1.
The final checklist consists of 46 voluntary information items. Appendix 5.1 presents the
final checklist and examples of prior studies that used the selected items. Comparing with
the prior voluntary disclosure studies, the number of items is considered to be reasonable.
For example, checklist of 30 voluntary items were used to assess the extent of voluntary
disclosure in Switzerland (Raffournier, 1995); 46 voluntary items in Singapore (Eng and
Mak, 2003); 20 voluntary items in Saudi Arabia (Alsaeed, 2006); 43 information items in
Hong Kong (Gul and Leung, 2004); 53 voluntary items to in Malaysia (Ghazali and
Weetman, 2006); and 36 information items in Ghana (Tsamenyi et al, 2007).
As indicated in chapter two, there is some variation in the number, title and components of
the categories that constitute the checklist of total voluntary disclosure. For example,
information about directors and financial highlight statement. To provide more
understanding of the voluntary disclosure practices by Egyptian listed companies, the
current study extends the approach of Meek et al (1995) by classifying the final checklist
into seven subcategories: general information, financial information, non-financial
) Examples of information items removed from the initial c.h~~klist incl~de. number of employees and bank
loans and mortgages. While examples of items added to the initial checklist mclude presentmg annual reports
in Arabic and English and significant events calendar.
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information, future or projected information, corporate governance information,
shareholders information and social responsibility information. In this regard information
about board of directors may be more related to the corporate governance disclosure and
therefore it was decided to include it in the category of corporate governance disclosure.
Because the current study does not focus on a specific user group; stakeholder; or a
specific type of information, the balance among the number of items under each category
has been kept. Table 5.5 shows the number of items in and the percentage of each sub
category to the total voluntary disclosure.
Table 5-5 The categories of voluntary disclosure
Category No. of items Percentage of«.
General Information 7 15%
Financial information 6 130/0
Non financial information 6 13%
Future information 6 130/0
Corporate governance information 8 170/0
Shareholders information 6 13%
Social responsibility information 7 15%
Total 46 100%
2) Scoring the items:
To capture levels of disclosures, Cooke (1989) indicates two main approaches of
developing a scoring scheme: The first approach which advocated by Copeland and
Fredericks (1968) depends on the presentation of information. Under this approach, the
researcher mentions the number of words used to describe an item disclosed. So, the scale
of disclosure varies between zero and one. Cooke (1989) criticizes such procedure of
scoring due to subjectivity in allocation of scores and suggests the second approach; a
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dichotomous procedure. Under dichotomous procedure, a required disclosure item scores
one if it is disclosed. zero if it is not disclosed. However, to avoid any negative effect on
the reliability and validity of the disclosure scores, two issues related to scoring process
must be considered: weighting the score and inapplicable items. The following paragraphs
deal with both of them.
Weighted scores or un-weighted scores? There is a debate about weighting the
disclosure scores. While un-weighted approach assumes all disclosure items are equally
important weighted approach assumes that the importance to user groups vary from item
to item. Those who advocate the use of the un-weighted scores believe that the subjective
weights of user groups will average each other out, some groups will value certain
disclosures more and some will value certain disclosures less, resulting in an averaging out
of their subjective weights (Cooke, 1989; Hodgdon, 2004). On the other hand, those who
advocate the use of the weighted scores believe that the weighted scores help in measuring
the quality of disclosure not only the extent of the disclosure. In addition, the weighted
scores may help in mitigating the problems of subjectivity. (Botosan, 1997; and Hodgdon,
2004)
However, the current study follows the majority of disclosure studies in using the un-
weighted approach. The reasons for adopting this approach are summarized in the
following points:
• The importance of each item of information may change over time and among
different sectors (Hassan et al., 2006). Therefore, we use un-weighted disclosure
index because we study the disclosure practices over four years.
• The subjectivity inherent in weighting process. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987
indicate that a weighted index suffers from subjectivity. The process of weighting
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depends on ratings obtained through a survey and without real economic
consequences to the respondents. Therefore, the ratings represent the perceptions of
information needs and may not fully reflect the actual use of information items. Un-
weighted scores avoid such subjectivity inherent in assessing the relative
importance of each disclosure item across all potential groups of information users.
(Ferguson et al., 2002)
• Under weighted scores weights are often based on perceptions of investment
analysts which is not necessarily reflect the importance of the item to other
stakeholders.
• It is assumed that an un-weighted index is most appropriate when the research
focus is on stakeholders, rather than specific user groups (Cooke, 1989, Hossain et
al., 1995, Wang et al, 2008)
• There is evidence from the literature of substantially identical results of weighted
and un-weighted scores when both have been used (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren,
1987 Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992 and; Wallace and Naser, 1995)
• Spero (1979) provides support for not using weights. He found that attaching
weights to disclosure items was irrelevant because companies that disclose more
the important items also disclose more the less important items and are thus
consistent in their disclosure practices. Therefore, companies would be scored the
same way regardless of whether items are weighted or un-weighted (Meek et al.;
1995)
• As shown in chapter two, un-weighted scores have been used in a large number of
disclosure studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Meek et al.; 1995; Street and Bryant, 2000;
Street and Gray, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002).
161
• Using un-weighted scores emphasizes the extent of overall disclosure rather than
emphasizing particular items (Belkaoui, 1994 as cited in Abdelsalam and Weetman
2007)
• Weighted approach may affect the reliability of disclosure index (Marston and
Shrives, 1991).
Inapplicable items. The current study follows Cooke (1989) and employs the
dichotomous approach; scoring the item one if it is disclosed and zero if is not disclosed.
The dichotomous approach has been employed by the majority of disclosure literature (e.g.
Cooke. 1989, 1991; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and
Weetman. 2004; Barako et al 2006 and Ghazali and Weetman 2006). However, not all
disclosure items are relevant and applicable to all companies. Scoring inapplicable items
means penalizing companies and affects the reliability and validity of the disclosure index.
Therefore, companies shouldn't be penalized for non disclosing inapplicable items. In this
regard Cooke (1989 and 1991) suggests that the researcher can read the entire annual
report to decide whether an item is applicable for a company or not. He recognizes that this
procedure introduces an element of subjectivity into this approach but he argued that
failure to adopt such procedure would mean that larger more diversified companies would
be able and likely to disclose more information.
To avoid any potential bias or penalty, the research follows the prior studies and read the
entire annual report to identify any inapplicable items. In this regard reading the collected
annual reports of a company helps in making the right judgement and enhancing the
reliability and validity of the research instrument. Moreover, to reduce the element of
subjectivity in identifying inapplicable items the researcher have contacted Egypt for
information dissemination (EGID) and CMA asking for a list of all mergers, acquisitions
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and disposals from 2000 to 2006. It was noticed that 44 of the 46 items in the final
checklist are applicable to all companies. the only two items that were inapplicable to some
companies are related to information about mergers, acquisitions and disposals.
Accordingly. the actual total voluntary disclosure (ATVD) score of applicable items for a
Company is additive as follows:
t
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Where:
ATVD = actual voluntary disclosure score for a company,
d, = 1 if item i is disclosed; 0 if item i is not disclosed,
n = number of items.
3) Computing the index:
Having scored the disclosure items, the total voluntary disclosure index can be computed.
The total voluntary disclosure index is the ratio of the actual scores awarded to a company
(ATVD) to the maximum applicable disclosure score for a company (M).
Therefore, total voluntary disclosure for each company IS computed as the following
equation:
The
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Where:
TVDS : total voluntary disclosure score.
M = maximum applicable disclosure score = number of applicable items « 46)
At the end of this section, it may worthy mentioning that the same procedure has been
followed to compute the voluntary disclosure score for each of the seven sub categories in
the checklist. The following section presents the independent variables in the current study.
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5.5.3 Independent variables:
The current study follows the recent direction in disclosure literature of assessing the
association between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. It uses a number of
corporate governance characteristics; specially board characteristics; in addition to
ownership structure and firm characteristics as explanatory variables of the extent of
voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. As such the independent variables
examined in the current study can be classified into three groups. The first is corporate
governance characteristics (board characteristics): board leadership (role duality); board
composition (family members on the board, the proportion of non-executive directors, and
foreign members on the board); and board size. The second group is the aspects of
ownership structure: block holder own ership; government owne rship; a nd institutional
ownership, The third group of independent variables is firm characteristics: structure-
related variables (firm size and gearing); performance-related variables (profitability and
liquidity); and market-related variables (listing status, industry type and audit firm). Table
5-6 summarizes the definition and measurement of the dependent variable and independent
variables examined in the current study. The independent variables data was collected from
the disclosure book issued by CASE; corporate annual reports; and the financial year book
(Kompass Egypt) for each of the four years.
The following model has been employed to examine the association between voluntary
disclosure and each of corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm characteristics:
TVDS = Po + PI Inst + P2Block + 133 Gov + 134 Bsize +psNexc + p6Rduai +
P7Fam + psFom + 139 Atype + plOFsize + PuROE + 1312 Gear +
P13Crosls + Pl4Liq + plslndm + E
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Table 5-6 Definition and measurement of variables
Variable Definition Measurement
Dependent Total, voluntary the ratio of the total score awarded to a
TVDS disclosure Score company to the maximum applicable score
that company could obtain
Independent Institutional Percentage of equity ownership by banks,
Inst ownership
insurance companies and other institutional
investors
Block holder Percentage of equity ownership by
Block
ownership substantial shareholders (owns > 5%)
Government Percentage of equity ownership by
Gov
ownership government
Bsize Board size The total number of the members on the
board
percentage of non Ratio of non-executive directors to the
Nexc total number of directors on the board.executives
Rdual Role duality 1 if CEO IS the chairman and 0 if
, otherwise.
Fam
Family members on 1 if there are family members on the board
and 0 if otherwisethe board
Fom
Foreign members on 1 if there is foreign member on board and 0
if otherwisethe board
Atype Auditor type 1 if the auditor has a partnership with one
of the big four audit firm and 0 if otherwise
Fsize Firm size Total assets as at the end of the year
ROE Return on equity Net profit after tax / shareholders Equity
Gear Gearing ratio Debt / Shareholders equity
Crosls Cross listing
1 if the company listed in other exchange, 0
if otherwise
Liq Liquidity Current assets to current liabilities
Indm Industry type
1 if the company IS manufacturing
company, 0 if otherwise
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5.6 Statistical Analysis and tests
This section provides an overview of the statistical techniques that will be used to carry out
the empirical section. To answer the first two research questions, the next chapter will
provide descriptive analysis of the results of the checklist over the four years. It will start
with assessing the reliability and validity of disclosure index. The study will analyze the
total voluntary disclosure; then the categories of such disclosure and will end with item by
item analysis. To test if there is significant difference in the total voluntary disclosure
before and after the Egyptian code of corporate governance and also among years,
ANOVA and T test as parametric tests will be applied. Moreover, non parametric tests;
Kruskal - Wallis and Mann Whitney; will be employed. To explore the characteristics of
companies with more disclosure, two tests will be used; Kolmogorov - Smimov test; as a
parametric; and Mann Whitney test as non parametric.
Regarding the determinants of voluntary disclosure, it can be noticed that OLS regression
analysis is the dominant statistical technique in the disclosure literature. However, there are
two types of tests parametric and non parametric. The parametric techniques are based on
some assumptions that must be satisfied. On the other hand, non parametric techniques are
considered to be distribution free tests, so no need to justify these assumptions. It is
commonly agreed that parametric tests are more powerful than non parametric tests when
the assumptions of a parametric tests in terms of data are met (Siegel and Castellan (1988)
as cited in Cooke (1998); Field (2000))
Among the regression assumptions which justify employing the parametric tests, linearity;
normality of the error distribution; hmoscedasticity; and independence of error terms
Moreover, the number of observations must be greater than the number of parameters to be
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estimated, In addition to using interval scale in measuring data, there should be no perfect
multicollinearity. (Field, 2000 and Gujarati, 2003).
If any of these assumptions is violated then the forecasts, confidence intervals, and
economic insights yielded by a parametric test may be inefficient and / or misleading. To
avoid such problem transformation may be used before employing the parametric tests.
Therefore, the empirical section will start by performing regression diagnostics to examine
the data before choosing the appropriate tests. STATA software will be used to carry out
the statistical analysis.
Normality of Residuals The assumption of normality implies that errors (residuals) should
be normally distributed. Technically, normality is necessary only for hypothesis tests to be
valid, Normality of residuals can be checked by both normality plots and normality tests.
The most common normality plots include: Q-Q plot; P-P plot; histogram; and Density
estimate. The Q-Q plot plots the quantiles of a variable against the quantiles of normal
distribution while P-P plot represents the standardized normal probability plot. The
histogram indicates whether the distribution of the variable is skewed or takes the bell
shape. Density estimate plots the density of a variable and the normal density. Moreover,
the most common normality tests skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk will be used for
both the residuals and the dependent variable.
Linearity To check for the linearity assumption, the residuals will be plotted versus the
independent variable(s) values. Linearity can also easily be checked through plotting each
independent variable against the dependent variable and see how well does the fitted
regression line represent their relationship. However, if linearity exists, there will be no
obvious clustering of positive residuals or a clustering of negative residuals.
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Homoscedasticity of Residuals To check for heteroscedasticity, two methods will be
employed: graphical and numerical method. One can look at plots of residuals versus time
and residuals versus predicted values, and be alert for evidence of residuals that are getting
larger (i.e., more spread-out) either as a function of time or as a function of the predicted
value. Numerically two tests will be conducted by STATA the first is Breusch-Pagan /
Cook-Weisberg and White's tests and the second is Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition
ofIM test.
Checking for Multicollinearity Multicollinearity implies that there is a linear relationship
between two or more explanatory variables. In such relationship between the predictors,
OLS estimators may be biased and if this linear relationship among the predictors is
perfect, the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. To check for
multicollinearity, the current study will apply the common ways which include correlation
coefficients; parametric (Pearson) and non parametric (Spearman); and variance inflation
factors (VIF) in addition to tolerance values.
To test the hypothesis of the current study both bivariate and multivariate analysis will be
used.
Bivariate analysis: by calculating Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for
continuous independent variables, and using T-test and Mann Whitney test for categorical
independent variables.
Multivariate analysis: The following statistical techniques will be applied: OLS with
transformation, Normal scoring, GLS regression, Tobit regression and Quantile regression.
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5.7 Summary and Conclusion
The current study is conducted based on a multi-approach paradigm which represents the
interpretivist - functionalist transition zone. The study aims to investigate the voluntary
disclosure practices in the annual reports; the status quo; of the most active companies in
an emerging capital market; namely Egypt, that lacks prior voluntary disclosure studies.
Furthermore it seeks to examine empirically the association between the extent of
voluntary disclosure and a number of corporate governance characteristics, ownership
aspects and firm characteristics. Therefore the study follows the deductive approach that
requires developing hypotheses based on a theory. As indicated in chapter four, the current
study employed multi approach theoretical framework that benefit from integrating a
number of disclosure theories. As such, the study is considered to be quantitative study. It
measures the extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories in the corporate annual
report based on self constructed checklist of voluntary disclosure items and using un-
weighted disclosure index. The most active non financial listed companies in the Cairo and
Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) represent the sample population in the current study.
The period of study is the four years from 2003 to 2006 after issuing the new listing rules
in 2002 and the Egyptian corporate governance code in 2005. The final sample is 64
companies with 182 firm year observations. The following chapter presents the research
hypotheses before moving to the empirical section in chapter 7 and 8.
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Appendix 5.1: Voluntary Disclosure Checklist
--
Information items Examples of disclosure studies
1 General information
1.1 Statement of corporate Strategy. Chow and Wong - Boren (1987), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray
(2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis and
Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al (2006)
Hossain et a1. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Eng and
1.2 Information on the principal products, projects. Mak (2003), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006),
Barako et al (2006)
1.3 Productive capacity. Leventis and Weetman (2004), Egyptian annual reports
1.4 An overview of industry. Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006), Lim et a1 (2007)
Hossain et a1. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al (2006), Lim
1.5 Information on competitive environment. et al (2007)
Hossain et a1. (1994), Meek et a1.; (1995); Chau and Gray (2002); Eng and
Mak (2003); Leventis and Weetman (2004), Barako et al (2006), Patelli and
1.6 Organizational structure. Prencipe (2007), and Lim et al (2007)
1.7 Presenting annual reports in Arabic and English. Egyptian annual reports
2 Financial information
2.1 Historical data and statistics for more than 2 years Hossain et a1. (1994), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002),
Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
2.2 Any industry-specific ratios. Lim et al (2007), Patelli and Prencipe (2007)
2.3 Using charts, Graphs, Photos, or figures. Leventis and Weetman (2004)
2.4 Reasons and effects of acquisitions / disposals on past Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), and Lim et al
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results. (2007)
Financial ratios disclosed (profitability, leverage, liquidity, Cooke (1989), Ilossain ct al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang
2.5 and other ratios) (2001), Ferguson et al (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006), Barako et al (2006), Hassan et al (2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
2.6 Amount spent on training Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa
and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006)
3 Non- financial information
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Barako et al
3.1 Market share. (2006)
Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa
3.2 Number of employees trained. and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006)
Company policy on human resources and employee Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa
3.3 training. and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006)
3.4 Research and development activities. Chow and Wong - Boren (1987), Hossain et al. (1994), Meek et al (1995),
Suwaidan (1997), Ferguson et al (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006)
3.5 Productivity indicator. Barako et al (2006), Patelli and Prencipe (2007)
Chow and Wong - Boren (1987), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997),
Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002),
Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al
3.6 marketing network and the principal markets. (2006)
4 Future information
4.1 Effects of acquisition / disposals on future results Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Lim et al (2007)
4.2 Future expansion and capital expenditure Gul and Leung (2004), Barako et al (2006), Egyptian annual reports
4.3 General discussion of future industry trend Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002),
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Ghazali and Weetman (2006)
--
4.4 Information on earnings and cash flow forecast. Gul and Leung (2004), Lim et al (2007)
4.5 Information on production plan and forecast. Gul and Leung (2004), Hossain et a1. (1994), Egyptian annual reports
4.6 Information on market share forecast Gul and Leung (2004), Lim ct al (2007)
5 Corporate 20vernance
Hossain et a1. (1994), Barako et al (2006), Hassan et al (2006), Tsamenyi et
5.1 List of board members. al (2007)
5.2 Picture of chairperson and/or other members. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Egyptian annual reports
Hossain et a1. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al (2006),
5.3 Board member qualifications. Tsamenyi et al (2007)
5.4 Number of shares held by members of the board. Barako et al (2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
5.5 Compensation policy for top management Leventis and Weetman (2004), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
5.6 Information on audit committee and its members Egyptian annual reports, Tsamenyi et al (2007),
Corporate governance codes, policies, implementation Egyptian annual reports, Tsamenyi et al (2007),
5.7 extent
Composition of board of directors: executives and non- Barako et al (2006), Egyptian annual reports
5.8 executives
6 Shareholders information
6.1 Composition of shareholdings and Majority shareholders Leventis and Weetman (2004), Hassan et al (2006)
6.2 Share performance, traded volume and value. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and
Weetman (2006)
6.3 Share price information. Hossain et a1. (1994), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa
and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman
(2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
6.4 Factors affecting dividends policy. Meek et al (1995), Leventis and Weetman (2004)
6.5 Information on risk management Hossain et a1. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman
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(2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
6.6 Dividends per share compared with previous years. Hassan et al (2006)
7 Social responsibility information
7.1 Environmental information Hossain et al. (1994), Meek et al (1995), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and
Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004),
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al (2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007)
7.2 Community involvement Hossain et al. (1994), Meek et al (1995), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and
Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004),
Ghazali and Weetman (2006)
7.3 Charitable donations and sponsorship Meek et al (1995), Gray et al (1995), Ferguson et al (2002), Chau and Gray
(2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali
and Weetman (2006)
Meek et al (1995), Gray et al (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Ghazali and
7.4 Health and safety information Weetman (2006)
7.5 Significant events calendar Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Egyptian annual reports
7.6 Improvement in customer service Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006)
7.7 Award/ ratings received and attempts to get or sustain it Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006)
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Chapter Six: Development of Hypotheses
6.1 Introduction
In reviewmg disclosure literature, it can be noticed that disclosure practices are a
sophisticated phenomenon that may be affected by several variables. Previous studies have
mainly focused on the impact of firm characteristics on the extent of disclosure. As
indicated in chapter two and four, there is no one theory can fully explain the corporate
disclosure practices. Also the recent direction in disclosure literature aims to explain
disclosure practices not only by firm characteristics but also by other variables such as
corporate governance, culture, economic and institutional features. In addition to the firm
characteristics, the current study use some attributes of corporate governance, and
ownership structure as possible determinants of voluntary disclosure.
In summary, there are three main hypotheses:
H.I there is an association between a number of corporate governance characteristics and
the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
H.2 there is an association between a number of ownership aspects and the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
H.3 there is an association between a number of firm characteristics and the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
Where the characteristics to be explored are as follows:
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1. Corporate governance:
1.1 Board leadership (Role duality)
1.2 Board composition
• Non executive directors
• Family members on the board
• Foreign members on the board
1.3 Board size
2. Ownership Structure
3.1 Governmental ownership
3.2 Institutional ownership
3.3 Block holder ownership
3. Firm characteristics:
4.1 Structure-related variables (Size and Gearing)
4.2 Performance-related variables (Profitability and Liquidity)
4.3 Market-related variables (Listing status, Industry type and Audit firm)
6.2 Corporate governance: Board characteristics
As indicated in chapter two, the board of directors plays an important role in corporate
governance practices. The members of the board are responsible for the governance of
their companies. The disclosure literature investigates the effect of number of board
characteristics on the extent of disclosure. Based on the evidence from these studies along
with the theoretical framework of the current study this section provides the hypotheses
related to board characteristics. Three characteristics will be investigated namely, board
leadership, board composition and board size.
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6.2.1 Board leadership (Role duality)
Role duality exists when the chief executive officer (CEO) is also the chairman of the
board. Role duality creates a strong individual power base, which could affect the effective
control exercised by the board (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Whittington, 1993). On the other hand, role duality enables
the CEO to act rapidly. Moreover, the chairman will be in a better position to make good
decisions due to his better knowledge about the firm. Moreover, role duality may provide
strong leadership (Brickley et al., 1997).
A number of studies indicate that role duality may constrain board independence and
impair the board' s oversight and governance roles which include corporate disclosure
policies. Forker (1992) finds a negative association between role duality and corporate
disclosure; share option disclosure. Also, there is evidence of a negative significant
relationship with the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia and Hong Kong (Haniffa
and Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004). The expertise of non-executive directors
moderates the negative association between role duality and voluntary disclosure (Gul and
Leung, 2004). On the other hand, some studies conclude that role duality is not associated
with the level of voluntary disclosure (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay,
2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006).
Board leadership may be affected by aspects of culture. Therefore, caution must be taken
about the negative association of role duality. Based on Hofstede's model, Egyptian culture
is characterized by collectivism and large power distance (Dahawy and Conover, 2007).
Role duality is dominant in Egypt, (ROSC, 2004). The Egyptian code of corporate
governance recognises this issue of dominant form of board leadership and just
recommends companies to separate the posts of chairperson and managing director CEO.
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The code also states that "Should joining the posts be necessary, its reasons should be
clarified in the corporation's annual report, further, a non executive vice chairperson
should be appointed" (paragraph 3.6, p.8).
In view of the prior empirical results we test for the negative association between role
duality: measured by dummy variable 1 if the chairman is the CEO and 0 otherwise; and
the voluntary disclosure.
Hl.l there is negative association between role duality and the level of voluntary
disclosure in annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
6.2.2 Board composition
6.2.2.1 Non-executive directors
Non executive directors are the directors other than managing directors and functional
directors. It is commonly agreed that using non executive is considered as a way for good
corporate governance (Crowther and Jatana, 2005). Non executive directors can play an
important role in monitoring the performance of management and limit managerial
opportunism (see Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Gul and Leung (2004) argue that
corporate boards with a higher proportion of expert non-executive directors are expected to
be more effective in board monitoring and encouraging higher levels of corporate
transparency. Such members will convey their experience and experts views to the board.
In addition they are expected to protect the interests of all stakeholders not only
shareholders.
However, as indicated in chapter two, even non executive majority boards may be
controlled by insider directors. The nature of non executive appointments (Crowther and
Jatana, 2005) and tenure of current non executive directors in the same company (Patelli
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and Prencipe 2007) are examples of the factors that threaten the independence of non
executive directors. This criticism is clear in developing countries such as Egypt.
Prior studies indicate that outsider dominated boards are less likely to suffer from financial
statement fraud and more likely to issue earnings forecasts consistently (Beasley, 1996;
Ajinkya et al., 2005). Forker (1992) finds positive association of independent directors and
share option disclosure and Chen and Jaggi (2000) document a positive relationship
between the proportion of independent non-executive directors and inclusiveness of
financial disclosure. Moreover, there is evidence of a positive association between board
independence and voluntary disclosure in annual reports of firms listed in Spain and
Singapore market (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).
On the other hand, Eng and Mak (2003) find significant negative association of outside
directors on the board and voluntary disclosure in Singapore. Using sample from Malaysia,
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find negative but insignificant association between non
executive directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, Ho and Wong
(2001a) conclude that the ratio of independent directors has insignificant association with
the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong.
In Egypt, there are no rules governing the balance between executives and non executive
directors. Moreover, the concept of the independent board member is not clearly applied in
most of the Egyptian companies (Fawzy, 2003). There is no rule or criterion to choose the
independent non executive directors. In most cases it depends on the previous relationship
between the candidate and the chairman or executive directors. In view of the mixed
evidence from literature, we test for an association between the proportion of non-
178
executive directors and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most
active Egyptian listed companies.
H1.2 there is all association between the proportion of non-executive directors and the
level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
6.2.2.2 Family members on the board
A company is classified as a family company if the founder or descendants continue to
hold positions in the top management or on the board, or are among the company's largest
shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Wang, 2006; and Ali et al, 2007). Family
ownership and control is dominant among publicly traded companies around the world
(Burkart et al, 2003). Family members usually hold important positions on both the
management team and the board of directors (Wang, 2006).
The traditional VIew of family companies is that family members have the access to
required information and the incentive to run the company in their interests. Ali et al
(2007) indicate that the characteristics of family companies raise interesting issues about
their corporate disclosure practices. They point out that US family companies face two
types of agency problems. The first, and less severe, arises from the separation between
ownership and management, while the second, and the more severe, arises between
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Also, Chen et al (2008) indicate that while
family companies, compared to non-family companies, tend to provide less voluntary
disclosure about earning forecasts, they disclose more earnings warnings. They indicate
that family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. Moreover,
potential investors may consider companies with family members on the board as an
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unattractive. Therefore it can be argued that such companies may have the motivation to
disclose more information to prove themselves as a good investment opportunity.
Furthermore. based on political cost theory and legitimacy theory, it can expect that active
family companies will be in the public eye and therefore have the incentives to legitimize
and distinguish themselves by being more transparent.
Wang (2006) argues that family members have a greater stake in the company than non-
family executives, due to the long term and sustainable presence of family members in the
company and the need to protect family reputations. He documents evidence challenging
the traditional view that family companies have entrenched ownership and thus have
greater incentives to opportunistically manage reported earnings than non-family
companies. Moreover, Ali et al, (2007) conclude that US family companies report better
quality earnings and make better financial disclosure than non-family companies. They
point out that their results may not apply to companies in other countries due to the
institutional differences across countries.
However, the available evidence from pnor disclosure studies suggests negative
association of the proportion of family members on the board and the extent of voluntary
disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find significant
negative associations between voluntary disclosure and the proportion of family members
on the board of Malaysian listed companies. The same was concluded by Ho and Wong
(2001a) in Hong Kong. Chen and Jaggi (2000) indicate that the positive relation between
independent non-executives directors and the inclusiveness of financial disclosures is
weaker for family controlled companies.
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In Egypt a single family may have controlling stakes in a number of companies whether
directly or indirectly (Sourial, 2004). While most family companies are closed companies,
a number of family companies benefit from the new policy of privatization, governmental
incentives and from market imperfections (Youssef, 2003). The most active listed
companies in CASE include a number of such family led companies.
Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence from prior studies, the current study test
the relationship between the existence of family members on the board and the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
Dummy variable will be used to measure this variable; 1 if there are family members on
the board and 0 if otherwise.
H1.3 there is an association between the presence offamily members on the board and the
level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
6.2.2.3 Foreign member on the board
Emerging capital markets are willing to attract foreign direct investment. However, the
internal governance of companies is problematic in such markets especially in transitional
economies. One of the related problems is the shortage of management resources (Youssef,
2003). In this regard foreign directors can play a unique role. The presence of foreign
members on the board is one of the forms of importing western corporate governance
system. Foreign members are often assigned to the board as representatives of foreign
investors. Therefore, "the presence of foreign directors on the board dramatically alters the
ownership - control equation. It provides the foreign investors with a tangible direct
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representation that can be leveraged to influence the strategic direction pursued by the
organization" (Ramaswamy and Li, 2001, p. 212)
It is argued that outsider Anglo-American board members have a particularly important
role with respect to monitoring companies in small or emerging economies (Oxelheim and
Randoy, 2001). The existence of those foreign members should reduce the managerial
entrenchment. Foreign directors possess unique knowledge and understanding of various
overseas strategic market areas a firm is interested in (Ramaswamy and Li, 2001).
The presence the foreign members on the board may signal the ability of the company to
deal with the international markets that characterized by high level of disclosure and
transparency. Moreover, it can be expected that companies with foreign directors may
disclose more information to signal their managerial capabilities and to distinguish
themselves from other companies. Related to stakeholder theory, Carey (1994) as cited in
Ramaswamy and Li (2001) indicates that foreign members possess the social capital -
networks of connections with key stakeholders. Consequentially, high level of voluntary
disclosure can be expected in companies with foreign member on their board.
Furthermore, foreign members, due to cultural differences, may have different attitudes
about financial reporting and how to deal with stakeholders' information need. It is
commonly accepted that foreign members are more familiar with the western pattern of
disclosure and corporate governance. Consequently it can be expected that the extent of
voluntary disclosure will be higher in the annual reports of companies with foreign
members on their boards. The current study means by foreign members non Arab
members. Although there may be Arab, not Egyptian, members on the board of some
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companies, the current study does not consider them as foreign members due to the relative
similarity in culture and in the framework of financial reporting.
Based on the above discussion, the current study expects that the presence of foreign
members on the board will positively affect the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
HIA there is positive association between the presence offoreign members on the board
and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
6.2.3 Board size
As a result of communication and coordination problems related to larger groups,
increased board size may have a negative impact on the board's effectiveness. Moreover,
larger groups have a lower level of motivation and satisfaction due to the lack of
participation usually observed in large decision making groups. Therefore, larger boards
may be less likely to become involved in strategic decision making including disclosure
policy (Goodstein et al, 1994).
Oversized boards slow down decision-making and reduce individual commitment
(Lauenstein, 1977) and are generally ineffective in conducting effective discussions and
making strategic decisions in a timely fashion (Herman, 1981 and Kovner, 1985). Yermack
(1996) notices higher market valuation of companies with small board of directors.
According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), board size has a significantly negative
relationship with market performance.
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On the other hand, increased board size may increase the expertise diversity in the board
including financial reporting expertise. Large boards may increase the representation of
independent directors and, therefore, improving the probability of disclosing more
information voluntarily. In addition, the larger board members, the higher possibility to
represent the view of different stakeholders.
A number of studies provide evidences in favour of the larger board size. Laksmana (2007)
provides evidence of the positive association between the size of the board and the extent
of voluntary disclosure of executive compensation. Beasley (1996) indicates that the
likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases with the decrease in board size. Beasley
and Salterio (2001) and Klein (2002) argue that limited board size will also limit the
number of independent directors available to serve on the audit committee, and report
evidence that audit committee independence increases with the board size. There is also
evidence of a positive association between board size and the issuance of management
forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) in addition to the inverse relation with the cost of
debt (Anderson et al. 2004). However, a number of studies conclude that board size is not
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and
Courtenay, 2006).
In Egypt, the board must consist of an odd number with a minimum of the three members.
Board members must be shareholders or representatives of the participating companies
with the exception of two members (as a maximum) who are chosen as experts of the field
(Fawzy, 2003). So the board size is expected to vary between Egyptian companies. In the
context of the current study, larger boards would have more expertise diversity and
knowledge to make effective disclosure decisions. Thus, the study tests the effect of board
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size: measured by the number of board members; on the extent of voluntary disclosure in
the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies
H1.5 there is an association between board size and the level ofvoluntary disclosure in the
annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
6.3 Ownership structure
6.3.1 Block holder ownership
With the separation between ownership and management; or control of a firm; it is
proposed that the conflict between the principal and the agent; agency problem; will
increase with widely held companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983). To mitigate the severity of
such problem, mangers may be willing to use disclosure. By disclosing more information
voluntarily managers can send a signal to the principal about their capabilities and the
company performance. In other words, it can be expected that the extent of voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports decreases with higher proportion of block holder
ownership. In addition, block holders may represent the key stakeholder who has power
and therefore mangers may use several methods other than voluntary disclosure in
corporate annual report to satisfy them.
The empirical evidence from prior studies is mixed. For example, Depoers (2000) provides
evidence from France that ownership concentration is insignificant variable. Also, Eng and
Mak (2003) indicate that while lower managerial ownership and significant government
ownership are associated with increased voluntary disclosure; different types of block-
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holder ownership (individuals, institutions/corporations and nominees) are not related to
disclosure in the Singapore context.
However. evidence of negative association between the level of disclosure and ownership
concentration was provided by Mitchell et al (1995) and Schadewitz and Blevins (1998).
Chau & Gray (2002) present evidence of a significant positive association between wider
ownership structure and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore.
From Malaysia. Hossain et al (1994) provide evidence of a significant negative
relationship between the ownership by top ten shareholders and the extent of voluntary
disclosure. In contrast, Haniffa & Cooke (2002) find a significant positive association
between the ownership of the ten largest shareholders and the extent of voluntary
disclosure. Using the same variable; ownership of top 10 largest shareholders; in the same
country, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) report insignificant association.
Based on the above discussion, the current study tests for the negative association between
block holder ownership; measured by the percentage of shareholders who owns 5% or
more; and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies.
H2.1 there is negative association between block holder ownership and the level of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
6.3.2 Governmental ownership
There are different views regarding governmental ownership. Companies with higher
government ownership have government funding and can easily obtain capital, so they
may not need to attract investors and consequently they have less incentives to disclose
more information. On the other hand these companies are in the public eye and may have
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some non profit considerations beside their economic objective. So they may subject to
pressure from others to disclose more information.
Prior studies indicate mixed results. Eng and Mak (2003) find positive association between
voluntary disclosure and government ownership. Although Suwaidan (1997) presents
evidence of positive association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and
government ownership in Jordanian listed companies, Naser et al (2002) find no significant
association. Moreover, Luo et al (2006) conclude that government ownership affect the
association between voluntary disclosure level, current returns and future earnings.
In Egypt, 314 public sector companies were identified, in 1991, for privatization and were
listed on the Egyptian stock exchange. Some of these companies are still awaiting
privatization and others are partially privatized. To attract investors and facilitate the
privatization, companies with higher government ownership may disclose more
information voluntarily. Moreover, managers of these companies may use be willing to
signal to the market their capabilities. Therefore, it can be expected that the extent of
disclosure may differ according to the portion of governmental ownership.
H2.2 there is an association between governmental ownership and the level of voluntary
disclosure in the most active Egyptian listed companies.
6.3.3 Institutional ownership
It is generally assumed that institutional investors are more sophisticated and have more
technical expertise to monitor managers effectively (Guan et al.; 2007). The relationship
between institutional ownership and disclosure has been examined in prior studies, the
evidence is mixed. El-Gazzar (1998) argues that large institutional ownership may
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encourage firms to disclose voluntarily more information. McKinnon and Dalimunthe
(1993) and Mitchell et al. (1995) examine voluntary disclosure of segment information by
Australian companies and provide weak support for the positive relation between
ownership diffusion and disclosure. Barako et al (2006) find a positive association between
institutional ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kenyan corporate annual
reports. In Taiwan Guan et al (2007) document positive association of institutional
ownership and the aggregate extent of disclosure in the annual reports and website. On the
other hand. Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) address interim disclosures in Finnish firms
and provide evidence of negative association between institutional ownership
concentration and disclosure.
In Egypt, an organization is allowed to be a member in the board of directors of any other
company. This organization usually appoints its representatives on the board and therefore
they have access to information. As such, companies with higher institutional ownership
may have less incentives to disclose more information voluntarily. In this regard, Crowther
and Jatana (2005) point out that there may be a potential conflict of interest. Those
members should work in the interests of their own company and the company they are a
nominee director of.
The percentage of institutional ownership, in Egypt, has increased over the last few years.
One of the reasons of this increase is that the large privatization deals were mainly
conducted by institutions (Abdel Shahid, 2003). The current study tests the effect of
institutional ownership on voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports.
H2.3 there is an association between institutional ownership and the level of voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies..
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6.4 Firm Characteristics
It is common to classify firm characteristics that may affect the extent of disclosure into
three groups: structure related variables (firm size and gearing); performance related
variables (profitability and liquidity); and market related variables (cross listing, industry
membership and audit firm) (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).
6.4.1 Structure related variables:
6.4.1.1 Firm size
As indicated in chapter two, firm size is the most common variable in disclosure literature
either in developed or developing countries. The majority of disclosure studies indicate
that firm size has a significant positive association with the level of disclosure; voluntary
and mandatory. Examples of disclosure studies that provide evidence of such association
are Singhvi,1968; Buzby, 1975; Chow& Wong-Born, 1987; Wallace,1988; Tai et al, 1990;
Cooke, 1992; Hossain et al 1994; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Wallace& Naser 1995;
Marston & Robson, 1997; Owusu- Ansah, 1998; Chen & Jaggi 2000; Depoers 2000;
Camfferman &Cooke 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Naser et al 2002, Ferguson et al.;
2002; Eng and Mak, 2003, Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Barako et al.; 2006; Alsaeed,
2006; Agca and Onder 2007 and Boesso, and Kumar, 2007.
Many theories have been used to explain the influence of firm size on disclosure policy.
Based on the political economic approach, larger companies are more exposed to political
attention, so these companies have more incentives to disclose more information to reduce
political costs (Cooke, 1989; and Camfferman & Cooke 2002). The larger the firm size the
higher the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Some studies point out that the
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proportion of disclosure costs is smaller for larger companies (Lang and Lundholm, 1993;
Verrecchia 2001). The desire to reduce the costs of capital (Botosan 1997; Lang and
Lundholm, 1993) The more disclosure the more competitive advantages (Buzby, 1975;
Dye 1985; Meek et al. 1995). Furthermore, based on stakeholder theory the larger firm size
the larger the number of stakeholders who are willing to get more and different
information. However. due to being more exposed to political attacks, Cooke (1998)
indicates that large companies may respond by reducing the extent of disclosure in their
annual reports. Therefore, the proposed theoretical relationship is somewhat uncertain.
In this regard, it can be noticed that firm size is a comprehensive variable that can proxy a
number of corporate attributes such as competitive advantage, information production
costs, and political costs (Hossain et al 1994 and Abdelsalam, 1999). Moreover, while
there is strong evidence that firm size associates positively with the extent of disclosure
(e.g. Marston and Shrives, 1991 and Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), Gruning (2007) concludes
that that firm size has an indirect effect on disclosure which is mediated by listing status.
The author indicates that listing status can be identified as the key element in
understanding the network of related drivers of corporate disclosure.
Different measures for firm size have been used in the disclosure literature such as total
assets, total sales, number of employees and market capitalization. A number of studies
combine some measure in one measure (Cooke, 1992) while others use one measure.
However, there is no criterion to choose the best proxy of firm size (Hassan et al., 2006).
Reviewing the literature, it can be noticed that the most common measure is total assets.
Drawing on the theoretical and empirical evidence from prior studies, the current study can
expect a positive relationship between the firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure in
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the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies. The study measures firm
size by total assets.
H3.1.a there is a positive association between firm size measured by total assets and the
level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
6.4.1.2 Gearing
One of the measures of financial risk is gearing. It is a ratio of debt to shareholders equity.
It represents the ability of the firm to meet its obligations. Based on agency theory,
companies with higher gearing ratio may incur higher monitor costs and therefore may
disclose more information to reduce these agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; myers,
1977; Malone et a11993; Wallace et a11994; Abd-Elsalam 1999; and Depoers 2000).
However, Camfferman & Cooke (2002) indicate that such effect may differ depending on
the debt holder; banks or capital markets. In capital markets based financial system, highly
geared companies may have more incentive to increase disclosure than highly geared
companies in the code based legal system where the debt raised from banks. The number
of stakeholders will differ and therefore highly geared companies must deal with them.
Furthermore, Eng and Mak (2003) argue that the restrictive debt covenants in debt
agreement can control agency costs of gearing instead of more disclosure in annual reports.
However, lower geared firms may disclose more information in their annual reports to
signal to the market their financial structure.
The empirical studies provide contradictory results. While some studies found a significant
positive association between gearing and disclosure (e.g., Malone et al 1993; Ng and Koh
1994; Hossain et al 1995; Naser et al 2002; and Camfferman & Cooke (Netherland) 2002)
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other studies found a significant negative association (e,g. Meek et al 1995). On the other
hand, there are a number of studies found no significant association between gearing and
disclosure (such as: Chow & Wong- Boren 1987; Wallace et al 1994; Raffournier 1995;
Wallace& Naser 1995~ Ahmed 1996; Chen & Jaggi 2000; Depoers 2000; Camfferman &
Cooke (UK) 2002 ~ and Haniffa & Cooke 2002)
In Egypt, despite the increasing role of capital market in providing debts, banks are the
main provider. In view of the prior mixed results, the current study has no specific
expectation about the direction of the association between gearing and voluntary
disclosure. Therefore, the study tests for a significant association through the following
hypothesis.
H3.1.b there is an association between gearing measured by the ratio of total debt to
equity and the level ofvoluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian
listed companies.
6.4.2 Performance related variables:
6.4.2.1 Profitability
Profitability as a measure of performance is considered to be one of the most common
explanatory variables that have been used in disclosure literature. A number of theoretical
and empirical bases can be noticed. Managers can use disclosure to deal with the problem
of information asymmetry, they look for improving the corporate image and for
maintaining their positions (Singhvi, 1968). So, based on the agency theory it can be
assumed that the more profitable companies, the more disclosure. The political costs theory
supports this idea. It suggests that managers of companies with higher profits are motivated
to disclose more information to justify their higher profits (Inchausti, 1997). Stakeholder
192
theory support the idea of disclosing information to satisfy all stakeholders not only
shareholders. In this regard, profitability is considered to be one of the main information
needs of many stakeholders, other than shareholders, such as employees, creditors,
governmental agencies, and customers. Signalling theory suggests more disclosure in
profitable companies as a signal to distinguish themselves from less profitable companies
or to avoid under evaluation of their shares (Akerlof, 1970; Foster, 1986; Inchausti, 1997).
However, companies with bad news may be motivated to disclose more information to
reduce the risk of legal liability and severe share devaluation or loss of reputation (Skinner,
1994). As such different theories can predict different direction of the relation between
profitability and voluntary disclosure.
Empirically, the prior studies provide mixed evidence of the relation between profitability
and the level of disclosure. While some studies show a significant positive association
between profitability and disclosure (such as, Singhvi, 1968; Ng & Koh, 1994; Patton &
Zelenka 1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Haniffa &Cooke, 2002; Naser et al, 2002, Ali et al.
2004), other studies report a negative association between profitability and disclosure (such
as: Wallace & Naser 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). On the other hand,
Wallace et al (1994), Raffounier (1995), Meek et al (1995), and Hackston & Milne (1996)
found no significant association between profitability and disclosure.
From the above, we can notice that there is no agreement about a specific theoretical
expectation about the effect of profitability on the extent of disclosure. The current study
tests the significant association between profitability and voluntary disclosure. Following
the literature, return on equity ROE is used as a measure of profitability.
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H3.2.a. there is an association between profitability measured by return on equity and the
Jerel of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies.
6.·t2.2 Liquidity
Liquidity is another measure that can be used to evaluate the firm performance. Some of
prior disclosure studies use signalling theory to explain the relation between liquidity and
disclosure. According to this theory companies with considerable or reasonable liquidity
ratio may be more motivated to disclose information voluntarily to distinguish themselves
from other companies that face liquidity problem. Camfferman & Cooke (2002) provide
evidence of a positive association between liquidity and disclosure. On the other hand,
agency theory suggests that companies with a low liquidity ratio might disclose more to
satisfy the needs of shareholders and creditors. It may be worth to notice that managers
may consider the balance between profitability and liquidity when they decide the level of
disclosure. According to stakeholders, managers may be motivated to disclose more
information about both of liquidity and profitability. However, Wallace et al (1994) and
Naser et al (2002) report evidence of negative association between liquidity and disclosure,
while barako et al (2006) provide evidence from Kenya of insignificant association
between liquidity and voluntary disclosure.
In view of mixed evidence from prior research, there is no specific expectation in the
current study about the direction of association between liquidity and disclosure. It tests the
significant association between liquidity and voluntary disclosure.
H3.2.b there is an association between liquidity measured by current ratio and the level of
voluntary disclosure in annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies
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6.4.3 Market related variables
6.4.3.1 Industry type
The relation between the extent of disclosure and industry type has been tested in prior
disclosure literature. It can be noticed that the level of disclosure in annual reports differs
among different sectors. In this regard, proprietary costs and legitimacy theory are used to
explain such relationship (Verrecchia, 1983; Deegan and Gordon, 1996). As a result of
competition or political pressure, companies in some industries may face a level of
pressure to disclose certain type of information. If a company does not adopt similar
reporting strategy as other companies in the same sector or industry, the market may
interpret this situation as a bad signal (Inchausti, 1997). This is also can be seen from the
perspective of institutional theory. Based on mematic isomorphism, it can be assumed that
companies in one sector will follow the similar disclosure patterns particularly those of the
leading companies. A number of studies report evidence of following the disclosure
practice of the dominant companies (Cooke, 1989; 1991; and Camfferman and Cooke,
2002).
The empirical evidence from preVIOUS studies is mixed. A number of studies report
evidence of a significant association between the extent of disclosure and the industry type,
manufacturing companies were found to disclose more information than non
manufacturing companies (Cooke 1991, 1998; Ng & Koh 1994; Meek et al 1995;
Suwaidan 1997; Camfferman & Cooke 2002; and Haniffa & Cooke 2002). It may be worth
to mention that suggested reasons for this association differ among studies. On the other
hand, some studies provide evidence of no significant association between the industry
type and the extent of disclosure (Wallace et al 1994; Raffournier 1995; Inchausti 1997;
Naser et a12002; and Eng & Mak 2003).
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All Egyptian listed companies are subject to the same disclosure requirements. The current
study intends to test whether manufacturing companies include their annual reports more
information voluntarily than non manufacturing companies. Therefore, following prior
studies (e.g. Ghazali, 2004 and Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007) the study captures this
variable by classifying the investigated companies into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing companies. Dummy variable is used, 1 for manufacturing companies and 0
for other companies. In view of mixed evidence from prior research, there is no specific
expectation in the current study about the direction of association between industry and
disclosure: it tests the significant association with voluntary disclosure.
H3.3.a there is an association between industry type measured by dummy variable (1 for
manufacturing company, 0 for non manufacturing) and the level ofvoluntary disclosure in
annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
6.4.3.2 Cross listing
As indicated in chapter two, the listing status is a common explanatory variable in
disclosure literature either in developed or developing countries. Some companies have
multiple listing, one in their home country and other in foreign country. Theoretically,
companies listed in a foreign stock exchange are subject to different pattern of disclosure
whether mandatory or voluntary. It is commonly agreed that companies with cross listing
are subject to more pressure to provide further information and guidance than they do in
their home markets (Lang et al.; 2003). Generally, the extent of disclosure in developed
countries, efficient markets is greater than that in developing countries or emerging capital
markets. Therefore such companies with cross listing will be familiar with such disclosure
policy and may be motivated to distinguish themselves from other companies in local stock
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exchange by applying the foreign disclosure pattern. The cost benefit analysis may provide
another explanation which the information to be disclosed will be ready and available.
According to stakeholder theory, companies listed in stock exchanges of developed and
developing countries will deal with different stakeholders and so the policy of dealing with
them may vary. As such these companies may have a motivation to behave; in the stock
exchange of developing country; as a bench marker of other companies by disclosing more
than the local disclosure requirements. However, cross listing may be considered also as an
indirect reflection of the culture effect.
It has been hypothesised that companies with cross listing will disclose more information
in their annual reports. The majority of prior disclosure studies provide evidence of a
significant positive association between listing status and the level of disclosure (for
example, Cooke, 1998 and Ferguson et al. (2002)).
However, Gruning (200 7) indicate that firm characteristics do not have only singular
impacts on disclosure but they are interrelated. It is well accepted that large firms are
expected to have a higher likelihood to be cross-listed than small ones, and the size of
firms is to some extent industry specific.
Based on this empirical evidence, the study tests the following hypothesis of positive
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and cross listing. Cross listing is
measured by a dummy dichotomous variable 1 if the company listed in other stock market
and 0 ifnot.
H3.3.b there is a positive association between cross listing and the level of voluntary
disclosure in annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
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6.4.3.3 Audit firm
A number of prior disclosure studies test audit firm as a variable that may affect the level
of disclosure. They use a dummy dichotomous variable to capture whether the auditor is
one of big audit firms or not. It has been hypothesised that companies audited by an
international big audit firm will disclose more information voluntarily. According to
signalling theory, audit firm may benefit from the higher level of disclosure in the annual
reports of its clients as a signal of its own quality and reputation. Therefore, auditing firms
may support and encourage their clients to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements
and to increase the extent of information voluntarily disclosed. (Ahmed & Nicholls 1994;
Inchausti 1997; Abdelsalam 1999)
Results from prior studies regarding the relationship between audit firm and the extent of
disclosure are contradictory. A number of prior studies, in developed and developing
countries, provide evidence of a significant positive association between audit firm and
level of disclosure. Such as, Singhvi & Desai (1971), Craswell & Taylor (1992), Ng &
Koh (1994), Ahmed (1996), Suwaidan (1997), Patton & Zelenka (1997), Inchausti (1997),
Naser et al (2002), Camfferman & Cooke (2002) (UK), and Xiao et al (2004).
On the other hand, Wallace & Naser (1995) provide evidence of a negative association.
However, other prior studies, such as Firth (1979), McNally et al (1982), Malone et al
(1993), Wallace et al (1994), Hossain et al (1994), Raffournier (1995), Depoers (2000),
and Camfferman & Cooke (2002) (Dutch) found no significant association between audit
firm and level of disclosure.
In Egypt, international accounting firms can only operate through an Egyptian partner. In
addition, the audit profession and auditor independence have been well regulated since the
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1950s.The argument that large audit firms are more independent, stricter with their clients
and more sensitive to their reputation than small audit firms, can apply to large local and
international firms. (Abd-Elsalam, 1999)
H3.3.c There is an association between audit firm and the level ofvoluntary disclosure in
annual reports ofthe most active Egyptian listed companies.
6.5 Summary and conclusion
The previous chapters provide an outline of the theoretical section in the current study
while the following chapters will present the empirical section. The current chapter, with
chapter five. helps in making a link between the theoretical and empirical sections.
According to the deductive approach indicated in chapter five and based on the proposed
theoretical framework in chapter four, the Egyptian environment in chapter three and the
evidence from disclosure literature in chapter two, three main hypotheses related to
corporate governance characteristics, ownership structure and firm characteristics have
been developed in the current chapter. Moreover these main hypotheses have been divided
to a number of sub-hypotheses that will be tested in the chapter 8 to answer the third
research question. The next chapters show the empirical section of the current study.
before dealing with the hypotheses testing in chapter eight, chapter seven will present a
descriptive analysis of the results of disclosure checklist to answer the first two research
questions: what is the extent of voluntary disclosure practice in corporate annual reports
and how it evolves over time in the Egyptian capital market
199
Chapter Seven: Voluntary Disclosure Practices
Corporate Annual Reports: Descriptive Analysis
7.1 Introduction
•In
As indicated in chapter five, the current study developed self constructed checklist as a
research instrument to measure the extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories.
Reviewing the literature revealed the importance of subdividing the total voluntary
disclosure into subgroups. To understand the voluntary disclosure practice, it may be better
to look in depth into the results of the score sheet. The self constructed checklist consists of
46 information items classified into seven groups that serve different stakeholders. The
current chapter deals with the first two research questions which are:
RQ1: To what extent do Egyptian listed companies disclose more information voluntarily
in their annual reports?
RQ2: How do voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Egyptian listed
companies evolve over time?
It provides answers for these questions through a detailed analysis of the results of the
checklist. It adopts hierarchical analysis, starting with the total voluntary disclosure,
moving to its categories and then to information items. The chapter starts with the
assessment of the reliability and validity of the checklist using the relevant statistical tests
in section 7.2. Then it deals with the extent and the trend of total voluntary disclosure over
the period of the study in section 7.3. The analysis of the extent and the trend of voluntary
disclosure according to its categories and items are reported in section 7.4 and section 7.5.
The chapter ended with Summary and conclusion which are provided in section 7.6.
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7.2 Assessment of reliability and validity of disclosure index
To assess the goodness of a measure one should consider its reliability and validity. While
reliability focuses on accuracy in measurement, validity refers to whether we are
measuring the right thing. i.e. the intended concept. As indicated before, the current study
employs disclosure index as a research instrument to measure the extent of voluntary
disclosure practices in the annual reports, as an intended concept.
The reliability of a measure is an indication of the stability and consistency with which the
instrument measures the concept and helps to assess the goodness of a measure. While
stability refers to the ability of the measure to repeat the same results over time with low
vulnerability to changes in the situation, consistency indicates how well the items
measuring a concept hang together as a set. (Sekaran, 2003) There are different forms of
reliability: test retest, Parallel form reliability, inter-coder reliability, and internal
consistency. Parallel form reliability needs two comparable forms that have similar items
and the same response format but with different words and different sequence of the
questions. This form of reliability focuses on the error variability resulting from wording
and ordering of the questions. Inter coder reliability requires more than one coder which is
impractical in the current study which is considered to be individual project. However, test
- retest reliability can be used to examine stability while consistency can be measured by
internal consistency reliability.
Validity represents evidence that the instrument, technique or process used to measure a
concept does indeed measure the intended concept (Sekaran, 2003, pA25). Three common
types of validity can be identified: content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct
validity.
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Content validity ensures that the measure includes an adequate and representative set of
items that tap the concept. Several ways can be employed to attest the content validity, for
example careful definition of the research through the literature review and using a panel
of judges. In this regard face validity is considered as a basic and a very minimum index of
content validity. (Sekaran, 2003 and Saunders et al 2007)
Sekaran (2003: P.206) states that 'criterion related validity is established when the measure
differentiates individuals on a criterion it is expected to predict'. There are two types of
criterion related validity, concurrent validity and predictive validity. Concurrent validity is
established when the measure discriminates different individuals. Predictive validity refers
to the ability of the measure to make accurate predictions, i.e. differentiate among
individuals with reference to a future criterion. However, content validity is seen as not
sufficient to conclude the validity of a measure. Moreover, criterion related validity is not
often used with social science measures (Hassan, 2006).
The third type of validity is construct validity that shows 'how well the results obtained
from the use of the measure fit the theories around which the test is designed' (Sekaran,
2003, p.207). As such construct validity focuses on the consistency with theoretical
expectations and evidence from literature. In the context of disclosure, the correlation
between disclosure scores and significant explanatory variables in prior studies has been
used to validate the disclosure index (for example Hussainey 2004).
Based on the above discussion, the current study tests stability and consistency of the
disclosure index using test retest reliability and statistical tests of internal consistency
reliability. It may worth to notice that an examination of the internal consistency of the
disclosure index provides some insights into the validity of the disclosure scores
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(Hussainey. 2004). However. the validity of disclosure index IS assessed by content
validity (see section 5.5) and construct validity.
Test retest reliability: investigating the four years enhances the reliability of the
disclosure index. For the consistency purposes, we started with careful reading to the entire
annual report of each company to identify the non applicable items. Then we read it again
to identify the allocated score for each company. We examined the available annual reports
of all companies year by year. We started with the year 2003. After scoring the annual
reports of the first two years, we re-examine the annual report of the first year. The
rationale of this procedure is to allow time between the first examination and the second
one. We repeat this procedure with the annual reports of the years 2004, and 2005 which
were re-examined after scoring the voluntary disclosure of the years 2005 and 2006
respectively. The annual reports of the year 2006 have been re examined after the second
examination of the year 2005. The correlation coefficients between the first and second
rounds confirm the stability of our research instrument.
Internal consistency reliability: Reliability of the scale is basically measured through
correlation coefficients and Cronbach's alpha and Guttman coefficients. Item-to-total
correlations help to assess the internal consistency reliability, while Cronbach's alpha and
Guttman concern with the measure as a whole. Reliability and validity assessments were
conducted on the entire data set for the total voluntary disclosure score as well as
categories scores. A summary of results can be shown in the following tables.
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Item to sub-total (group score) correlations
Table 7-1 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (General Information)
Item XII X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17
=
;.I
0
= Pearson 0.644 0.018 0.199 0.371 0.583 0.327 0.677.- QJ
...-
.-~ C'J
- ~QJ
l-o ~
l-o QJ Spearman 0.627 0.007 0.206 0.390 0.588 0.316 0.6530 0
U U
Sig. 0.000 0.928 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7-2 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (Financial Information)
Item X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 X26
= ...-0 = Pearson 0.529 0.514 0.756 0.614 0.260 0.417rz CJ.-~ C'JQJ !.=:
l-o ~ 0.610 0.253 0.390l-o QJ Spearman 0.530 0.471 0.783d 0U
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Table 7-3 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (Non financial Information)
Item X31 X32 X33 X34 X35 X36
=
...-
0.519 0.498 0.506 0.460 0.110 0.2540 = Pearson.- QJ...- ....~ C'J
- !.=:QJ
l-o ~ 0.515 0.488 0.502 0.459 0.117 0.240l-o QJ Spearman0 0
U U
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.001
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Table 7-4 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (Future Information)
Item X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 X46
=
.....
0
= Pearson 0.742 0.445 0.466 0.274 0.479 0.427.. ~
..... ..
CI: ~
- !.=:~l. ~
l. ~ Spearman 0.688 0.435 0.505 0.224 0.464 0.3780 0
U U
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Table 7-5 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (Corporate Governance)
Item X51 X52 X53 X54 X55 X56 X57 X58
c .....
0 = Pearson 0.390 0.705 0.864 0.063 0.505 0.723 0.876 0.811~ ~..
.:5 ~~ !.=:
l. ~
l. ~ Spearman 0.552 0.776 0.633 0.130 0.364 0.512 0.730 0.544a 0u
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7-6 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (Shareholders Information)
Item X61 X62 X63 X64 X65 X66
= ..... 0.570 0.398 0.443 0.239 0.280 0.5990 = Pearson.. ~
..... ..CI: ~
- !.=:~
l. ~ 0.612 0.326 0.369 0.239 0.267 0.605l. ~ Spearman0 0
U U
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
205
Table 7-7 Correlation Coefficients and Significances
Between Items and Total Group Score (Social Responsibility)
Item X71 X72 X73 X74 X75 X76 X77
=
....
0
= Pearson 0.575 0.618 0.367 0.454 0.516 0.494 0.522..... ~
.... .....
~ ~
- ~~
l. ~
l. ~ Spearman 0.595 0.598 0.376 0.474 0.472 0.457 0.5110 0
U U
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
As can be seen from the above tables most items have significant correlation with their
group score at 1% significance level and some items are significantly correlated with their
group score at significance level 10%. However, table 7-1 indicates that item X12 has
insignificant correlation with its subgroup. Before excluding an item one should consider
its correlation with total score.
Item to total (TVD score) correlations:
The correlation coefficients between each item and the total score of disclosure index have
been calculated. The results indicate that most items are correlated with TVDS. Item X12
was found significantly correlated with total score. However, correlation coefficients
indicate that some items have no significant correlation with the TVDS; namely: X13 -
X32 - X35 - X45 - X54 - X64 - X65. It can be noticed that these items are significantly
correlated with their group score. As such all items in the scale have significant correlation
with their subgroup score or/and the total score. The reason to exclude any item is the lack
of significant correlation between this item and both of its subgroup score and the TVDS.
Therefore, it was decide to keep all items in the checklist.
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Statistical measures for total reliability
One of statistical measures that commonly used to assess the consistency and reliability is
Cronbach's alpha. It is a reliability coefficient that indicates how well items in a set are
positively correlated to one another. It is computed based on the average inter correlations
among the items measuring the concept. The closer Cronbach's alpha is to 1, the higher the
internal consistency reliability (Sekaran 2003). Examples of disclosures studies that
employed Cronbach's alpha include Hassan et al (2006) and Lapointe-Antunes et al (2006).
The current study uses Cronbach's alpha in addition to Guttman's coefficient as reliability
measures. These measures of reliability were done for the seven groups and for the
complete list of items. Table 7.8 shows the results of the reliability of subgroups as
follows:
Table 7-8 Reliability tests - subgroups
Chronbach's
Alpha if
Guttman'sNo. of group-test
Groups
Alpha
group
Coefficientitems correlation
Deleted
G1: General Information 7 0.7982 0.825
G2: Financial Information 6 0.7981 0.826
G3: Non-financial Information 6 0.5622 0.861
G4: Future Information 6 0.7241 0.8575 0.839 0.875
G5: Corporate Governance 8 0.8545 0.820
G6: Shareholders Information 6 0.4951 0.866
G7: Social Responsibility 7 0.8583 0.813
As indicated in the above table Cronbach's alpha is about 86% and Guttman's coefficient is
about 88%. These results reveal that the scale has a high degree of reliability. In addition,
Cronbach's alpha and Guttman's coefficient were computed also for the complete list of
207
items, 46 items and 182 cases. The results confirm the high degree of internal consistency
reliability of our scale, Chronbach's Alpha is 0.849 and Guttman's coefficient is 0.865.
Construct validity
Sekaran (2003) indicates that correlational analysis is a way in which construct validity can
be established. Correlation coefficients have been used in prior disclosure studies to assess
the validity of disclosure scores, for example Hussainey (2004) and Cheng and Courtenay
(2006). Following these studies, we conducted correlation analysis of total voluntary
disclosure score and its components, i.e. the sub groups. Table 7-9 presents both Pearson
and Spearman correlation coefficients, and Significances, between sub groups and total
voluntary disclosure score.
The results in table 7-9 indicate that all subgroups are highly correlated with total
voluntary disclosure score. This indicates how well the grouping scheme interprets the
total score. Moreover, it is expected that disclosure strategies of a company are similar
over the different categories or sub groups of voluntary disclosure (Botosan, 1997 and
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). The results in table 7.9 reveal that the subgroups are also
correlated with each other. Taken together the results confirm that the disclosure index
consistently captures voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports.
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Table 7-9 Correlation analysis of disclosure scores
TVDS GI FI NFl FUT CG SHI SRI
TVDS 1
0.7982*
GI 1(0.7596*)
0.7642* 0.5463*
FI 1(0.8001 *) (0.5216*)
0.5620* 0.3730* 0.4325*NFl 1(0.5584*) (0.3360*) (0.3880*)
0.6969* 0.5588* 0.4220* 0.2561 *FUT 1(0.6332*) (0.5546*) (0.3866*) (0.2405*)
0.8499* 0.6599* 0.5295* 0.3149* 0.5974*CG 1(0.7598*) (0.5868*) (0.5721 *) (0.3285*) (0.4875*)
0.5100* 0.3053* 0.3050* 0.1079 0.2322* 0.3739*SHI 1(0.4787*) (0.2916*) (0.3121 *) (0.1084) (0.2050*) (0.2726*)
0.8594* 0.5755* 0.6202* 0.4369* 0.5330* 0.6818* 0.4143*
SRI 1
(0.8635*) (0.5548*) (0.6400*) (0.4463*) (0.4722*) (0.6233*) (0.3787*)
*significant at 5%
Where: TVDS total voluntary disclosure score, GI general information, FI fmancial information, NFl non
fmancial information, FUT future information, CG corporate governance information, SRI shareholder
information, SRI corporate social responsibility
To attest construct validity of the disclosure index correlation analysis was carried out
between total voluntary disclosure score and the key firm characteristics documented in
prior disclosure studies. As indicated in chapter two the majority of disclosure literature
report that firm size and listing status are the key determinants that explain the variation in
disclosure practices. However, Hassan et al (2006) reported that profitability has a positive
association with disclosure practices in the annual reports of Egyptian listed companies.
Therefore we decided to investigate the correlation between total voluntary disclosure
score and the three firm characteristics. Table 7-10 presents Pearson and Spearman
coefficients.
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Table 7-10 Correlation coefficients and significances
between total voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics
Firm size Listing status profitability
Pearson Correlations 0.6941 * 0.5416* 0.4396*
Spearman's rho 0.5841 * 0.4718* 0.4232*
*significant at 1%
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that our disclosure index has a considerable
degree of reliability and validity that provides credibility and enable us to carry out the
empirical section in the current study.
7.3 The extent and trend of total voluntary disclosure
To measure the extent of total voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies we constructed a checklist of 46 items classified into seven
groups. 182 annual reports of 64 non financial companies for the years from 2003 to 2006
have been analyzed using this checklist. The percentage of awarded disclosure score to the
applicable score represents the extent of voluntary disclosure; the dependent variable in the
current study. The voluntary disclosure scores over the four years provide the trend of
voluntary disclosure practice in the annual reports.
To start our analysis, table 7.11 presents the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary
disclosure and its categories for each year and for the four years all together. The panel A
in the table 7-11 indicates that the mean of total voluntary disclosure score (TVDS) over
the four years is about 31%. This average suggests a low level of voluntary disclosure
which is to be expected. This low amount of voluntary disclosure could be explained on
the basis of its nature and the absence of enforcement to disclose (Alsaeed, 2006).
210
The table shows that the extent of voluntary disclosure over the four years has a wide
range. While the minimum disclosure index obtained is 6.82% for the year 2003, the
maximum is 76.09 for the year 2006. This wide range of voluntary disclosure level can be
noticed also in each year of the investigated period. Although the minimum score of
voluntary disclosure increased from 6.82% in 2003 to 9.1% for the following years, it is
still under 100/0. On the other hand, the maximum total voluntary disclosure score has been
increased over the years. It was 58.7% for the year 2003, 60.87% for the year 2004,
65.220/0 in 2005, and 76.090/0 for the year 2006. This result confirms the wide variation in
the voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies. In addition, it supports our decision to focus the current study on the most
active non-financial companies in the Egyptian capital market.
To shed more lights on the voluntary disclosure practice in the annual reports of the
Egyptian listed companies, panel B in table 7.11 presents the frequencies of the total score
of voluntary disclosure. In 2003, 44 companies of 46 companies (96%) disclosed less than
50% of the checklist. The remaining two companies (4%) scored 50% and 58.70/0
respectively. There was an improvement in the following years. Four companies, of 45
companies, represent 9 %, eight companies (12.5%), and ten companies (220/0) scored
more than 50% over the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively.
In average, 87% of our sample population, the most active non-financial companies, scored
range less than 50% of the measure of voluntary disclosure. 57% of the sample attained
voluntary disclosure score ranging from 20% to 40% of our checklist. Once more, this
confirms the need to keep a degree of consistency among the companies investigated. It
may be worth to mention that the company with the highest score in 2006 (about 76%) was
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awarded the 2006 best annual report in the competition organized by the Egyptian Institute
of Directors (EIoD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
Table 7.11
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Total Voluntary Disclosure (Dependant Variable)
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum S.D.
2003 46 0.2847 0.0682 0.5870 0.1122
200.+ 45 0.2986 0.0909 0.6087 0.1305
2005 46 0.3216 0.0909 0.6522 0.1483
2006 45 0.3431 0.0909 0.7609 0.1749
Pooled 182 0.3119 0.0682 0.7609 0.1261
Panel B: Frequency of Total Voluntary Disclosure Score
2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
TVDS
No. 0/0 No. 0/0 No. 0/0 No. 0A» No. 0A»
< 10 2 0.04 1 0.02 3 0.07 1 0.02 7 0.04
10 -19.99 7 0.15 8 0.18 5 0.11 8 0.18 28 0.15
20 - 29.99 17 0.37 16 0.36 16 0.35 13 0.29 62 0.34
30 - 39.99 13 0.28 11 0.24 9 0.20 8 0.18 41 0.23
40 - 49.99 5 0.11 5 0.11 5 0.11 5 0.11 19 0.11
50 - 59.99 2 0.04 3 0.07 5 0.11 5 0.11 15 0.08
60 - 69.99 0 0.00 1 0.02 3 0.07 4 0.09 8 0.04
> 70 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.02 1 0.01
Total 46 1.00 45 1.00 46 1.00 45 1.00 182 1.00
Although the average of voluntary disclosure is low, there is an increasing extent of total
voluntary disclosure over the period of study as indicated in panel A, 28.47%, 29.86%,
32.16%, and 34.31% for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. Figure 7.1
shows the extent of total voluntary disclosure for each of the years of the study. Figure 7.2
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shows the trend of voluntary disclosure over the four years. This result can be explained by
the recent development in the Egyptian capital market and the increasing awareness of the
importance of transparency and corporate governance. As indicated in chapter three the top
most active Egyptian listed companies play a distinct role to encourage all listed
companies to be more transparent and to apply the best practices of corporate governance.
Figure 7.1 Extent of total voluntary disclosure
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Moreover, as indicated in panel B, there is little number of companies who have the
highest scores of voluntary disclosure. These companies may lead the Egyptian market and
work as a bench marker for other companies. This continuous increase in the extent of
voluntary disclosure over the period of current study can be explained based on the
institutional theory, the concept of isomorphism. The active companies try to imitate or
follow the best practice of the annual report disclosure to get the same image of the most
active companies. The motivation and the characteristics of these companies will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Giving the continuous increasing in the total voluntary disclosure practice, it may be better
to look at the type of information that makes up this discretionary disclosure. However,
section 7..+ will explain these categories in detail. Figure 7.3 shows the contribution of the
different categories of discretionary information to the total voluntary disclosure score over
the period of study. The pie chart illustrates that non-financial information, with average
score 46.25%, has the largest contribution to the total voluntary disclosure level, about
21 %, over the period of the four years. Financial information and general information
categories, with average scores 45.64% and 41.05% respectively, have the second and the
third portion, 20.74% and 18.66% respectively.
While the average of corporate social responsibility information is about 28%, the average
of shareholders information and corporate governance information are about 23% and 22%
respectively. The portions of the three categories of voluntary disclosure are 12.63%,
10.32, and 9.96% respectively. On the other hand, information about the future and
prospects, with average score 14.67%, has the lowest proportion in the total voluntary
disclosure score, 6.7%. The low level of future information disclosure is considered to be
reasonable due to the cultural impact. Zarzeski (1996) provides evidence of cultural
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influence upon accounting, specifically the secretiveness of a culture relates to the level of
disclosure. Egypt has uncertainty avoidance and a secretive culture (Dahawy and Conover,
2007) which may affect the extent of voluntary disclosure. The conservatism policy is
deeply rooted in the Egyptian culture (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2007) .
Comparing with prior disclosure studies, our results are comparable to the results from
other developing countries (e.g. 28% in Saudi market, Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003 and about
31% in the Malaysian capital market, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Ghazali and Weetman,
2006) . However, caution must be taken into consideration when one makes such
comparisons. In addition to different institutions in each of these developing countries, the
sample. time of study, the checklist and its components are also different.
Figure 7.3 Extent of voluntary disclosure categories of the four years
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Given that total voluntary disclosure score increase over time, it may be helpful to test
whether there is significant difference between total voluntary disclosure scores over the
period under investigation. To test whether the observed changes in the TVDS over the
period of study are statistically significant or not, a series of statistical tests have been
conducted. First, Skewness-Kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk normality tests have been done for
all variables representing group scores and TVDS. Testing for normality is essential to
determine the type of tests to be used (parametric tests or non-parametric tests). The results
indicate that voluntary disclosure scores are not normally distributed, so nonparametric
tests is recommended. Secondly, the issue of independence; i.e. independent samples or
related samples; should be assessed. In our case, the four years represent the groups. The
50 most active companies differ from year to year. Based upon the above, it was decided to
use non-parametric tests for both of independent samples (Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-
Whitney tests) and dependent samples (Friedman and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests).
Regarding the differences between the four years, results of both Kruskal-Wallis and
Friedman tests indicate that there is no significant difference between TVDS over the four
years. Additionally we investigated if there is a significant difference in the TVDS between
each pair of years, and the result was the same.
To test the effect of Egyptian Code of corporate governance on the extent of voluntary
disclosure, both Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests indicate that there is no
significant difference between TVDS before and after the Egyptian code. However, the
code may need some time to affect the disclosure practices.
In summary, although there was increasing in the extent of total voluntary disclosure
throughout the four years, this increase was not sufficient to be statistically significant.The
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following section presents descriptive analysis of the extent and the trend of each category
of voluntary disclosure practice.
7.4 The extent and trend of voluntary disclosure categories
Table 7.12 indicates the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure categories over the
period of study. It may be worth analyzing the extent and trend of each category. To do
this, we start with the average score of each category in each year and over the four years.
Such analysis provides a clear understanding to the disclosure policy that active companies
prefer to apply and the changes in this policy. In addition, it helps in understanding the
effect of culture on the disclosure decision. It can be seen from table 7.12 that there is
gradual increasing in the average score of each of the seven groups. However, the
increasing rate differs among the categories. For example, while the increasing rate in the
general information was 1.43%, 0.88%, and 3.77% for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006, the
increasing rate in corporate governance information was 9.97%, 12.98% and 24.67% for
the same years.
However, the structure of total voluntary disclosure is similar in each of the four years. For
the year 2003, the category of nonfinancial information has the highest score, about 46%,
followed by financial information (420/0), general information (40%), social responsibility
information (22%), shareholders information (19.5%), corporate governance information
(17.9%), and future information (12.6%). The same structure was found in the years 2004
and 2005. There was a little change in the year 2006; financial information has the highest
portion (48.89%) followed by non financial information (46.7%). Moreover, there is a
considerable increase in the category of corporate governance information after issuing the
Egyptian code of corporate governance in 2005. Corporate governance information in the
annual reports scored about 28% for the year 2006 while its score in 2005 was about 22%
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which implies the highest increasing rate 24.67%. However, forward looking information
has the lowest mean in all years, ranging from 12.6% in 2003 to 16.6% in 2006. Once
again, this is not an unexpected result. Secretive and conservative culture may be
reasonable explanation.
Figure 7.4 shows the bar chart of the seven categories over the four years. The figure
indicates the consistency of the voluntary disclosure structure over years. Although the
continuous increase in the extent of each category, there is no great change in the voluntary
disclosure policy. This suggests that the most active Egyptian listed companies manage
their voluntary disclosure policy. Moreover, the voluntary disclosure decision in these
companies tries to deal with the information needs of different stakeholders. However,
these results indicate that there is a room to increase the extent of disclosure in the annual
reports of Egyptian listed companies. These findings may motivate all interested parties in
the Egyptian capital market, especially Capital Market Authority (CMA), to provide the
relevant incentives that encourage the listed companies to disclose more information
voluntarily especially in the areas that may be affected by culture and therefore has the low
score such as forward looking information and corporate governance information.
Familiarity was identified as a possible reason for non compliance with mandatory
disclosure requirements in Egypt (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003). The same concept
may be more applicable with voluntary disclosure practices. Egyptian listed companies
may suffer from the lack of familiarity with the concept and the requirements of corporate
governance. Providing examples of corporate governance disclosure may help in justifying
the big increase in the average of corporate governance information in the year 2006. The
same apply with social responsibility information in years 2005 and 2006. In this regard
new institutional theory, the concept of isomorphism, may provide theoretical explanation
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to the increasing trend of voluntary disclosure practices. Companies with cross listing and
/ or foreign members on the board may be more familiar with the disclosure pattern of
developed countries and with the best practice of corporate governance. Such companies
may work as a bench marker. However, next chapter will examine the association of such
variables with voluntary disclosure.
Table 7-12 Extent of voluntary disclosure and its categories
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
General information (GI) 40.06 40.63 40.99 42.54 41.05
Financial information (FI) 42.32 45.48 45.94 48.89 45.64
Non financial information (NFl) 46.01 45.93 46.38 46.67 46.25
Future Information (FUI) 12.61 14.00 15.14 16.59 14.58
Corporate Governance Information (CG) 17.93 19.72 22.28 27.78 21.91
Shareholders Information (SHI) 19.57 21.11 25.36 25.19 22.80
Social Responsibility Information (SRI) 22.36 24.44 31.06 33.33 27.79
Total Voluntary Disclosure (TVDS) 28.47 29.86 32.16 34.31 31.19
The observed changes in voluntary disclosure score of the different categories raise
question about the statistical significance of these changes. To address this question we
applied the same statistical tests indicated in section 7.3 to each of the seven categories of
voluntary disclosure. Normality tests show that voluntary disclosure scores for the first
three categories were found to be normally distributed and the scores of the remaining
categories as well as the TVDS were not normally distributed.
219
Figure 7.4 Extent of voluntary disclosure categories
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For the seven categories, none of the statistical tests used (t-test was also used here as a
parametric test for differences between paired/related samples) revealed any significance
difference in the voluntary disclosure score over the period of study and also before and
after issuing the Egyptian Code of corporate governance. This confirms that companies
manage their disclosure policy. The following section presents in more details the results
of each item in the different categories of voluntary disclosure.
7.5 Descriptive analysis of the items of voluntary disclosure
This section analyzes the results of the checklist by items disclosed in each category. As
indicated before the checklist consistent from 46 information items classified into seven
groups. The following paragraphs provide descriptive analysis of the items disclosed in
each category.
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7.5.1 General information
The category of general information contains seven voluntary information items. As
indicated in table 7.12, the average of general information is about 41%. It can be seen
from the table that there is relative stability in the extent of this type of information over
the first three years. A low increasing rate can be noticed in the year 2006. Figure 7.4
shows the disclosure extent of this category.
Figure 7.5 Extent and trend of general information
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Table 7.13 presents the frequency of each item disclosed in this category. It can be seen
from the table that the highest average relates to information on the main projects and
products. Overall, the mean over the four years is about 73%. 133 annual reports of 182
annual reports investigated in the current study include this item in the annual reports. This
implies that companies are willing to notify the stakeholders about the main projects,
products, warehouses that may add to the firm value. The reason for disclosing such
information may be to advertise these products and to enhance the corporate image.
Referring to the secretive and conservative nature of Egyptian culture, disclosing
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information about the main products and projects may be considered as a signal to the
stakeholders about the future and the possibility to continue and growth.
The second highest score was awarded to the overview of trends in industry. The mean of
this item is 63.74%. 116 of 182 observations disclose information about the general trend
in the industry. Relatively, the highest average was for the year 2003, 65.22%. The
difficulties that Egyptian economy has faced during this year may explain this higher
average. The third rank in this group is for productive capacity which has mean 45.6%.
Moreover. table 7.13 shows that 26.92% of our sample discloses voluntarily information
about the corporate strategy. Information on the competition has average score 41.21 %. it
can be seen from the table that the mean of this item has increased from 34.78% in 2003 to
44.440/0 in 2006. This may reflect the increasing competition degree in the Egyptian market
in recent years. Using English language in the annual reports has mean 26.37%. The lowest
score was for information related to the organizational structure. About 10% of our sample
includes such type of information in their annual reports.
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Table 7.13 Frequencies of general information items
No 2003 2004 2005
2006 Pooled
Items
average sum average sum average sum average sum average sum
1.1 Statement of corporate Strategy. 23.91 11 26.67 12 28.26 13 28.89 13 26.92 49
1.2 Information on the principal products, project 71.74 33 75.56 34 76.08 35 68.89 31 73.07 133
1.3 Productive capacity. 47.83 22 46.67 21 41.30 19 46.67 21 45.60 83
1.4 An overview of industry. 65.22 30 62.22 28 63.04 29 64.44 29 63.74 116
1.5 Information on competitive environment. 34.78 16 44.44 20 41.30 19 44.44 20 41.21 75
1.6 Organizational structure. 10.87 5 8.89 4 8.70 4 11.11 5 9.89 18
1.7 Presenting annual reports in Arabic and 26.09 12 20.00 9 28.26 13 33.33 15 26.92 49English.
Total General information 0/0 40.06 40.63 40.99 42.54 41.05
Table 7.14 F ffi . I inf tion it
.I-
2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
No Items
average sum average sum average sum average sum average sum
2.1 Historical data & statistics for more than 2 43.48 20 53.33 24 50.00 23 46.67 21 48.35 88years
2.2 Any industry-specific ratios. 19.57 9 17.78 8 15.22 7 17.78 8 17.58 32
2.3 Using charts, Graphs, or figures. 43.48 20 51.11 23 54.35 25 55.56 25 51.10 93
2.4 Reasons, effects of acquisitions/disposals on 84.21 16 78.26 18 70.83 17 80 20 78.02 71
corporste results.
2.5 Financial Ratios (profitability, leverage, 84.78 39 82.22 37 86.96 40 88.89 40 85.71 156liquidity and other ratios).
2.6 Amount spent on training. 8.70 4 11.11 5 15.22 7 24.44 11 14.84 27
Total Financial review information % 42.32 45.48 45.94 48.89 45.64
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7.5.2 Financial information
The second category relates to financial information items. It contains six voluntary items.
It can be seen in table 7.12 that the average of financial review information is 45.64%. The
category of financial information has the second highest score over the four years.
However. the findings indicate that this type of information has the highest score in the
year 2006. the average score is 48.89%. These results are consistent with the recent review
of the corporate governance disclosure practices among leading enterprises in Egypt
(UNCTAD. 2007). Figure 7.6 shows the extent and the trend of this type of information
over the period of our study. As indicated in table 7.12 and the figure 7.6, the year 2003
has the lowest mean of financial review information which is 42.32%. This may be
explained in the view of the difficulties that Egyptian economy has faced over this period
as indicated in chapter three.
Figure 7.6 Extent and trend of financial information
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Table 7.14 presents the frequency of each item disclosed under this category. Not all
companies have merger, acquisition or disposal. Therefore, the current study recognizes
this issue when computing the score of disclosure to avoid any irrelevant penalty for
investigated companies. It may be worth mentioning that the reported percentages are
based on applicable items. It can be seen from the table that the highest average relates to
financial ratios. The average of this item over the four years is 85.71%. 156 of 182 annual
reports investigated in the current study include financial ratios, not just changes from the
last year. As can be noticed in table 7-20, the findings indicate that the item of financial
ratios disclosed has the first rank over the 46 items included in the checklist. The reason
for this may be because such type of information is easy to understand and also easy to
prepare. Moreover, the results imply that managers believe that financial ratios may help in
satisfying the information needs of several stakeholders.
The second highest mean relates to information on the reasons and effects of acquisition,
merger or disposal on the past results. The mean of this item is 78.02%, 71 annual reports
of 91 applicable annual reports over the four years. In this regard, a number of investigated
companies disclosed such information in the year of event and the years after. The reason
for disclosing this information may be the management's desire to provide indicator to the
effectiveness of changes that happened during the period of reporting and consequently the
effectiveness of the managers' decision. In general, this item was ranked the third item of
the highest disclosure items over the period of study, see table 7-20.
While about 51% of companies investigated in the current study use charts and graphs in
the annual reports, 48.35% of our sample revealed financial information and statistics for
more than two years. On the other hand, the lowest score is 14.84% which related to the
amount spent on training. The second lowest score is 17.58% for disclosing industry ratios.
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The reason for the low disclosure of these items may be attributed to the existence of other
qualitative information related to these items. Mangers may prefer to disclose qualitative
information more than quantitative, especially when the quantitative one will not add more
to the corporate image.
7.5.3 Non financial information
With regard to the category of non-financial information, six voluntary information items
are included under this type of information. These items cover different aspects and are
considered to be relevant to different stakeholders. As indicated in table 7.12 the disclosure
of non-financial information has the highest mean over the period of study. The average is
-+6.25% over the four years. The table also indicates that there is no wide variation in the
extent of non-financial information disclosed in each of the four years of the study. The
average of this type of disclosure is 46.01 %, 45.93%, 46.38%, and 46.67% for the years
2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. The mean is about 46% in each year. Figure 7.7
shows the extent of non financial information in each of the four years. These findings
suggest a relative stability in the disclosure extent of such information. The reason for
disclosing these items of information may be the desire of managers to response to the
information needs of many stakeholders in addition to improve the image of their
companies.
The frequency of items disclosed under this category of information is presented in table
7.15. As indicted in the table, information about human resources and training has the
highest mean in each year and over the four years. Its average is ranging from 66.67% in
year 2004 to 77.78% in year 2006. It can be noticed that Egyptian listed companies include
their annual reports information on human resource and training. However, the results
indicate a variation in items disclosed about the training. While about 38% of companies
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investigated reveal the number of employee trained over the period of reporting, only
1.+.840/0 of companies investigated, referring to table 7.14, reveal the cost of training, i.e.
amount spent on training. Once again, this suggests that mangers may prefer the qualitative
information more than quantitative information to send signals for stakeholders and
legitimize their companies. Moreover, it calls for more research on narrative disclosure in
emerging markets.
Figure 7.7 Extent and trend of Non financial information
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The second highest score under this category is 69.23% which is related to marketing
information. As indicated in table 7.15, the mean of this item is ranging from 66.67% in
year 2003 to 71 % in year 2004. These results may reflect the management awareness of the
importance of such information. Disclosing information related to principal markets may
be used as a signal to stakeholders about the effectiveness of the company and its
management. It may used also to demonstrate the available growth opportunities.
Productivity indicator has scored about 49% over the four years. As shown in the table,
there is decrease in the average of this item in 2006, 44.44%. This is can be viewed in
general with the higher average of financial information in the same year 2006. In other
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words, this suggests that compames may manage their disclosure policy to keep a
consistent level of disclosure over time. Information about research and development
activities was scored in average 25%. It can be seen that there is increasing trend in the
number of companies that revealed such type of information. However, the lowest average
under this category relates to market share. The results indicate that 24.73% of the
investigated companies, 45 of 182, disclose information about their market share.
7.5.4 Future information
As indicated before the forward looking information has the lowest average over the period
of study, 14.58%. It scored also the lowest mean in each of the years of study, 12.610/0,
14%, 15.14% and 16.59% in the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively. However,
the findings indicate a gradual increase over the four years. Figure 7.8 shows the extent
and the trend of future information disclosed in the annual reports. To get more
understanding of such type of disclosure, table 7.16 provides the frequency of future
information items disclosed by investigated companies.
Figure 7.8 Extent and trend of future information
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As shown in table 7.16, the most disclosed item is the effects of acquisitions or disposal on
the future results, 41.75%. It may be worth to noting that the percentage of this item is
based on the applicable item, 38 of 91 cases. While about 78% of the applicable annual
reports investigated in the current study disclose information on the reasons and effects of
acquisitions. merger and disposals on the past results, 41.75% only disclose information
about the effects of such transactions on the future results. The reason for disclosing such
item may be attributed to the management desire to improve the corporate image by
revealing the expected outcome of its decision. However, the results indicate that
companies prefer to reveal information about past results more than the future. In addition
to the cultural impact, this may be attributed to competitive disadvantages. Managers may
aim to avoid higher expectations by stakeholders and may tend of to be more careful about
the adverse effects on their companies
Moreover, the table indicates that the second highest score under this category is related to
the general discussion of future trends, 19.23%. This is followed by information on the
projected production plan and capacity, about 17%, and future expansion and capital
expenditure, 13.74%. Forecasting about market share and about earning and cash flow
scored the lowest average, 9.34% and 4.4% respectively. These findings imply that
companies are not willing to disclose quantitative forecasts. The reason for this low
average may be due to the culture effects; the relatively high degree of uncertainty
avoidance. Managers may prefer this disclosure practice, low or non disclosing more about
future, to avoid any adverse effects of such type of disclosure. Moreover, one of the
reasons behind the low level of future information disclosed in the annual reports may be
because managers prefer to use other information such as information about main products
and principal markets to signal the future; i.e. an indirect way to disclose looking forward
information.
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No 2003 2004 2005
2006 Pooled
Items
Average Sum average sum average sum Average Sum Average sum
3.1 Market share. 28.26 13 24.44 11 21.74 10 24.44 11 24.73 45
3.2 Number of employees trained 41.30 19 44.44 20 36.96 17 31.11 14 38.46 70
3.3 Company policy on human resources & 69.57 32 66.67 30 67.39 31 77.78 35 70.33 128
employee training.
3.4 Research and Development activities. 17.39 8 20.00 9 28.26 13 35.56 16 25.27 46
3.5 Productivity indicator. 50.00 23 48.89 22 54.35 25 44.44 20 49.45 90
3.6 Marketing network and the principal 69.57 32 71.11 32 69.57 32 66.67 30 69.23 126
markets.
Total Key non- financial statistics 0A. 46.01 45.93% 46.38°A. 46.67 46.25
Table 7.16 Frequencies of future information
.a
Items 2003 2004 2005 2006 PooledNo
Average Sum average sum average sum Average Sum Average sum
4.1 Effects of acquisition / disposals on future 42.1 8 47.82 11 37.5 9 40 10 41.75 38
results
4.2 Future expansion and capital expenditure 10.87 5 13.33 6 15.22 7 15.56 7 13.74 25
4.3 General discussion of future trends 19.57 9 15.56 7 19.57 9 22.22 10 19.23 35
4.4 Information on earnmg or
cash flow 2.17 1 4.44 2 4.35 2 6.67 3 4.40 8forecasts.
4.5 Information on production plan and capacity 17.39 8 13.33 6 17.39 8 20.00 9 17.03 31forecast.
4.6 Information on market share forecast 6.52 3 8.89 4 10.87 5 11.11 5 9.34 17
Total Future information 0/0 12.61 14.00 15.14 16.59 14.58
230
7.5.5 Corporate governance disclosure
The category of corporate governance information contains eight voluntary information
items. The disclosure of corporate governance practice is considered to be voluntary.
Companies are not enforced to disclose such information. As indicated before, the
Egyptian corporate governance code provides only guidelines of the best practice of
corporate governance. Unlike other countries such as UK and Malaysia, the Egyptian code
doesn't follow the rule of "comply or explain". The mean of this category of voluntary
disclosure is 21.91% over the period of the current study. Although this low level of
disclosure, the findings indicate a considerable increase in the extent of corporate
governance disclosure over the examined period. The mean has increased from 17.93% in
2003 to 27.780/0 in 2006. This result is considered to be reasonable after issuing the new
listing rules in 2002 and the Egyptian code of corporate governance in 2005. Figure 7.9
shows the extent and the trend of corporate governance disclosure in each of the four years.
Figure 7.9 Extent and trend of non-financial information
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The reason for such big increase may be attributed to the lack of the disclosure pattern of
corporate governance practices. As indicated in chapter three, corporate governance is a
new concept in the Egyptian environment, there was no clear view of such concept and its
principles. Most of Egyptian listed companies were unfamiliar and may look forward to
having example from the top companies. Companies with cross listing or with foreign
members on the board may be more familiar with corporate governance. As such, the
concept of isomorphism Inay help in explaining the gradual increase over the time. In
addition to the role of the top companies, issuing the Egyptian code of corporate
governance in 2005 may help in interpreting the big increase in 2006 by reducing the
unfamiliarity and providing the desired guidelines.
To get more understanding of the corporate governance disclosure practices, table 7.17
provides a closer analysis of the frequencies of disclosure items under this category. The
table indicates that the list of board members has scored the highest score, 78.57%. Most of
investigated companies include their annual report list of the names of board members. The
second highest score relates to using photos of chairperson and other members in the
annual reports, 34.62%. Disclosing such items may be attributed to the manger's desire to
enhance their managerial reputation and to the familiarity with such item. About 19% of
investigated companies include their annual reports statement about corporate governance
policy and the extent of implementation, 14 companies in 2006 compared to 4 in 2004.
However, all other items under this category have scored low average. 13.19% of
investigated annual reports were found to reveal information about the qualifications of the
members of the board. Although the importance of audit committee in corporate
governance, 9.34% of annual reports examined in the current study include information
about the committee and its members. The same average was scored to information about
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the executive and nonexecutive directors. The lowest scores are attributed to information
on shares held by board members and the compensation policy for top management; 2.75%
and 8.790/0 respectively. The low level of disclosure of the compensation and shares held
by directors in the annual reports may be attributed to considering this information; by
managers; as private and confidential so there is no need to include it in the annual report
which is for general purpose. Such information may be available on request for some
specific stakeholders: but not for all of them.
The findings indicate a wide variation In the average of items disclosed under this
category. It can be conclude that corporate governance disclosure in the annual reports of
Egyptian listed companies still premature. Even among companies that disclose such
information, the results indicate that a number of these companies may focus on the form
not the substance of corporate governance. Such companies may disclose to advertise
themselves and to improve their image.
Once again, the findings suggest a wide space of improvements that can be achieved
within this category of voluntary disclosure and also in the practice of corporate
governance principles. In other words, interested parties in capital market may benefit from
such findings to achieve both of de jure and de facto corporate governance and disclosure.
This is can be done by the reviewing the code of corporate governance and by applying the
concept of comply or explain and providing more details and guidelines of the best
practice. Moreover, increasing companies and managers' awareness of the importance of
corporate governance characteristics, such as audit committee, the role of non-executives,
shareholders protection, may help them to be familiar with such practice and will lead to
more transparency in the annual reports and other recent forms of communication.
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Table 7.17 Frequencies of corporate governance items
2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
No Items
Average Sum Average sum average sum Average Sum Average sum
5.1 List of board members. 78.26 36 77.78 35 80.43 37 77.78 35 78.57 143
5.2 Picture of chairperson and/or other 36.96 17 33.33 15 32.61 15 35.56 16 34.62 63
members.
5.3 Board member qualifications. 6.52 3 8.89 4 15.22 7 22.22 10 13.19 24
5.4 Number of shares held by board members. 2.17 1 2.22 1 2.17 1 4.44 2 2.75 5
5.5 Compensation policy for Top Management. 4.35 2 8.89 4 8.70 4 13.33 6 8.79 16
5.6 information on audit committee and its 2.17 1 6.67 3 10.87 5 17.78 8 9.34 17
members
5.7 Corporate governance codes, policies and 8.70 4 15.56 7 19.57 9 31.11 14 18.68 34implementation extent
5.8 composition of board: executives and non 4.35 2 4.44 2 8.70 4 20 9 9.34 17
executives
Total Corporate governance disclosure 0A. 17.93 19.72 22.28 27.78 21.91
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7.5.6 Shareholders information
Under the category of shareholders information, six voluntary information items are
identified. As shown in table 7.12, the mean of such category of disclosure is about 23%.
The average score of such information is ranging from 19.57% in 2003 to about 25% in
2006. The results indicate a low level of disclosure related to this type of information. The
extent and the trend of this category of disclosure is presented in Figure 7.10. It can be
seen from the figure that there is a gradual increasing in the extent of such disclosure.
Figure 7.10 Extent and trend of shareholders information
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Table 7.18 presentsthe frequencies of information items disclosed under this category. The
table indicates that the highest score is attributed to information on the majority
shareholders and composition of shareholding. 55.49% of annual reports examined in the
current study reveal such information item. Discussion of the risk and how companies
manage it is awarded the second highest score, 35.16%. The findings reveal an increasing
number of companies that include such information in their annual reports over the period
of study. The mean of this item has increased from about 26% in 2003 to 40% in 2006.
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This suggests that managers are willing to disclose more information about risk
management. The reason for that may be to signal the effectiveness of managers in
recognising and dealing with the business risk. In addition, keeping stakeholders update
with such information may help in managing their expectation about corporate results and
performance.
Moreover. 24.180/0 of the examined annual reports reveal information about the changes in
dividends per share from the last years. The lowest score relates to information about share
performance; about 50/0. This is followed by information on share price; about 6%; and on
the factors affecting dividends policy during the period; about 110/0. This low level of
disclosure related to share performance and dividends policy in annual reports may be
attributed to the existence of other sources for this type of information. In general,
shareholders have the right to access such information. Moreover, the performance of most
active companies and their shares are subject to analysis by financial analysts and the
capital market authority.
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•
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No 2003 2004 2005 2006
Pooled
Items
average Sum average sum average sum Average Sum Average sum
6.1 Composition of shareholdings and Majority 56.52 26 53.33 24 56.52 26 55.56 25 55.49 101
shareholders
6.2 Share performance, traded volume and value. 2.17 1 4.44 2 6.52 3 6.67 3 4.95 9
6.3 Share price information. 2.17 1 4.44 2 6.52 3 11.11 5 6.04 11
6.4 Factors affecting dividends policy. 8.70 4 6.67 3 15.22 7 13.33 6 10.99 20
6.5 Information on risk management 26.09 12 35.56 16 39.13 18 40.00 18 35.16 64
6.6 Dividends per share compared with previous years. 21.74 10 22.22 10 28.26 13 24.44 11 24.18 44
Total Stockholders information 0/0 19.57 21.11 25.36 25.19 22.80
Table 7.19 Frequencies of items disclosed in social responsibility category
_... --
2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
No Items
average Sum average sum average sum Average Sum Average sum
7.1 Environmental information 39.13 18 40.00 18 45.65 21 44.44 20 42.31 77
7.2 Community involvement 19.57 9 22.22 10 36.96 17 44.44 20 30.77 56
7.3 Charitable donations and sponsorship 45.65 21 40.00 18 39.13 18 28.89 13 38.46 70
7.4 Health and safety information. 19.57 9 31.11 14 34.78 16 37.78 17 30.77 56
7.5 Significant events calendar 8.70 4 8.89 4 10.87 5 15.56 7 10.99 20
7.6 Information on customer service 10.87 5 11.11 5 23.91 11 31.11 14 19.23 35
7.7 Award/ ratings received and attempts to get or 13.04 6 17.78 8 26.09 12 31.11 14 21.98 40
sustain it
Total Social responsibility information 0/0 22.36 24.44 31.06 33.33 27.79
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7.5.7 Social responsibility information
The last category in the checklist includes information items about corporate social
responsibility. Reporting on corporate responsibility has been identified as one of the
emerging issues in the area of corporate transparency. 'Including such information in
annual reporting not only meets the information needs of a range of stakeholders but also
offers the prepares a unique opportunity to showcase the conduct and contributions of the
enterprise with regard to economic and social development' (UNCTAD, 2006, p.28).
Seven information items are identified under this category. The mean of this type of
disclosure is 27.79% over the four years. The findings indicate a considerable increase in
the level of disclosure, from 22.36% in 2003 to 33.33% in 2006. This can be seen in figure
7.11 which shows the extent and trend of this category.
Figure 7.11 Extent and trend of corporate social responsibility information
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In addition, table 7.19 presents the frequency of each item disclosed over the period of
study. Environmental information has scored the highest average of disclosure under this
category, 42%. The table indicates a considerable increase in the disclosure extent in last
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two years of the current study compared with the first two years. This is the case for all
other information items included in this category which may reflect the increasing
awareness of corporate social responsibility. The second highest average was awarded to
charitable donations and sponsorship which scored about 38% over the four years. It can
be seen from the table that these two items, environmental information and charitable
donations and sponsorship, represent the highest score in the first two years 2003 and
2004. This may be an indicator that the investigated companies are more familiar with such
items than other items. The same is applying to some extent to information about the award
and ratings received.
Moreover, the table indicate that information about community involvement has scored
average 30.77%. The mean of this information item is ranging from 19.57% in 2003 to
44% in 2006. This may be explained by the increasing role that most active companies
play in Egyptian economic. As indicated in chapter two, Egyptian government allows and
encourages the private sector to lead the Egyptian economy. Therefore, such most active
companies may be willing to prove that they are aware about their social responsibility.
The findings are in line with the argument of Rizk et al (2008) that Egyptian companies are
willing to disclose environmental information in order to ensure their organizational
legitimacy and to avoid additional regulations.
The disclosure average of health and safety information is 30.77%. It is ranging from
19.75% in 2003 to 37.78% in 2006. Customer service information has scored about 19%
over the period of study. The results also indicate gradual increase in the disclosure of this
item which may be attributed to the degree of competition. The lowest average is allocated
to the significant events calendar, 10.99%. While four companies only disclose this
239
calendar in their annual reports of years 2003 and 2004, seven companies include this
information item in their annual reports in 2006.
In general, the findings indicate that investigated companies use annual reports to enhance
their image as good corporate citizens. In addition to promote themselves and portray their
companies, managers also may be willing to reduce the pressure that companies may face
from different stakeholders to be more social.
To end with the current chapter table 7-20 presents the rank of voluntary disclosure items
based on their average scores. As can be seen the top five items (disclosed by 70% or more
of investigated companies) are financial ratios, list of board members, reasons and effects
of acquisitions and disposal on corporate results, information on the principle products and
projects, and the policy of human resources and employee training. On the other hand the
lowest five items include number of shares held by members of the board, information on
earnings or cash flow forecasts, share performance, share price, compensation policy for
top management.
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No. Information item Average No. RankCompo
General Information
1.1 Statement of corporate Strategy. 26.92% 49 22
1.2 Information on the principal products, projects. 73.08% 133 4
1.3 Productive capacity. 45.60% 83 12
1.4 An overview of industry. 63.74% 116 7
1.5 Information on competitive environment. 41.21% 75 15
1.6 Organizational structure. 9.89% 18 38
1.7 Presenting annual reports in Arabic and English. 26.92% 49 23
Financial Information
2.1 Historical data and statistics for more than 2 years 48.35% 88 11
,.., ,.., Any industry-specific ratios. 17.58% 32 31_.-
J ., Using charts, Graphs, or figures. 51.10% 93 9-.j
2.-+ Reasons and effects of acquisitions / disposals on 78.02% 71 3
corporate results.
'1 - Financial Ratios disclosed (profitability and
_.)
leverage ratios, liquidity and other ratios). 85.71% 156 1
2.6 Amount spent on training. 14.84% 27 33
Non-financial information
3.1 Market share. 24.73% 45 25
3.2 Number of employees trained 38.46% 70 16
3.3
Company policy on human resources and 70.33% 128 5
employee training.
3.4 Research and Development activities. 25.27% 46 24
3.5 Productivity indicator. 49.45% 90 10
3.6 Marketing network and the principal markets. 69.23% 126 6
Future Information
4.1 Effects of acquisition / disposals on future results 41.75% 38 14
4.2 Future expansion and capital expenditure 13.74% 25 34
4.3 General discussion of future trends 19.23% 35 28
4.4 Information on earning or cash flow forecasts. 4.40% 8 45
4.5 Information on production plan
and capacity 17.03% 31 32
forecast.
4.6 Information on market share forecast 9.34% 17 39
Corporate Governance Information
5.1 List of board members. 78.57% 143 2
5.2 Picture of chairperson and/or other members. 34.62% 63 19
5.3 Board member qualifications. 13.19% 24 35
5.4 Number of shares held by members of the board. 2.75% 5 46
5.5 Compensation policy for Top Management. 8.79% 16 42
5.6 Information on audit committee and its members 9.34% 17 40
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5.7 Corporate governance codes, policies,implementation extent 18.68% 34 30
5.8 composition of board of directors: executives and 9.34%non executives 17 41
Shareholders Information
6.1 Composition of shareholdings and Majority
shareholders 55.49% 101 8
6.2 Share performance, traded volume and value. 4.95% 9 44
6.3 Share price information. 6.04% 11 43
6.4 Factors affecting dividends policy. 10.990/0 20 36
6.5 Information on risk management 35.16% 64 18
6.6 Dividends per share compared with previous years. 24.18% 44 26
Social responsibility Information
7.1 Environmental information 42.31% 77 13
7.2 Community involvement 30.77% 56 20
7.3 Charitable donations and sponsorship 38.46% 70 17
7.4 Health and safety information. 30.77% 56 21
7.5 Significant events calendar 10.99% 20 37
7.6 Information on customer service 19.23% 35 29
7.7 Award/ ratings received and attempts to get or 21.98% 40 27
sustain it
7.6 Summary and conclusion
To answer the first two research questions related to the extent and the trend of voluntary
disclosure over the period of the study, the current chapter provides a closer analysis to the
results of the checklist that has been constructed in the current study. It starts with
assessing the goodness of the disclosure index. Several tests have been done to assess the
reliability and validity of the index. The results of Cronbach's Alpha and the correlation
analysis confirm that our measure of total voluntary disclosure is reliable and valid.
As expected in emerging capital markets, the findings indicate that the level of total
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Egyptian listed companies is low. However, a
gradual increase in the extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories has been
noticed over the period of study. Statistical tests indicate no significant differences
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between voluntary disclosure scores over the four years. The voluntary disclosure structure
was consistent over the examined period. This suggests that Egyptian listed companies
manage their disclosure policy. Additional analysis before and after issuing the Egyptian
code of corporate governance in 2005 also indicates no significant differences between the
extent of total voluntary disclosure before and after the Egyptian code. This suggests that
the Egyptian code has no effect on the voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports.
Such conclusion may be explained based on the lack of familiarity in addition to the
absence of the concept of "comply or explain" in the Egyptian code of corporate
governance. However, caution must be taken into account when explaining such finding.
We examined the voluntary disclosure for only one year; 2006; subsequent the Egyptian
code of corporate governance. The effect of such code may need sometime to be reflected
in the annual reports.
Having documented the reliability and validity of the research instrument and answered the
first two research questions, the next chapter deals with the third research question related
to the determinants of total voluntary disclosure in corporate annual report.
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Chapter Eight: Statistical Results and Discussion
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter deals with the first two research questions of the current study, the
extent and the trend of voluntary disclosure practice. The current chapter aims to answer
the research question related to the determinants of voluntary disclosure practice.
Specifically it tests the research hypotheses related to corporate governance characteristics,
ownership structure and corporate characteristics. The chapter starts with descriptive
analysis of the variables included in the study in section 8.2. Section 8.3 presents the
bivariate analysis while section 8.4 summarizes the regression diagnostics. The statistical
results of multivariate analysis are presented in section 8.5. Section 8.6 presents discussion
of the statistical results and tests the research hypotheses. Section 8.7 summarizes the
regression results related to the categories of voluntary disclosure. The chapter ends with
conclusion in section 8.8.
8.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 8-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables in the
current study. As indicated in the table, the mean board size is about 9 members with
minimum 3 members and maximum 17 members. In addition it is notable that the average
of the proportion of non executive directors is about 79%. It ranges from 40% to 93%
which may reflect the vital role that non executive directors can play on the board and raise
a question about its effectiveness. Regarding ownership structure, it is clear that there is a
wide range of each of the three aspects, the average of block holders is about 15% and
ranges from 0 to 85%, the mean government ownership is about 25% and ranges from 0 to
95% and institutional ownership has a mean 10% and ranges from 0 to 51 %.
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In addition the four continuous firm characteristics, namely firm size, profitability,
liquidity and gearing, have wide ranges. Firm size ranges widely from 57.4 million
Egyptian pound to 49506 million Egyptian pound. Also profitability ranges from -306% to
96.8% with average 18.520/0. Liquidity has mean 1.59 and it ranges from 0.1 to 11.8 and
gearing ranges from 0 to 7 with average 0.46. Therefore these variables are highly skewed,
as can be seen from the table 8-1, which means that none of these variables is normally
distributed and may need a form of transformation. The figures in table 8-1 indicate that
observations have some extreme amounts (outliers) which need more attention during the
analysis process and the interpretation of the results. However more explanation for this
issue will be presented in the section of regression diagnostics (section 8.4.1).
Table 8-1 Descriptives for Regression Variables
Variable Mean Min. Max. S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
Board size 8.543956 3 17 2.880 0.237 2.396
Non executive directors 0.785184 0.4 0.933333 0.128 -1.504 4.862
Block holder ownership 14.68429 0 84.94 23.349 1.459 3.776
Governmental ownership 25.35467 0 94.93 28.922 0.856 2.503
Institutional ownership 10.19901 0 50.52 12.595 1.335 3.938
Firm size (million EP) 2852.491 57.355 49506.2 6390.108 4.667 27.755
I
Profitability (ROE) 18.52951 -306.83 96.8 32.801 -5.730 57.071
Liquidity 1.591225 0.101 11.882 1.243 4.096 30.087
Gearing 0.461742 0 7.101 0.881 4.266 27.098
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8.3 Bivariate analysis
8.3.1 Continuous independent variables
To start our analysis, this section examines the association between the extent of total
voluntary disclosure as the dependent variable and each of the continuous independent
variables. As indicated before, Pearson correlation as a parametric test and Spearman's
rank correlation as a non parametric test have been used in the current study. Table 8.2
presents the correlation coefficients based on the actual (untransformed) data.
The Pearson correlation coefficients (r) indicate that five explanatory variables are
significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the
investigated companies. Three of them represent firm characteristics; firm size,
profitability, and gearing; one is related to corporate governance; Board size; and the other
is governmental ownership. Regarding the corporate governance variables, the size of
board of directors is found to be significantly associated (at 1% and 5% significance levels)
with total voluntary disclosure. This suggests that the larger the size of the board, the more
information to be disclosed voluntarily. On the other hand, the percentage of nonexecutive
directors was found to have insignificant association with the extent of voluntary
disclosure. The results indicate weak association between total voluntary disclosure and the
percentage of non executive directors.
Regarding the three aspects of ownership structure, the percentage of block holder
ownership and institutional ownership are found to be not associated with total voluntary
disclosure. Similar to the percentage of nonexecutive directors, the correlation coefficients
suggest a weak association between total voluntary disclosure and the percentage of
institutional ownership. The results indicate that governmental ownership is associated
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negatively with total voluntary disclosure at 1% and 5% significance level. This suggests
that the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports increase with the decrease of
governmental ownership.
Table 8-2: Correlation coefficients between total voluntary disclosure
and continuous independent variables
Variable Pearson Spearman
Board size 0.25** 0.23**
Non executive directors 0.04 0.05
Block holder ownership 0.14 0.17*
Governmental ownership -0.21 ** -0.19*
Institutional ownership -0.01 0.01
Firm size 0.60** 0.58**
Profitability (ROE) 0.30** 0.42**
Liquidity -0.13 -0.17*
Gearing 0.26** 0.47**
** Significant at 1%, * significance at 5%
Moreover, three variables represent firm characteristics; firm SIze, profitability, and
gearing; were found to be positively associated (at 1% and 5% significance level) with the
dependent variable; total voluntary disclosure. It can be noticed that liquidity is not
observed to be significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure. According to the
results, companies with big size, high profitability, and high gearing ratio are willing to
disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports.
As indicated in table 8-2; the Spearman's rank order correlation coefficients support the
results from spearman test in respect of each of board size, firm size, profitability, and
gearing. All these variables are found to be significantly associated with total voluntary
disclosure at 1% and 5% significance level. Moreover, Spearman coefficients show
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consistent results with Pearson regarding the proportion of non executive directors and the
percentage of institutional ownership. However, results regarding other variables are
mixed. While the percentage of governmental ownership is found to be significant at 1%
and 5% level under Pearson test, it is found to be significant at 5% significance level under
Spearman test. Moreover, the' proportion of block holder ownership and liquidity were
observed to be significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure at 5% significance
level.
8.3.2 Categorical (nominal) independent variables
To test the association between the dependent variable and the categorical independent
variables in the current study, two statistical tests have been employed; t test as a
parametric test and Mann Whitney test as non parametric test. Table 8-3 presents the
results of both tests on total voluntary disclosure and the dummy independent variables.
The results indicate significant differences (at the 1% level) in the mean of voluntary
disclosure between groups in each of the categorical independent variables except role
duality. Both parametric (t test) and non parametric (Mann Whitney) tests returned the
same result.
Interestingly, companies with family members on the board were found to disclose more
voluntary information than companies without family members on the board (at 10/0
significant level). The existence of family members on the board may be inauspiciously
recognised by investors and other stakeholders who may feel that those members may
focus on their own interests. Therefore, managers in such companies may be motivated to
increase the extent of voluntary disclosure to mitigate the unfavourable effects. In addition,
voluntary disclosure by companies with foreign members on the board is considerably
more than companies without foreign members on the board. This suggests that foreign
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members have more experience with financial reporting and corporate governance issues,
and are aware of the interests of stakeholders. However, further discussion for these
variables will be provided in section 8.6.
Table 8-3 T test and Mann Whitney test for categorical independent variables
T test Mann Whitney test
Variable N Mean S.D. t -value Probe z- value Probe
Family members on the
board
-10.6356 0.000 -7.713 0.000
Yes 45 0.4673 0.1399
No 137 0.2608 0.1027
Foreign members on the
board -6.9031 0.000 -6.375 0.000
Yes 37 0.4417 0.1258
No 145 0.2787 0.1287
Role duality 1.3389 0.182 0.929 0.3531
Yes 137 0.3037 0.1348
No 45 0.3367 0.1673
Cross listing -8.6444 0.000 -6.347 0.000
Yes 21 0.5269 0.1106
No 161 0.2838 0.1224
Auditor type -7.8359 0.000 -6.448 0.000
Big four 65 0.4089 0.1596
Non big four 117 0.2579 0.0999
Industry type 3.4912 0.001 2.645 0.008
Manufacturing 150 0.2952 0.1271
non manufacturing 32 0.39 0.188
As indicated in table 8-3, the results of t test confirm that there is no significant difference
between the mean of total voluntary disclosure of companies with role duality and the one
of companies without role duality. This suggests that role duality doesn't significantly
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affect the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. The results of Mann
Whitney test; non parametric; support the results of parametric t test; z value is .0.929 and
the probability is 0.3531.
Regarding the firm characteristics, the results of both tests; parametric and non parametric,
indicate that the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies with
cross listing, audited by big audit firm, and non manufacturing companies is significantly
more than companies listed only in local capital market, audited by non big audit firm and
manufacturing companies. This indicates that companies with foreign listing are familiar
with the disclosure pattern and practice in western capital market. In addition, the results
support the idea of influence of the big audit firm on their clients to increase their
disclosure and transparency (Wallace et al.; 1994).
As such, bivariate analysis provides evidence of the relationship between the dependent
variable; total voluntary disclosure; and each of the independents variables. As indicated in
chapter two, a number of prior disclosure studies employed only such type of analysis (e.g.
Firth, 1979 and 1980; McNally et al.; 1982). However, it may be better to consider the
relationship between the dependent variable and all independent variables at the same time.
The majority of disclosure studies use both bivariate and multivariate analysis. Some of
these studies report that significant explanatory variables vary under both analyses (for
example, Hossain et al.; 1994, and Raffournier, 1995). The following section employs
multivariate analysis, multiple regression, to explain the variation in the extent of total
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active non financial Egyptian listed
companies.
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8.4 Multivariate analysis
Multivariate analysis, as an expression, is used to describe analysis of data that are
multivariate. Multivariate data consist of observations on several different variables for a
number of individuals or objects studied. It is commonly agreed that results of multivariate
analysis could not be attained without multivariate analysis (Chatfield and Collins, 1980
and Afifi et al. ~ 2004). Among multivariate analyses is regression analysis which is one of
the most common and widely used techniques in statistical analysis especially in disclosure
literature (Cooke. 1998). It is mainly used in situations where there is one or a group of
dependent variable/s that is thought to be a result of one or more independent variables, the
changes in the values of independents explain most of the changes in dependents' values.
The relationship between dependents and independents can take many forms, but generally
it is either 'linear' or 'non-linear'. When we have one dependent variable and two or more
independent variables, the regression model is said to be 'multiple'. As indicated before,
the current study examines the relationship between total voluntary disclosure as
dependent variable and a number of independent variables; board characteristics,
ownership structure and firm characteristics. Therefore, multiple regression model is
considered to be relevant to the current study. The basic and typical choice for the
relationship form between dependent and independents, as a starting point, is linear, so the
model is called "multiple linear regression model". The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression is considered to be a powerful technique especially when the model contains
continuous and dummy variables (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). However, there are
some assumptions must be satisfied before using the multiple linear regression analysis,
OLS. The following sections present the multiple regression model suggested in the current
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study, followed by the regression diagnostics that represent the first step to choose the
relevant statistical method to analyze the collected data in the current study.
Multiple Regression Model:
The multiple linear regression model can be represented, in its general form, as follows:
where:
Y : dependent variable
Xl, . 0 • , Xk: independent (explanatory) variables
{Jo, .. 0' (Jk: regression model coefficients (parameters).
j], ..., fi: functions (transformations) of independent variables, such that the
relationship between Yand eachf(.x) is assumed to be linear.
: random error
As illustrated in chapter five, the dependent variable is the total voluntary disclosure in the
annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies TVDS. The independent
variables contain proxies of three groups that expected to have ; based on the theoretical
framework and evidence from prior studies; a relationship with the dependent variable.
These independent variables contain continuous variables and categorical variables. The
continuous variables include board size, percentage of non executive directors, proportion
of block holder ownership, governmental ownership, institutional ownership, firm size,
profitability, gearing, and liquidity. On the other hand, the categorical variables include
family members on the board, role duality, foreign members on the board, cross listing,
industry type and auditor type.
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8.4.1 Regression diagnostic
Cooke (1998) highlights the importance of detailed data screening in disclosure studies to
assess the impact of distribution problems, non linearity, in addition to the problems of
outliers before deciding the appropriate statistical method. In general, there are several
methods to estimate regression coefficients (parameters). The linear regression is usually
used: OLS method. To justify using OLS, there are four principal assumptions.
1. Linearity: The relationship between the dependent variable and each independent
variable should be linear.
2. Independence and normality of Error: The error terms (Ej) are independent (successive
residuals are not correlated, no serial correlation) and identically distributed and follow
the normal distribution with constant mean zero and constant variance r:}.
3. Homoscedasticity: the variance of the error terms is constant for each observation (set of
Xi values).
4. There is no linear relationship between two or more independent variables (no
multicollinearity).
If any of these assumptions is violated (i.e., if there is nonlinearity, non-normality of
errors, heteroscedasticity and/or multiple correlation), then the results of regression model
may be inefficient or seriously biased or misleading. After running a multiple linear
regression analysis and estimating the values of the dependent variable (TVDS) and
therefore residuals (errors), one can check if the OLS linear regression is a good choice or
not by performing some model diagnostics that are basically based on checking the OLS
linear regression assumptions.
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8.4.1.1 Checking Linearity
The relationship between the dependent and independent variables should be linear. To
check this, one can look at the plot(s) of the residuals versus the independent variable
values, and if linearity exists, there will be no obvious clustering of positive residuals or a
clustering of negative residuals. Linearity can also easily be checked through plotting each
independent variable against the dependent variable and see how well does the fitted
regression line represent their relationship. The graphs for checking linearity of each
independent indicate that some of the independent variables in the model does not have an
obvious linear relationship with the dependent variable, especially firm characteristics
namely: profitability, liquidity, gearing and firm size.
This is either because of the presence of outliers or unusual observations, or because that
the linear model is not a good fit to describe the relation between the dependent variable
and each independent variable. As a result, it can be concluded that the linearity
assumption is not satisfied, and therefore the OLS estimators related to the nonlinear
relationship variables will not be unbiased. However, this result of non linearity is common
in the majority of prior disclosure studies (Cooke, 1998).
8.4.1.2 Checking Normality of Residuals
Normality implies that errors (residuals) should be normally distributed. Technically,
normality is necessary only for hypothesis tests to be valid. Normality of residuals can be
checked by two methods; graphical methods and numerical methods. Both of them;
normality plots and normality tests; have been employed in the current study.
Graphical methods
These are the most common plots to check the assumption of normality:
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• Q-Q plot: plots the quantiles of a variable against the quantiles of
Normal distribution.
• P-P plot: standardized normal probability plot.
• Histogram.
• Density estimate: plots the density of a variable and the normal density.
Using STATA, the normality plots were as follows:
Figure 8-1 Q-Q Plot
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Figure 8-3 Histogram, normal curve and Kernel density estimate
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Numerical methods ofNormality test:
There are many numerical methods can be used to test the assumption of normality.
Examples of these methods include Kolmogorov - Smirnov D statistic, skewness, and
Shapiro - Wilk W statistic. However, Kolmogorov - Smirnov D has been found to have
poor power properties. It is argued that it tends to suggest rejecting the null hypothesis
when the sample size is large and accept it when the sample size is small. On the other
hand, Shapiro - Wilk W statistic has been shown to have a good power against a wide
range of non normal distribution. If the value of p is small, then the data may not be
considered normally distributed. Skewnessis is a measure of how non symmetric a
distribution is. If the data are symmetrically or normally distributed, the computed
skewness will be close to zero (Afifi et al.; 2004).
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Therefore, the current study use STATA to employs two common tests for normality:
skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk for both the residuals and the dependent variable.
Tables 8-4 and 8-5 present the results of the two methods).
Table 8-4 SkewnesslKurtosis tests for Normality
Variable Pr(skewness) Pr(kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2
r 0.627 0.468 0.74 0.6892
TVDS 0.000 0.703 12.45 0.002
Table 8-5 Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Variable obs w v z Prob>z
r 182 0.99556 0.611 -1.129 0.87055
TVDS 182 0.95044 6.813 4.394 0.00001
The two methods of normality test, graphical and numerical method, suggest the same
result. It is clear from the previous results that errors are normally distributed which is
considered to be necessary for doing hypotheses testing about regression parameters. On
the other hand, it can be noticed that the dependent variable is not normally distributed,
and this is mainly related to the skewness of the distribution. One of the features of
disclosure studies is that the extent of disclosure, the dependent variable, is non negative
variable. The average of total voluntary disclosure score ranges from zero for non
disclosure to 100% for full disclosure. Statistically, this may lead to biased prediction
problem that may need to transform the dependent variable, using log odd for example
(Ahmed and Nichols, 1994).
1 Both methods have been employed after omitting the outliers and the results were the same; errors are
normally distributed and the dependent variable was not normally distributed.
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However. the main purpose of the majority of disclosure studies is to explain the
variability of the extent of disclosure among investigated companies not to predict the
disclosure level (Cooke, 1998). Therefore, normality of dependent variable is not our main
concern in this regard.
8.4.1.3 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals
The homoscedasticity assumption means that variance of the error terms is constant for
each observation. Graphical and numerical methods can be applied to check this
assumption. Graphically, one can look at plots of residuals versus predicted values (in
some situations, residuals can also be plotted versus some independent variables for further
analysis). and notice if residuals are getting larger (more spread-out) as a function of
predicted values. STATA provides two numerical methods for hetroscedasticity; Cameron
& Trivedi's decomposition of 1M test and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's
tests. The current study employs the graphical and numerical methods. Figure 8-4 shows
the graph representing residuals versus predicted values. Tables 8-6 and 8-7 present the
results of numerical tests.
Figure 8-4 The relationship between residuals and predicted values
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Nunlerical tests of heteroscedasticity:
Table 8-6 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's tests for Heteroscedasticity
Test Chi-square Prob>chi2
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 2.19 0.1388
White's 167.20 0.0133
Table 8-7 Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of 1M test for Heteroscedasticity
Source Chi-square df Prob>chi2
Heteroskedasticity 167.20 129 0.0133
Skewness 30.55 15 0.0101
Kurtosis 1.69 1 0.1941
Total 199.44 145 0.0018
The test results point out that errors have non-constant variance (heteroscedastic), which
indicate that the OLS estimators will not have the minimum variance of all unbiased
estimators, and also the P-values will be unreliable. In other words the current data suffer
from heteroscedasticity.
8.4.1.4 Checking for Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity implies that there is a linear relationship between two or more
independent variables. When multicollinearity exists, it will be difficult to differentiate the
individual effects of explanatory variables and OLS estimators may be biased; tend to have
large variances (Murray, 2006). Furthermore, if there is a perfect linear relationship among
the independents, the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. The
two common ways to check for the presence of multicollinearity between independent
variables are correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance
values. These two ways have been used widely in disclosure literature. The current study
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employs both of them to check whether the explanatory variables or the model suffer from
multicollinearity. Table (8-8) shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance
coefficients of each explanatory variable. Correlation coefficients (Pearson and Sperman)
for independent variables in the regression model are shown in Tables (8-9) and (8-10).
Table 8-8 VIF test results
Variable
Tolerance
VIF
(INIF)
Family members on the board 2.270 0.440
Firm size 2.150 0.466
Cross listing 2.070 0.483
Board size 2.040 0.490
Governmental ownership 1.910 0.523
~nstitutional ownership 1.730 0.577
Auditor type 1.700 0.587
Industry type 1.600 0.625
Foreign members on the board 1.500 0.667
~Iock holder ownership 1.500 0.668
!Percentage of non executive members 1.470 0.679
Gearing 1.380 0.724
Role duality 1.240 0.808
Profitability 1.200 0.833
Liquidity 1.150 0.873
Mean VIF 1.66
Regarding The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Gujarati (2003) indicates there is no
problem if the VIP is less than 10. However, others suggest that that the value of 5 can be
used as a rule of thumb (Groebner et al.; 2005). However, it can be seen from the table that
the maximum VIP is 2.27 and the mean VIP is 1.66. Moreover, the lowest tolerance
coefficient is 0.44. Therefore, the results of VIP and tolerance coefficients; based upon the
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rule of thumb: indicate that there is no an unacceptable level of multicollinearity in the
current study.
It is commonly agreed that the correlation matrix is a powerful tool for indicating the
relation between predictors. There has been no agreement among researchers regarding the
cut off correlation percentage (Alsaeed, 2006). While some researchers use 0.8; e.g.
Gujarati (2003); others suggest using 0.7; e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). Tables 8-9
and 8-10 present the correlation coefficients of parametric and nonparametric tests;
Pearson and Spearman Coefficients. It can be noticed from both tables that correlation
coefficients confirm the results of VIF. According to Pearson correlations (table 8-9), the
correlation coefficients of all continuous independent variables are less than 0.50. The
same can be concluded from Spearman's rank correlation which indicates that the highest
coefficient is 0.55. Based on these results, it can be concluded that there is no potential
multicollinearity problem in the current study.
8.4.1.5 Unusual and Influential Data
In any data set, there may be some observations that are inconsistent with other
observations; i.e. outliers; and can change the results of regression analysis. It is important
to have a quick check for such potential unusual observations in the data set and see how
they are different. Sometimes, this helps to identify possible errors in data entry.
An unusual observation can be either an outlier (observation with large residual) or an
influential data point (when removed, the estimated coefficients change significantly) or
observation with relatively high leverage (leverage is a measure of how far an independent
variable deviates from its mean).
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Table 8-9 Pearson Correlation
Bsize Nexc Block Gov lost Fsize ROE Gear Liq
Bsize 1
Nexc 0.488** 1
Block 0.022 0.117 1
Gov -0.306** -0.305** -0.39** 1
lost 0.475** 0.306** -0.102 0.004 1
Fsize 0.153* 0.071 -0.057 -0.149* -0.113 1
ROE 0.191** 0.025 -0.027 -0.033 0.131 0.177* 1
Gear -0.182* 0.048 0.125 0.046 0.008 0.161 * -0.113 1
Liq 0.083 0.036 -0.057 0.114 0.069 -0.146 -0.032 -0.234** 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 8-10 Spearman Correlation
-
Bsize Nexc Block Gov lost Fsize ROE Gear Liq
Bsize 1
Nexc 0.554** 1
Block 0.096 0.088 1
Gov -0.218** -0.152* -0.361** 1
lost 0.434** 0.313** 0.012 0.192** 1
Fsize 0.298** 0.160* 0.027 -0.110 -0.025 1
ROE 0.145 0.012 -0.156* 0.011 0.145 0.305** 1
Gear 0.058 0.117 0.117 -0.153* 0.044 0.360** 0.087 1
Liq 0.026 -0.043 -0.086 0.115 0.107 -0.136 -0.131 -0.433** 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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In STATA, one can examine his data set for unusual data points in several ways. One simple
and quick way is through a plot that shows the leverage by the residual squared to see if any
observations are jointly high on both of these measures. This can be done using the Ivr2plot
command. The following figure 8-5 shows this scatter plot.
Figure 8-5 Leverage vs. residuals scatter plot
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The horizontal reference line is the mean for leverage, and the vertical is the mean for the
normalized residual squared. As shown in the figure, it is clear that certain points are
obviously extreme. However, it is usual to have some observations that seem to be quite high
or low. So the question is: should these observations be removed or not? Afifi et al (2004)
indicate that statisticians differ in their opinions. Some of them prefer to remove these
outliers and others see that it is unethical to remove outliers for fear of biasing the results.
However, running the analysis twice, with and without outliers, enables the researcher to see
the effect of these observations on the results. To explore the effect of extreme observations
on the results and to avoid any possible unethical issues, it was decided to follow the last
approach of running the analyses twice. The following sections present the regression results
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-ased on all observations and also highlight the difference in results after omitting the
:mtliers.
8.4.1.6 Regression Diagnostic summary
Based on the results of the above graphical and numerical methods, it can be noticed that
there are some violations of OLS assumptions. The results suggest non-linearity for some
independent variables in addition to the problem of heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, the tests
indicate the normality of residuals, although the dependent variable was found to be not
normally distributed. In addition, the results of VIF and correlations coefficients confirm that
there is no multicollinearity.
The question now is how to deal with the violations of classical regression assumptions? To
answer this question, Draper (1988); as cited in Cooke (1998); identified four approaches as
follow:
1. To do nothing approach
2. The data analytic approach: investigate influential observations and transformations.
3. The model expansion approach: departure from assumptions once found
4. The robust approach: use non classical techniques such as M - estimators.
The first approach is considered to be impractical because it ignores the problem and the
results will be unreliable. Therefore it was decided to reject this approach. The second
approach; data analytic approach; is widely used within the context of linear regression. The
common way to deal with such assumption violations is to transform the data.
Transformation is considered to be helpful in regression analysis especially in the case of non
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linearity. non normality and / or heteroscedasticity problems (Cooke, 1998). In the context of
disclosure literature. Cooke (1998) argues that
"Scholars undertaking research on disclosure issues should pay attention to the
structure of the data and, when necessary, consider the appropriateness of
transformations" (p 209)
However. there are many forms of transformation. Common transformations include
logarithmic, inverse, exponential, square and, square root. When using transformations, one
should choose between transformations that are valid for each specific variable. By valid, we
mean that transformation keeps the basic structural differences between values (for example
negative and positive values). STATA has an option called ladder of powers that
automatically produces power transformations for various values of P Also STATA through
the command "Inskewu" considers all transformations of the form In ( X -k) and finds the
value of k which makes the skewness approximately equal to zero. If skewness is around zero
0.000 (- or +) that means the transformed variable fits a normal distribution much better than
the original data (Afifi et al.; 2004).
On the other hand, it is not easy to evaluate the usefulness of transformation especially in the
case of small sample size or outliers. Therefore it may be helpful to perform the analysis with
and without the transformation. By examining the results of both analyses one will be sure
that the conclusion is not altered after transformation (Afifi et al.; 2004).
The third approach, the model expansion approach, requires examining data as in the second
approach and when departures are found they are modelled directly on the raw data scale
through a broadening of the parametric model. A leading example of this approach can is
Generalized Linear Models (Draper, 1988). In addition, one can choose another test; non
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classical technique: which doesn't necessarily require fulfilling these assumptions; i.e. the
fourth approach according to Draper (1988).
Based on the above discussion, it has been decided; for the purposes of the current study; to
follow the approaches of Draper (1988), except the first one. The study has employed
transformation to deal with the problems of nonlinearity and heteroscedasticity. In addition, it
was decided to use tests other than OLS regression, namely GLS, Tobit and Quantile
regression. Using several forms of transformation and regression tests provides opportunity to
clarify the answer of research questions by identifying variables that have most significant
relationship with the dependent variable; total voluntary disclosure. Moreover; using several
approaches is recommended to ensure that the results are not method driven but are robust
across methods (Cooke, 1998). As such, the three approaches add more robustness to the
results and conclusion of the present study. The following section presents the results of
regression analyses and the rational for choosing each of regression tests.
8.5 Regression Analyses
8.5.1 OLS regression analysis
OLS with Transformed data and normal scores
The majority of disclosure literature has employed several forms of transformation to
overcome the problems of not satisfying with the linear regression assumptions. Examples of
prior disclosure studies that employ rank transformation include Lang and Lundholm (1993);
Wallace et al. (1994); Wallace & Naser (1995); Owusu-Ansah (1998), and Abd-Elsalam
and Weetman (2003). On the other hand, normal score transformation has been used by a
number of prior studies such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006).
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The issue of transformation in disclosure studies has been examined by Cooke (1998) who
reviews using rank regression and suggests replacing the data with their normal scores. Under
rank regression, the observations are transformed based on its ranking from the smallest one
to the largest one (Iman and Conover, 1979). Rank transformation is relatively insensitive to
outliers and is considered to be distributed free, and for that reason ranks can be used to
develop tests of heteroscedastisty and serial correlation {Cheng et al, (1992) and Cooke
(1998)}. However. rank transformation suffers from some weaknesses. Under such type of
transformation which is distribution free, caution must be taken in testing for and interpreting
the significance of F and t test. In addition, the error structure cannot be normal and the
mapping of individual observations to ranks is a somewhat arbitrary transformation (Cooke,
1998).
Cooke (1998) proposes using normal scores instead of ranks as an extension of rank method.
Normal scores are based on Van Der Waerden approach; transforming actual observations to
the normal distribution by dividing the distribution into the number of observations plus one
region on the basis that each region has equal probability. Cooke indicates that the main
advantage of replacing the ranks by normal scores is that the resulting tests would have exact
statistical properties because (a) significance levels can be determined, (b) the F and t-tests
are meaningful and (c) the power of the F and t-tesls may be used. Moreover, the regression
coefficients derived using normal scores are meaningful. In addition, it offers a means
whereby a non-normal dependent variable may be transformed into a normal one; a further
advantage over ranks.
Based on the above discussion, transformation has been decided to be employed in the
current study to deal with the problem of assumptions' violation. Several regression models
were run based on different transformations. We transformed the independent variables that
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seem to have a nonlinear relation with the dependent variable, and to deal with the
heteroscedastisty, we transform the dependent variable which is not normally distributed'. In
addition, it is recommended to transform the dependent and independent variables to their
normal scores, not only the dependent one, to keep the relationship between the dependent
variable and all independent variables (Cooke, 1998). Therefore, we used normal scores to
transform the dependent and all continuous independent variables. Table 8-11 presents
summary of the results of regression analyses.
As indicated in table 8-11 there is a little difference in the adjusted R square and the
significant variables under the different transformations. The adjusted R square in the first
model was about %64 which is slightly higher than the adjusted R square in the second
model, full normal scores %63. This implies that over %60 of the variation in total voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports of investigated companies can be explained by the proposed
model in the current study. The R-squared is comparable to Depoers (2000) 65% and higher
than Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 47.9% and Barako, et al (2006) 53.4%; but it is lower than
Hassan et al (2006) 86.3%. The coefficients of the independent variables show the direction
and the magnitude of the relationship with the dependent variable. In case of corporate
governance characteristics results of the first model indicate that two variables are positively
associated (at level 10/0) with total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports; the existence of
family members on the board and the existence of foreign members on the board. The
percentage of non executive directors was found to be negatively associated with total
voluntary disclosure at level 5%. However, the results of the first model indicate that both of
role duality and board size were not associated with total voluntary disclosure.
2 Transforming the independent variables is more preferable than transforming the dependent variable (Cooke,
1998). The reason is the disturbing of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent
variables and the change in the error distribution. However, given the problems of heteroscedastisty and non
normal dependent variable we transform the dependent variable in our multivariate analysis.
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Table 8 -11 Results of regression analyses
Variable OLS Normal scoring
Coefficient p>t Coefficient p>t
Corporate Governance
Family members on the board 0.724054 0.000 0.69316 0.000
Role duality 0.118414 0.295 0.116656 0.310
Board size 0.036612 0.105 0.067613 0.319
Non executive directors -0.86487 0.040 -0.09022 0.119
Foreign members 011 the board 0.49188 0.000 0.468973 0.001
Ownership Structure
Block holder ownership -0.00114 0.619 -0.02356 0.724
Governmental ownership 0.004085 0.052 0.110137 0.092
Institutional ownership 0.006028 0.214 0.082857 0.186
Firm Characteristics
Cross listing 0.469581 0.009 0.527075 0.003
Auditor type 0.385814 0.001 0.346267 0.004
Industry membership 0.216089 0.130 0.144515 0.318
Firm size 0.108301 0.030 0.154081 0.013
Profitability 0.171834 0.001 0.186912 0.001
Gearing 0.44187 0.000 0.226133 0.000
Liquidity 0.109033 0.157 0.076476 0.157
Constant -1.50629 0.002 -0.66445 0.000
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
R- squared 0.6694 0.6589
Adjusted R- squared 0.6396 0.628
Using normal scores for all variables, model two, the results support the significance
association of the existence of family members and foreign members on the board (at level
1%) with total voluntary disclosure. also it was found that both of role duality and board size
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were not associated with total voluntary disclosure. However, contrary to the first model, the
percentage of non executive directors was found to be insignificant variable.
Regarding ownership structure, none of the three aspects of ownership structure was found to
be significant at the levels 1% or 5% in the first model. The percentage of block holder
ownership has a negative association but insignificant also institutional ownership was
insignificant but with positive association. However, governmental ownership was found to
be significant only at the 10% level. The second model provided the same results, the
percentages of block holders and institutional ownership were found to be insignificant. In
addition, governmental ownership was found to be marginally significant at the 10% level.
In respect of corporate characteristics, five variables were found to have significant
association with total voluntary disclosure in the first and the second models. These variables
are cross listing, auditor type, profitability, gearing at the 1% level and firm size at the 5%
level. Industry membership and liquidity were found to be insignificant variables in both
models.
8.5.2 GLS regression analysis
The regression diagnostic indicates heteroscedastisty in the current study. There are several
reasons for this case of unequal variance, e.g. outliers and skewness. In such case of
heteroscedasticity, it is preferred to give less weight for observations coming from
populations with greater variability than the weight given for observations from populations
with smaller variability. However, OLS does not make use of the information contained in
the unequal variability of the dependent variable since it assigns equal weight to each
observation. Generalized least squares GLS is OLS on the transformed variables that satisfy
the standard least-squares assumptions. As such, GLS minimizes a weighted sum of residual
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squares not minimizing an un-weighted or equally weighted as OLS. (See Gujarati, 2003,
pp.388-398)
To benefit from the advantages of panel data analysis in the current study we employed
pooled generalized least squares GLS (unbalanced). The results are shown in table 8- 12.
Table 8 - 12 Results of GLS regression
Number of obs 182 Wald chi2(l5) 523.21
Number of groups 4 Prob. > chi2 0.000
TVDS Coef. z P>z
Family members on the board 0.1047 5.230 0.000
Role duality 0.0180 1.300 0.195
Board size 0.0073 2.650 0.008
Non executive directors -0.1257 -2.490 0.013
Foreign members on the board 0.0604 3.670 0.000
Block holder ownership -0.0003 -1.050 0.295
Governmental ownership 0.0004 1.710 0.088
Institutional ownership 0.0004 0.700 0.483
Cross listing 0.0889 4.120 0.000
Auditor type 0.0460 3.180 0.001
Industry membership 0.0183 1.050 0.293
Firm size 0.0238 3.990 0.000
Profitability 0.0229 3.550 0.000
Gearing 0.0507 3.530 0.000
Liquidity 0.0092 0.950 0.342
cons 0.0517 0.910 0.363
-
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According to the results of GLS in table 8-12, four variables of corporate governance
characteristics were found to have significant association, at the 1% and 5% level, with total
voluntary disclosure. The existence of family member on the board, board size, and the
presence of foreign members on the board were positively significantly associated with total
voluntary disclosure at the 1% level. While the proportion of non executive directors was
significant variable at the 50/0 level, it was found to have negative association with total
voluntary disclosure. On the other hand role duality did not appear to have significant
association with the dependent variable.
Regarding the three aspects of ownership structure, the results of GLS were similar to the
results of OLS, the two models. None of the three aspects of ownership structure, block
holders. governmental, and institutional ownership, was found to be significant at the levels
1% or 50/0. The only significant variable was governmental ownership but at the 10% level. In
addition, the results were identical in the sign of coefficients. The percentage of block holder
ownership has a negative association but insignificant while governmental ownership and
institutional ownership have positive association.
With respect to corporate characteristics, five variables were found to have significant
association with total voluntary disclosure. These variables are cross listing, auditor type,
firm size, profitability, and gearing. The results of GLS are identical with the both models of
OLS. The only difference is related to firm size that was found, using GLS, to be positively
significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure at the 1% level, not at the 5% level as
it is suggested with OLS. Moreover, the results of GLS confirm that there is no significant
relationship between total voluntary disclosure and both of industry membership and
liquidity.
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From the above discussion, it can be noticed that there is agreement between the results of
OLS and GLS about the significant variables related to ownership structure; Governmental
ownership at the 10% level; and corporate characteristics; cross listing, auditor type,
profitability, gearing, and firm size. The level of significant was varying in respect to firm
size, 5% with OLS and 1% with GLS.
On the other hand, the results of OLS and GLS are different regarding the corporate
governance characteristics. While GLS indicated that four variables; namely the existence of
family members on the board, board size, the proportion of non executive directors, and the
presence of foreign members on the board; were identified as significant determinant of total
voluntary disclosure. The results of OLS; in both employed models, indicated that board size
does not have significant relationship with total voluntary disclosure. In addition, there are
different results about the proportion of nonexecutive directors which it was found be
insignificant in the second model, normal scores, while the first model and GLS indicated
that it is significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure. However, the three models
agree about the direction of such relation, negative association.
In the light of above results and following the fourth approach of Draper (1988), it was
decided to go through further analysis to clarify the conflict of the results of OLS and GLS
and to provide sensitivity analysis in the current study. The following paragraphs provide
details of the further analysis.
8.5.3 Further Analysis
Although transformation can be used to deal with the violation of classical linear regression
assumptions, researchers may face a number of problems when transforming their data and
therefore some general guidelines should be followed (see, Hair et al 1998). However, the
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existence of outliers may affect the results even with transformed data. Therefore it is
recommended to employ statistical techniques that put less emphasis on such outliers. In this
regard, Cooke (1998) points out that consideration should be given to using generalised
maximum likelihood estimators; M - estimators. In addition, robust regression analysis such
as quantile regression is another example of those techniques that focus on minimizing the
sum of absolute residuals not the sum of squared errors as in OLS (Salama, 2005). In the
current study, \V~ employed two additional tests; Tobit regression and quantile regression.
8.5.3.1 Tobit Regression
As indicated before, the dependent variable, total voluntary disclosure, is non negative
variable. All values of the total voluntary disclosure are positive. In addition none of
companies investigated in the current study scores zero, the minimum score was 0.0682 and
the maximum score was 0.7608 as shown in table 7-11. That means our dependent variable is
limited dependent variable, both left censored and right censored, that may causes bias in the
results of classical linear regression. Tobit regression generates a model that predicts the
outcome variable to be within the specified range (See: UCLA). The Tobit model is one of
limited dependent variable regression models that may be suitable in this case (Tobin, 1958
and Gujarati, 2003).
Tobit regression provides Pseudo-R squared. In such regression, the model estimates are
maximum likelihood estimates which are reached through an iterative process. There are
many formula or methods to compute Pseudo R square. In the current study, it is computed
based on McFadden's method which is used in STATA and allowed for negative pseudo-R'.
The Pseudo-R square is not equivalent to R square in OLS and therefore one cannot compare
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both of them:'. As a further analysis, we use censored regression (Tobit) as a non parametric
analysis to retest our model. STATA provides opportunity to employ Tobit as censored
regression. Table 8-13 shows the results.
As seen in table 8-13 four variables of corporate governance characteristics were identified as
significant determinants of total voluntary disclosure. Two of these variables, namely the
existence of family members on the board and the presence of foreign members on the board,
were significant at the 1% level. The other two variables, namely board size and the
proportion of non executive directors were found to be significant determinants of total
voluntary disclosure at the 5% level but with different directions; board size was positive
association and the percentage of non executive directors was negative. The only variable of
corporate governance that found to be insignificant was role duality. As such the results of
Tobit regression confirm the results of GLS in respect of corporate governance
characteristics.
Concerning the three aspects of ownership structure, the results of Tobit regression were
identical with the results of OLS and GLS. Governmental ownership was found to be
insignificant variable at the 1% and 5% level but it 'was marginally significant at the 10%
level. Block holder ownership was found to have a negative association with total voluntary
disclosure but insignificant and institutional ownership was found to have positive
association but also insignificant.
As for corporate characteristics, there was no difference between the results of GLS and
Tobit. The five significant variables of corporate characteristics in OLS and GLS; namely
3 For more details see http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/multpkg/faq/general/PsuedoRSquareds.htm
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cross listing, auditor type, firm size, profitability, and geanng; were found also to be
significant at the 1% level using Tobit regression.
Table 8- 13 Tobit regression results
Number of obs. 182.000
LR chi2(15) 244.710
Log likelihood = 211.764
Probe > chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 -1.369
TVDS Coef. t P>t
Family members on the board 0.1108 5.390 0.000
Role duality 0.0179 1.270 0.207
Board size 0.0067 2.400 0.018
Non executive directors -0.1125 -2.150 0.033
Foreign members on the board 0.0574 3.440 0.001
Block holder ownership -0.0003 -1.180 0.238
Governmental ownership 0.0004 1.670 0.097
Institutional ownership 0.0004 0.710 0.480
Cross listing 0.0921 4.140 0.000
Auditor type 0.0460 3.100 0.002
Industry membership 0.0191 1.070 0.285
Firm size 0.0248 3.990 0.000
Profitability 0.0221 3.360 0.001
Gearing 0.0520 3.430 0.001
Liquidity 0.0098 1.020 0.312
cons 0.0375 0.640 0.526
-
/sigma 0.073357
Obs. summary: 1 left-censored observation at TVDS <=.0681818
180 uncensored observations
1 right-censored observation at TVDS >=.76086962
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8.5.3.2 Quantile Regression
Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduce Quantile regression methods which offer a mechanism
for estimating models for the conditional median function and the full range of conditional
quantile functions. Quantile regression methods are looking for minimizing the sum of the
absolute residuals not the sum of squared residuals as in classical linear regression. Contrary
to the classical regressions techniques and M estimators that deal with variable means,
Quantile regression focuses on the median. Koenker and Hallock (2001) explain that:
"Just as lee can define the sample mean as the solution to the problem of
minimizing a sum ofsquared residuals, we can define the median as the solution
to the problem of minimizing a sum of absolute residuals. The symmetry of the
piecewise linear absolute value function implies that the minimization of the sum
of absolute residuals must equate the number ofpositive and negative residuals,
thus assuring that there are the same number ofobservations above and below the
median. (p.145)
Regression quantile methods provide; through supplementing the conditional mean with an
entire collection of conditional quantiles, a much more complete statistical analysis of the
stochastic relationships among variables. Moreover, they are more robust against possible
outliers; skewed tails; and heteroscedasticity, and can be computed via traditional linear
programming methods. In addition such methods provide wider explanation of the impact of
independent variables on the dependent variable than traditional regression (OLS) that focus
on the mean (See: Buchinsky and Hahn (1998), Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
"The quantile regression results offer a much richer, more focused view of the
applications than could be achieved by looking exclusively at conditional mean
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models. In particular, it provides a way to explore sources ofheterogeneity in the
response that are associated with the covariates." (Koenker, 2005, P.25)
As such, this feature of Quantile regression is likely to be particularly helpful in the context
of voluntary disclosure in the current study. Therefore, it was decided to employ Quantile
regression in order to check the results of OLS, GLS and Tobit. STATA provides quantile
regression as one of non parametric analysis. Table 8-14 shows the results of Quantile
regression.
As can be seen from the table, the results of quantile regression confirm the results of GLS
and Tobit regarding the characteristics of corporate governance. Role duality is the only
variable of board characteristic that found to be insignificant. All other board characteristics
were found to be significantly associated with total voluntary disclosure; the presence of
family members on the board (at the 1% level), board size, the percentage of nonexecutive
directors, and the existence of foreign members on the board (at the 5% level). These
significant variables have positive association with the dependent variable (TVDS) except the
percentage of non executive directors that found to have negative association.
Concerning ownership structure, quantile regression results indicate that none of the three
aspects of ownership was found to be significant. Similar to the results of OLS, GLS, and
Tobit, block holder ownership was found to be insignificant but with positive sign not
negative and institutional ownership has positive association with total voluntary disclosure
but also insignificant. On the other hand, quantile regression provides contradictory result to
the other techniques; OLS, GLS and Tobit; regarding governmental ownership. As indicated
in the table, governmental ownership was found to be insignificant variable. However, it may
be worth to mention that the reported significant association between governmental
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ownership and total voluntary disclosure using OLS, GLS, and Tobit was weak (marginally
significantly at the 100/0 level).
Table 8- 14 Results of Quantile regression
Median regression
Raw sum of deviations 20.15613 (about .27272731) No.ofobs. 182
Min sum of deviations 10.78453 Pseudo R2 0.465
TVDS Coer. t P>t
Family members on the board 0.0974 3.630 0.000
Role duality 0.0114 0.580 0.561
Board size 0.0088 2.330 0.021
Non executive directors -0.1782 -2.370 0.019
Foreign members on the board 0.0431 2.000 0.048
Block holder ownership 0.0002 0.520 0.605
Governmental ownership 0.0005 1.450 0.148
Institutional ownership 0.0013 1.620 0.108
Cross listing 0.0883 2.690 0.008
Auditor type 0.0542 2.620 0.010
Industry membership 0.0083 0.340 0.736
Firm size 0.0000 4.280 0.000
Profitability 0.0007 2.540 0.012
Gearing 0.0300 3.390 0.001
Liquidity -0.0031 -0.580 0.565
cons 0.2258 3.440 0.001
-
With reference to corporate characteristics, quantile regression provides identical results to
the other techniques. The same five significant variables, namely cross listing, auditor type,
firm size, profitability, and gearing were found to have significant association with total
voluntary disclosure at the 1% level; except firm size which it was significant at the 5% level.
Similar to the other statistical techniques employed in the current study, industry type and
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liquidity were found to be insignificant variables to explain the variation in total voluntary
disclosure. The difference here is related to the sign (direction) of the liquidity it was negative
not positive as in other techniques.
As such. the further analysis using Tobit and Quantile regression supports the results of GLS;
except governmental ownership under the quantile regression. This is adding to the
robustness of the results. The following section discusses the results of the different statistical
techniques employed in the current study.
8.6 Discussion of statistical results
This section discusses the results of the statistical results to identify the determinants of total
voluntary disclosure by testing the hypotheses of the current study. Firstly it starts with the
corporate governance characteristics and then the aspects of ownership structure followed by
the firm characteristics. Tables 8-15 , 8-16 , and 8-17 provide comparison among the results
of employed statistical techniques.
8.6.1 Corporate governance characteristics
Five variables related to board characteristics have been investigated in the current study
using bivariate and multivariate analyses. A summary of the results of the statistical
employed techniques is presented in Table 8-15
Family members on the board Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the
existence of family members on the board is significant variable. As can be seen in the table
8-15, there is agreement among all statistical techniques about the positive significant
association of the existence of family members on the board with total voluntary disclosure at
99% confidence level. This means that companies with family members on the board are
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willing to disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports. This result is
consistent with Ali et al (2007) who indicate that US family firms make better disclosure than
non family firms and Chen et al (2008) who find that family companies disclose more
earnings warnings. Our results also are in line with the argument of Wang (2006) who
challenged the traditional view of the greater incentives of family companies to
opportunistically manage earnings. However, such strongest positive association IS
inconsistent with the evidence from prior disclosure studies in emerging capital markets, such
as Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in Malaysia and Ho and Wong
(2001a) in Hong Kong; that report negative significant association between the proportion of
family members on the board and the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports.
Table 8-15 Board characteristics: results summary
OLS
Bivariate
Corporate Governance Variables Model Model GLS Tobit Quantile
analysis
1 2
Family members on the board *** *** *** *** *** ***
Role duality
Board size *** *** ** **
Non executive directors (-) ** (-) ** (-) ** (-) **
Foreign members on the board *** *** *** *** *** **
*** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5%
The positive association of family members with total voluntary disclosure is considered to
be interesting result since it suggests that some determinants of voluntary disclosure practice
in emerging capital markets are similar to those in developed countries. Such positive
association can be explained by the key role played by these companies, as part of private
sector, in the Egyptian program for economic reform. As indicated in chapter three, the
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CASE cooperates with the top ten listed companies, which includes a number of family - led
companies, to increase disclosure and transparency and to enhance corporate governance
practices. In addition these companies are not closed companies and benefit from banking
loans and trading. So these publicity traded family companies are in the public eye which
may encourage them to reduce the political costs by providing more disclosure for different
stakeholders. Moreover, family owners may have greater litigation and reputation cost
concerns (Chen et al, 2008). In addition, such companies aim to legitimize themselves by
disclosing information more than the requirements. Additional explanation for such
relationship is the management desire to avoid or reduce the adverse effects of the negative
impression that potential investors may feel about the power of family members to influence
the decision making. Furthermore, companies with family members on the board aim to
reduce the severity of the second type of agency problems that arises between controlling and
non controlling shareholders (Ali et al.; 2007). Based on the statistical results, the hypothesis
H1.3 in the current study is accepted.
Board leadership (Role duality) The insignificant association of the role duality in
parametric and non parametric tests in the bivariate analysis is confirmed by all statistical
methods employed in the multivariate analysis. The table 8-15 indicates that role duality has
a positive association with the extent of voluntary disclosure but insignificant. The results
suggest that the variation in the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the
most active Egyptian listed companies cannot be explained by the separation between the
CEO and the chairman. This result is consistent with Arcay and Vazquez (2005) in Spain;
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) in Singapore, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in Malaysia and
Barako et al (2006) in Kenya; who report lack of a significant relationship between role
duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, it contradicts with the findings of
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Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Gul and Leung (2004) who reported a significant negative
relationship between role duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports.
As indicated before the role duality is the dominant form in the Egyptian business
environment. About 75% of the investigated companies have role duality. As mentioned
before. the Egyptian code of corporate governance, which is just guidelines not requirements,
recognises this issue in its paragraph 3.6 and encourages companies with role duality to
appoint a non executive vice chairperson. As such based on the statistical results we reject the
hypothesis Hl.l of the negative association between role duality and the extent of voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports.
Board size Consistent with the results of bivariate analysis, the findings from the panel data
analysis GLS (at 1% level), Tobit and Quantile (at 5% level) indicated that the size of the
board of directors is a significant variable. This suggests that companies with large board size
disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports. Our result is consistent with
Laksmana (2007) who reports a positive association between the size of the board and the
extent of voluntary disclosure of executive compansation. The finding is also in line with the
evidence from prior studies that board size affect the quality of financial reporting e.g.
Beasley (1996); Beasley and Salterio (2001); and Klein (2002). However, it is contradictory
to the evidence presented by Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) of
no association between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure.
The explanation of this positive association may be based on the expertise diversity on the
board; including financial reporting expertise; that provides greater knowledge base. With
such knowledge base the members are willing to legitimize themselves and their company by
disclosing more information voluntarily as a signal directed to the stakeholders. In addition,
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the more board members, the higher possibility to represent the VIew of different
stakeholders. As such, based on the empirical findings we accept the hypothesis H1.5 of the
positive association between board size and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
The proportion of non executive directors As shown in table 8-15 the bivariate and
multivariate analyses provide different results regarding the significance and the direction of
the association between the percentage of non executive directors and the extent of voluntary
disclosure. \\bile the findings of the bivariate analysis indicate that it was found to be
positively associated and insignificant, the different statistical techniques employed in the
multivariate analysis show negative association of the percentage of non executive directors
with the dependent variable. All statistical methods, except the OLS using normal scores,
found significant association between the percentage of non executive directors and the
dependent variable at the 5% level.
However, the findings conflict between the bivariate and multivariate analysis has been
noticed in a number of disclosure studies and may be attributed to the effect of other variables
in the model or to the statistical significance being overstated by the correlations used in the
bivariate analysis (Hossain et al., 1994). Although the correlation coefficients in table 8-9 and
8-10 show that the current study does not face serious multicollinearity problem, it can be
noticed that the highest correlation coefficient; in each of Pearson and Spearman, was
between the percentage of non executive directors and board size; about 49% and 55% in
Pearson and Spearman respectively. To verify that including the percentage of non executive
directors did not affect our conclusion about the direction and the significance of other
variables, it was decided to run the panel data analysis of GLS without this variable. The
results; presented in the appendix 8-1; indicate that there was no change in the direction or
·284·
the significance of any investigated variable. The differences were in Wald chi2 (14); 504.16;
and the level of significance of board size that was 10% not 1%; and governmental ownership
that was 5% not 100/0 level.
The proportion of non executive directors was the only variable of corporate governance
characteristics that has negative association with the extent of total voluntary disclosure. The
findings of multivariate analysis suggest that the extent of total voluntary disclosure decrease
with the higher percentage of non executive directors. This result is consistent with the
finding of Eng and Mak (2003) and Barako et al (2006) who provide evidence of negative
significant association of outside directors on the board and voluntary disclosure in Singapore
and Kenya respectively. However, it is in contrast to the findings of Chen and Jaggi (2000)
and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) who document positive association and also in contrast
with Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who report negative but insignificant association.
The different findings may be attributed to the different role that non executive directors play
on the board in different countries. The members of the board are selected by the main
shareholders, block holders, or the chairman of the board. As such non executive directors
may know each other as well as knowing the directors of the company before appointment.
Consequently, their independence that may lead to the expected high level of disclosure and
transparency is questionable (Crowther and Jatana, 2005). In addition, those directors may
represent the interest of shareholders or other parties who select them; not all stakeholders;
and may have access to the required information. Therefore they may play a substitute
monitoring role to disclosure not a complementary role to disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003).
The findings of the current study confirm these arguments especially in emerging capital
markets and developing countries. Based on the current findings, one can accept the
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hypothesis H1.2 of the association between the percentage of non executive directors and the
extent of total voluntary disclosure.
The presence of foreign members on the board As indicated in table 8-15 there was
agreement between bivariate analysis and the multivariate analysis about the positive
significant association of the presence of foreign members on the board with the extent of
total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of investigated companies. This variable was
found to be significant at the 1% level using the different statistical methods employed in the
current study. except Quantile regression, it was significant at the 5% level. Since foreign
members are representatives of foreign investors, this finding is considered to be consistent
with the evidence from prior studies of the positive effect of foreign ownership on the extent
of voluntary disclosure.
This result suggests higher level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies
with foreign members on the board than companies without foreign members on the board.
This result can be explained by the familiarity with western disclosure pattern that generally
impose disclosure requirements more than the requirements in emerging capital markets. In
addition, based on stakeholder theory, those members are aware about the information needs
of different stakeholders and have a good knowledge about how to deal with their
information needs. As well signalling theory provides support for this result since companies
with foreign members on the board are willing to distinguish themselves and their managerial
capabilities from other companies by adopting disclosure pattern similar to the western
pattern. Based on the finding of the current study, we can accept the hypothesis H1.4 Of the
positive association between the presence of foreign members on the board and the extent of
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
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8.6.2 Ownership structure
Table 8-16 shows the results related to the three ownership aspects investigated in the present
study. block holder ownership, governmental ownership, and institutional ownership. As can
be seen from the table the results indicate weak association between ownership structure and
the extent of total voluntary disclosure. the following paragraphs discuss the results of each
aspect.
Table 8- 16 Ownership structure: summary of results
OLS
Bivariate
Ownership Structure Model Model GLS Tobit Quantile
analysis
1 2
Blockholder ownership **(+)
Governmental ownership **(-) *(+) *(+) *(+) *(+)
Institutional ownership
** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Block holder ownership The findings in table 8-16 show conflict in the results of both
bivariate and multivariate analysis in the direction and the significance of the association
between the percentage of block holder ownership and the extent of total voluntary
disclosure. According to the bivariate analysis; Spearman coefficients; it was found that this
variable is positively significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, all statistical methods
employed in the multivariate analysis indicate that there is no significant relationship between
the block holder ownership and the dependent variable. In addition all methods, except
Quantile regression, showed that the direction of this relation is negative.
This finding suggests that the percentage of shareholders who own 5% or more is not
influencing the level of voluntary disclosure. Our result is consistent with the evidence
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provided by Eng and Mak (2003) that different types of block-holder ownership (individuals,
institutions/corporations and nominees) are not related to voluntary disclosure. However, our
finding is in contrast to Huafang and Jianguo (2007) who provide evidence of positive
association between the block holder ownership and the voluntary disclosure in China. And
also it is contrast to the findings of Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) and Mitchell et al (1995)
who report negative association between the level of disclosure and ownership concentration.
However, it may be worth to mention that relationship between block holder ownership and
voluntary disclosure may be affected by other factors such as the identity of block owners;
i.e. insider. outsider, governmental agency; and the corporate performance. Although there is
no high correlation between the three aspects of ownership structure, the non-significance of
block holder ownership may be partly explained by including governmental and institutional
ownership in our model (Ghazali, 2004). Based on the results of multivariate analysis, we can
reject the hypothesis H2.1. of the negative association between block holder ownership and
the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
comparues.
Governmental ownership Another difference between bivariate and multivariate analysis
was related to governmental ownership. According to the results of bivariate analysis,
governmental ownership was negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. In
contrast, the different statistical methods employed in multivariate analysis; except Quantile
regression; reported positive association with the extent of voluntary disclosure; marginally
significant at the 10% level. The finding of multivariate analysis suggests that companies
with higher percentage of governmental ownership disclose more information voluntarily.
This is consistent with the evidence provided by Suwaidan (1997) in Jordan and by Eng and
Mak (2003) in Singapore. However, our result is contrast to the result of Ghazali and
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Weetman (2006) who document insignificant association of the governmental ownership with
the leve1of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia.
A possible explanation for this finding is that these comparnes, with high proportion of
governmental ownership, were selected to be privatized and therefore they were listed in the
stock exchange. As indicated before, some of these companies were partially privatized and
some are still waiting. Such companies need to attract investors from private sectors and
disclosing more information is one of the methods that can be used in this regard. In addition
government as owner of these companies may have incentives to encourage these companies
to adopt disclosure pattern similar to the best companies. By doing this government signals to
the market and to international organizations; such as the World Bank, its interest and support
to adopt and encourage companies to follow the best practices. Managers themselves in such
companies may have incentive to signal their managerial capabilities to the market. Based on
stakeholder theory, government as an owner of such companies is accountable to the public
and therefore it may enforce managers to disclose more information that meet information
needs of different stakeholders. Based on our findings we accept the hypotheses H2.2 of the
association between governmental ownership and the extent of total voluntary disclosure in
the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
Institutional ownership Both of the bivariate and multivariate analyses present identical
results in regard to effect of institutional ownership on the extent of voluntary disclosure in
the annual reports. Although it is positively associated with the dependent variable,
institutional ownership was found to be insignificant variable in all statistical methods
employed in the current study. This finding suggests that the percentage of shares held by
institutional investors does not have a significant influence on the extent of total voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
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However, our result is contrast to the evidence provided by Barako et al (2006); in Kenya;
and Guan et al (2007)~ in Taiwan; who provide evidence for the positive association between
institutional ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. It is also contradictory to the
negative association reported by Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) in Finnish firms. The non
significant association between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure in the current
study may be attributable to the accessibility of information that institutional investors have
through their representative on the board. Based on the results of the statistical analysis, we
can reject the hypothesis H2.3 of the association between the percentage of institutional
ownership and the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies.
8.6.3 Firm Characteristics
As indicated in chapter two, firm characteristics represent the main investigated determinants
of voluntary disclosure in the prior studies. This section discus the results of bivariate and
multivariate analyses related to the firm characteristics. Table 8-17 summarizes the statistical
results of all statistical method employed in the current study on firm characteristics.
8.6.3.1 Structure-related variables
Firm size Both bivariate and multivariate analysis provided identical results regarding the
relationship between firm size and the extent of total voluntary disclosure. As indicated in
table 8-17 firm size was found to have positive association with total voluntary disclosure at
the 1% level; the significance level in OLS was 5%. This agreement between the results of
employed statistical methods indicates the strong relationship between the size of the firm
and the voluntary disclosure. In other words the findings suggest that larger companies as
measured by total assets disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports.
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Table 8- 17 Firm characteristics: results summary
Bivariate OLS GLS Tobit Quantile
n-« Characteristics analysis Model Model
1 2
Cross listing *** *** *** *** *** ***
Auditor type *** *** *** *** *** ***
Industry membership ***
Firm size *** ** ** *** *** ***
Profitability *** *** *** *** *** **
Gearing *** *** *** *** *** ***
Liquidity (-) **
*** Significant at 1% ** significant at 5%
Our results are consistent with the evidence from prior disclosure studies about the positive
association between firm size and voluntary disclosure, for example, Haniffa & Cooke,
(2002); Naser et al.; (2002), Ferguson et al.; (2002); Eng and Mak, (2003), Ghazali and
Weetman (2006); Barako et al.; (2006); Alsaeed, (2006) Boesso, and Kumar, (2007); and
Agca and Onder (2007).
Such strong association can be explained based on the political economic approach. Large
companies are in the public eye. As indicated in chapter three, the Egyptian government and
CMA expect that, and encourage, large companies will playa viable role to lead the Egyptian
market toward transparency and applying the best practices of corporate governance.
Furthermore, the society expects specific contributions from these companies, especially the
activities of social responsibility. Therefore, managers in these companies may have more
incentives or pressure to include their annual reports more information voluntarily. The
reason for following such pattern of disclosure may be to legitimize themselves and their
companies, in addition to reduce political costs (Cooke, 1989; and Camfferman & Cooke
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2002) and also the higher agency costs that may face them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Generally, large size companies have variety of stakeholders who are willing to get more and
different information. Based on the relative power of stakeholders managers may respond to
such information needs by disclosing information more than the requirements.
Unlike small SIze companies, the cost benefit analysis of the high level of voluntary
disclosure in the annual reports of large size companies indicates that the cost of such
discretionary disclosure is justified. The proportion of disclosure costs is smaller for larger
companies (lang and Lundholm, 1993; Verrecchia 2001) in addition to the desire to reduce
the cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In general, more disclosure
111ay lead to more competitive advantages (Buzby, 1975; Dye 1985; Meek et al, 1995). Based
on the finding of the current study the hypothesis H3.l.a of the positive association between
firm size and voluntary disclosure is accepted.
Gearing once again there was agreement among the results of bivariate and multivariate
analyses about the significance of gearing variable. As indicated in table 8-17 The results of
the four statistical methods indicate that gearing has positive significant association; at the
1% level; with the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies. This finding suggests that companies with higher gearing ratio
disclose more information voluntarily in their annual reports. Managers in such companies
are more willing to use voluntary disclosure as one of mechanisms to deal with the risk
arising from high gearing ratio. The finding of the current study is consistent with the
findings of Malone et al 1993; Ng and Koh 1994; Hossain et a11995; Naser et a12002; and
Camfferman & Cooke (Netherland) 2002) who documented evidence of the positive
association of gearing ratio with the extent of disclosure. However, it contradicts with the
results of other studies that concluded insignificant association between gearing ratio and the
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extent of disclosure: e.g. Chow & Wong- Boren 1987; Wallace et al1994; Raffournier 1995;
Wallace& Naser 1995; Ahmed 1996; Chen & Jaggi 2000; Depoers 2000; Camfferman &
Cooke (UK) 2002; and Haniffa & Cooke 2002, Ghazali and Weetman 2006). The current
result of positive relationship between gearing ratio and voluntary disclosure is consistent
with the theoretical argument of agency theory since companies with higher gearing ratio
may use voluntary disclosure to reduce agency costs. In addition, Such disclosure will help in
mitigate the adverse effects of perceiving highly geared companies, by different stakeholders,
as risky companies. Based on the statistical results we can accept hypothesis Hs.Lb.
8.6.3.2 Performance-related variables
Profitability firm profitability was also one of the significant variables in both Bivariate and
multivariate analysis. As can be seen in table 8-17 profitability was positively significantly
associated with the extent of total voluntary disclosure at the 1% level (5% in Quantile
regression). This finding suggests that companies with high profits disclose more information
voluntarily in their annual reports. This is consistent with the argument of signalling theory
since companies with high profits aim to distinguish themselves from other companies by
disclosing more information. In addition, by disclosing more information managers try to
justify their high profits to mitigate the adverse effects of political costs. Furthermore,
managers may be willing to legitimize their performance by disclosing more information.
A significant positive association between profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure
has been documented in previous disclosure studies such as Haniffa &Cooke, 2002; Ghazali
and Weetman 2006; Agca and Onder 2007. However, our result is in contrast with Wallace &
Naser 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Chen & Jaggi, 2000 who provided evidence of negative
association between profitability and disclosure. In addition other studies provide evidence of
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insignificance relationship between profitability and disclosure; Wallace et al (1994),
Raffounier (1995), Meek et al (1995), and Hackston & Milne (1996).
Thus based on the finding of the current study we can accept the hypothesis H.3.2.a of the
association of profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the
most active companies,
Liquidity There was disagreement between the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses
about the direction and the significance of liquidity variable. While it was found to be a
negatively significant variable in bivariate analysis, all statistical methods employed in the
multivariate analysis show that liquidity has positive association but insignificant with the
extent of total voluntary disclosure. This finding suggests that liquidity does not affect the
decision of voluntary disclosure.
The finding of the current study is consistent with Barako et al. (2006) who conclude that
liquidity does not have a significant influence on the level of voluntary disclosure in Kenya.
However, the finding is in contrast with the results of Wallace et al (1994) and Naser et al
(2002) who report evidence of negative association between liquidity and disclosure and
Camfferman & Cooke (2002) who provide evidence of a positive association between
liquidity and disclosure. The difference between the results of bivariate and multivariate
analysis may be attributable to the effect of other variables included in the model. It can be
noticed that firm characteristics have interrelated impacts on disclosure (Gruning, 2007).
Based on the statistical results of the multivariate analysis we can reject hypothesis H3.2.b of
the association between liquidity and the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
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8.6.3.3 Market-related variables
Cross listing one of the strongest variables in explaining voluntary disclosure practice is
cross listing. The results of all statistical methods employed in multivariate analysis confirm
the results of bivariate analysis. Cross listing was found to be positively associated with total
of voluntary disclosure at the 1% level. The finding of the current study suggests that the
extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies listed only in the local stock
exchange is less than the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies
with multiple listing.
The statistical results of the current study are consistent with the evidence from the majority
of previous disclosure studies that document positive association of cross listing with the
extent of voluntary disclosure such as Cooke (1998) and Ferguson et al., (2002). Such
positive association can be explained by the familiarity with different disclosure pattern and
dealing with variety of stakeholders. In general, managers of companies with cross listing are
willing to distinguish; and legitimize; themselves and their companies by adopting disclosure
policy similar to the one used in the efficient stock exchange. Furthermore, the cost of
disclosing information more than the disclosure requirements in the local stock exchange is
considered to be more justified in companies with multiple listing. Based on the statistical
results of bivariate and multivariate analyses we accept the hypothesis H.3.a of the positive
association between cross listing and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports
of the most active Egyptian listed companies.
Industry membership although the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses agree about
the direction of the relationship between industry membership and voluntary disclosure, these
results were conflicted with respect to the significance of such relation. As indicated in table
8-17, while the bivariate analysis indicated that industry membership has significant
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influence on the extent of voluntary disclosure; all statistical methods employed in the
multivariate analysis showed that this variable is insignificant. This finding suggests that
there is no significance difference between the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports of the manufacturing companies and non manufacturing companies listed in the
Egyptian stock exchange.
The statistical results of the current study are consistent with the evidence provided by
Raffournier 1995 and Eng & Mak 2003 who provided evidence of non significant association
and the industry type. The statistical results do not support the hypothesis H.3.b of the
association between the industry type and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies. Therefore we reject this hypothesis.
Auditor type It can be seen from table 8-17 that both of bivariate and multivariate analyses
provided identical results about the direction and the significance of auditor type and the
dependent variable. Auditor type was found to have positively significant association, at the
1% level, with the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active
Egyptian listed companies. This result suggests that companies audited by one of the big four
audit firms voluntarily disclose information in their annual reports more than companies
audited by other audit firm not one of the big four.
The statistical results support the theoretical argument of signalling theory. Companies may
prefer to be audited by one of the big four audit firms to distinguish themselves. In the same
time big audit firms may support and encourage their clients to increase the extent of
information voluntarily disclosed in the annual reports as a signal of its own quality and
reputation. It may be worth to mention here that there was increasing trend in the average of
companies audited by a big firm from about 30% in 2004 to 42% in 2006. Based on the
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statistical results we can accept the hypothesis H.3.3.e of the association between auditor type
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed
companies. Having tested the research hypotheses it may be helpful to go further with our
analysis to examine the association between the independent variables and each category of
voluntary disclosure.
8.7 Regression analysis of voluntary disclosure categories:
This section presents the results of regression analysis of the association between the
independent variables and each category of voluntary disclosure. We employ each of OLS
and GLS regressions in separate seven models. Table 8-18 summarizes the results of OLS
(with robust), while Appendix 8-2 presents the results of GLS regression. As shown in table
8-18 the explanatory power of each model vary among the different categories. It ranges from
29.7So for non financial information to 78.3% for corporate governance information. The
second highest R squared was 60.4% for social responsibility information. However, the
results in table 8-18 suggest that the determinants of voluntary disclosure vary among the
seven categories. These results are consistent with the evidence from prior studies (e.g. Meek
et aI, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002).
Concerning with corporate governance characteristics, the results of all models show that the
existence of family members on the board associated at the 1% level with each of general
information, future information, corporate governance and social responsibility. The board
size associated positively with general information and corporate governance at the 5% level,
and shareholders information at the 10% level. Role duality was found to be insignificant
with the different categories of voluntary disclosure except shareholders and social
responsibility information at the 10% and 5% level respectively. The percentage of non
executive directors is negatively associated with each of financial information, shareholders
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information (at 50/0) and corporate governance (at 100/0). Also the presence of foreign
members on the board was found to be a significant variable with each of non financial
information, future information, and corporate social responsibility at the 1% level. The
results of GLS presented in appendix 8-2 support the results of OLS and indicate a marginal
significance of the presence of foreign members on the board with financial information (at
the 10°0 level),
None of the three aspects of ownership structure was significantly associated with future
information, shareholder information and social responsibility information. However, the
block-holder ownership was found negatively associated with corporate governance
information at the 1% level. This suggests that companies with higher percentage of block-
holders disclose less information about corporate governance. However, the block-holder
ownership is significantly associated with financial information at the 10% level.
Governmental ownership was significant variable general and non financial information at
the 1% and 10% level respectively, while institutional ownership was significantly associated
with financial information only (at the 5% level). GLS results support OLS but indicate
insignificant association between block-holders and financial information and also between
governmental ownership and nonfinancial information. However, it indicate a negative
association between institutional ownership and nonfinancial information.
Regarding firm characteristics, it is notable that there is no variable associated with all
categories of voluntary disclosure. Cross listing was found significantly associated with
shareholders information at the 5% level, and with each of general information and corporate
governance information at the 1% level. Auditor type is a significant variable with general
information (at the 5% level), future information (at the 1% level), and shareholder
information (at the 10% level). While industry membership significantly associated with
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nonfinancial information (at the 1% level), and social responsibility (at the 5% level).
However. it is negatively associated with corporate governance at the 10% level. This
suggests that non manufacturing companies disclose corporate governance information more
than manufacturing companies. Although firm size is a significant variable in the majority of
disclosure studies, it was found to be significant only with each of financial information (at
the 5% level), nonfinancial information (at the 10% level), corporate governance and social
responsibility (at the 1% level). The same with profitability that was significantly associated
with shareholder and social responsibility information at the 1% level, and corporate
governance information at the 50/0 level. Gearing and liquidity were associated with
positively with each of general information (at the 1% level), financial information (at the 5%
level), nonfinancial information (l0% and 1% level respectively) and social responsibility
information (5% and 10% level respectively). However, liquidity was negatively associated
with future information and shareholder information at the 1% level. Mostly, GLS results
support the results of OLS but indicate an association (at the 10% level) between financial
information and each of cross listing and auditor type, and between profitability and general
information.
The above paragraphs provides an additional evidence from an emerging capital market of
the importance of analyzing the extent of voluntary disclosure practice according to its
different categories. While block holder ownership and industry membership were
insignificant with total voluntary disclosure, they were negatively associated with corporate
governance disclosure. Moreover, the results suggest that no single variable can explain the
variation in all categories of voluntary disclosure. Due to the lack of previous studies about
the voluntary disclosure practice in the Egyptian environment, caution must be taken into
consideration when comparing such results with prior studies. The classification of categories
and number of items in each category may affect such comparisons.
·299·
Table 8-18 summary of OLS regression results for voluntary disclosure categories
GI FI NFl FlJT CG SHI SRI
Variable
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coer. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z
Family members on the board 0.180 0.000 0.070 0.195 -0.057 0.200 0.124 0.001 0.249 0.000 0.022 0.590 0.123 0.003
Role duality 0.029 0.212 -0.023 0.513 0.013 0.674 0.024 0.290 -0.007 0.728 0.045 0.053 0.049 0.030
Board size 0.010 0.045 0.005 0.557 0.005 0.446 0.005 0.222 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.096 0.001 0.871
Non executive directors
-0.124 0.211 -0.354 0.015 -0.052 0.645 0.080 0.337 -0.108 0.097 -0.228 0.013 -0.002 0.980
Foreign members on the board 0.021 0.429 0.063 0.140 0.148 0.000 0.092 0.005 -0.013 0.620 -0.045 0.120 0.152 0.000
Block holder ownership 0.000 0.585 0.001 0.095 0.001 0.353 0.000 0.431 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.197 -0.001 0.222
Governmental ownership 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.284 0.001 0.088 0.001 0.134 0.000 0.442 0.001 0.177 0.000 0.808
Institutional ownership 0.000 0.831 0.003 0.044 -0.002 0.115 0.000 0.827 0.000 0.586 0.001 0.299 0.002 0.114
Cross listing 0.127 0.001 0.089 0.128 0.068 0.151 0.046 0.278 0.185 0.000 0.095 0.036 0.003 0.954
Auditor type 0.061 0.019 0.057 0.108 0.030 0.378 0.103 0.000 0.018 0.384 0.050 0.061 0.021 0.450
Industry membership
-0.010 0.755 0.013 0.824 0.102 0.001 0.021 0.379 -0.049 0.065 -0.002 0.939 0.076 0.026
Firm size 0.006 0.558 0.036 0.021 0.028 0.073 0.007 0.412 0.032 0.002 0.000 0.980 0.060 0.000
Profitability 0.017 0.121 0.022 0.191 0.010 0.478 0.001 0.918 0.023 0.016 0.042 0.000 0.039 0.003
Gearing 0.080 0.001 0.093 0.014 0.063 0.070 0.018 0.451 0.015 0.486 0.023 0.406 0.072 0.026
Liquidity 0.042 0.003 0.041 0.037 0.054 0.005 -0.035 0.005 -0.018 0.182 -0.046 0.003 0.029 0.080
cons 0.204 0.079 0.273 0.104 0.086 0.460 -0.146 0.092 -0.022 0.771 0.266 0.010 -0.361 0.002-
R- squared 0.574 0.435 0.297 0.533 0.783 0.303 0.604
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8. 8 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to identify the determinants of voluntary disclosure practices in the
annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies. It reports the empirical findings
of the association between the extent of total voluntary disclosure in the annual reports over
the four years, from 2003 to 2006, and each of board characteristics, ownership structure
aspects and firm characteristics
Two types of analyses, bivariate and multivariate, were employed to analyze the data in the
current study. In bivariate analysis, correlation coefficients; parametric and non parametric
tests; were used to test the relation between the dependent variable; the total voluntary
disclosure; and each of the continuous variables. In addition, T test and Mann Whitney tests
were used as parametric and non parametric tests to test the correlation between the total
voluntary disclosure and each of nominal independent variables.
The multivariate analysis was based on the regression analyses. To choose the relevant
statistical technique, the data was examined to validate the assumptions of the classical
regression; regression diagnostic. A case of assumption violation has been found in the
current study. Therefore several approaches to deal with this violation have been decided.
Specifically, five models have been employed, OLS using transformed data, OLS using
normal score for all variables, GLS panel data, Tobit regression and Quantile regressions.
Based on the findings of the empirical section, it is concluded that a number of corporate
governance characteristics can explain the variations in the extent of voluntary disclosure in
the annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies over the examined period. Of
the five corporate governance variables examined in the current study, only role duality was
insignificant. Three board characteristics have positive association with voluntary disclosure
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in corporate annual report namely family members on the board, Board size and foreign
members on the board. Political economic approach and isomorphism notion have been used
to explain such results. However, the percentage of non executive directors was found to be
negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. This result raises a question
about the independence of nonexecutive directors in emerging capital markets.
Of the three ownership aspects, governmental ownership was significant variable at the 10%
leve1. Block holder ownership and institutional ownership were not related to the voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports. On the other hand, while industry membership and
liquidity were insignificant variables, five firm characteristics were found to have a positive
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. These characteristics are firm size, profitability,
cross listing, auditor type and gearing. Political cost, Legitimacy, and stakeholder theory have
been used to explain the significant positive association observed between voluntary
disclosure and each of these variables.
The study concludes that the determinants of voluntary disclosure vary among the different
categories. There was no single variable can explain the total voluntary disclosure and each
of the seven categories. Some variables that were insignificant with total voluntary disclosure
such as block holder ownership and industry membership were found to be negatively
associated with corporate governance disclosure. Moreover, the explanatory power of the
model vary among the different categories. These findings highlights the need to analyze
voluntary disclosure practice based on its different categories.
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Appendix 8-1 GLS excluding non executive members
Number of obs 182 Wald chi2(l4) 504.16
Number of groups 4 Prob> chi2 0
TVDS Coef. z P>z
Family members on the board 0.1116 5.510 0.000
Role duality 0.0171 1.210 0.225
Board size 0.0047 1.820 0.069
Foreign members on the board 0.0606 3.630 0.000
Block holder ownership -0.0003 -1.180 0.240
Governmental ownership 0.0006 2.170 0.030
Institutional ownership 0.0003 0.540 0.591
Cross listing 0.0866 3.940 0.000
Auditor type 0.0443 3.010 0.003
Industry membership 0.0215 1.220 0.224
Firm size 0.0246 4.030 0.000
Profitability 0.0250 3.840 0.000
Gearing 0.0458 3.140 0.002
Liquidity 0.0087 0.890 0.375
cons -0.0331 -0.700 0.483
-
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Appendix 8-2 Summary of G LS results for voluntary disclosure categories
GI FI NFl FUT CG SHI SRI
Variable
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z
Family members on the board 0.179 0.000 0.071 0.131 -0.063 0.126 0.097 0.001 0.237 0.000 0.024 0.511 0.126 0.001
Role duality 0.027 0.224 -0.027 0.406 0.012 0.662 0.023 0.268 -0.020 0.276 0.044 0.076 0.050 0.063
Board size 0.010 0.021 0.005 0.425 0.004 0.492 0.007 0.114 0.011 0.002 0.009 0.072 0.001 0.804
Non executive directors -0.099 0.235 -0.380 0.002 -0.076 0.460 0.088 0.248 -0.138 0.034 -0.225 0.015 0.004 0.968
Foreign members on the board 0.022 0.409 0.064 0.096 0.167 0.000 0.086 0.001 -0.015 0.483 -0.043 0.146 0.154 0.000
Block holder ownership 0.000 0.665 0.001 0.121 0.001 0.354 0.000 0.759 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.192 -0.001 0.223
Governmental ownership 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.330 0.001 0.236 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.382 0.001 0.136 0.000 0.940
Institutional ownership 0.000 0.985 0.003 0.028 -0.002 0.044 0.000 0.762 0.000 0.691 0.001 0.375 0.002 0.120
Cross listing 0.122 0.001 0.095 0.062 0.055 0.211 0.036 0.278 0.186 0.000 0.097 0.014 0.001 0.975
Auditor type 0.058 0.013 0.060 0.075 0.026 0.385 0.101 0.000 0.009 0.627 0.051 0.054 0.021 0.460
Industry membership -0.009 0.761 0.013 0.750 0.101 0.005 0.015 0.576 -0.040 0.078 -0.003 0.933 0.079 0.019
Firm size 0.007 0.488 0.035 0.013 0.027 0.026 0.005 0.616 0.030 0.000 -0.002 0.853 0.060 0.000
Profitability 0.019 0.072 0.022 0.148 0.010 0.463 0.009 0.379 0.025 0.004 0.043 0.000 0.039 0.002
Gearing 0.083 0.001 0.097 0.005 0.069 0.021 0.026 0.216 0.006 0.743 0.021 0.433 0.071 0.013
Liquidity 0.043 0.004 0.042 0.057 0.061 0.002 -0.039 0.008 -0.016 0.208 -0.047 0.007 0.028 0.117
cons 0.179 0.058 0.303 0.025 0.124 0.288 -0.130 0.127 0.025 0.734 0.268 0.010 -0.375 0.001
-
Wald chi2 252.47 147.68 82.04 221.35 662.61 80.05 280.84
Chapter Nine: Conclusions, Limitations and
Recommendations
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9.1 Introduction
The current chapter summarizes the results and conclusion from the previous chapters. It
starts with section 9.2 that outlines the objective, research questions and methodology. The
findings of the study are summarized in section 9.3. Section 9.4 outlines the contributions
to the knowledge followed by the limitations of the study in section 9.5. The chapter ends
with section 9.6 that presents suggestions for future research.
9.2 Research questions and methodology
The main objective of the present study is to study the voluntary disclosure practices in
emerging capital markets. It uses sample from Egypt as an emerging capital market in
MENA region that lacks enough number of disclosure studies. The study addresses the
level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies
over a period of increasing awareness of corporate governance and enhancing disclosure
and transparency. The study aims to answer the following questions:
1. To what extent the Egyptian listed companies disclose more information
voluntarily in their annual reports?
2. How do voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Egyptian listed
companies evolve over time?
3. What are the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the
Egyptian listed companies?
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To achieve the objective of the study, a multi-paradigm approach that mix the interpretivist
and functionalist approaches has been followed. Such approach provides an opportunity to
employ a wider theoretical framework and to answer the research questions. The first two
questions have been answered by applying a descriptive analysis of the total voluntary
disclosure: and its categories; in the annual reports over the examined period. The results
of the checklist; the research instrument, have been analyzed on the three levels: total
voluntary disclosure, category of voluntary disclosure and item by item. Moreover, these
results have been analyzed year by year to outline how voluntary disclosure practices
evolved over time, and to highlight any significant difference among the voluntary
disclosure practices over the years. In addition, it aims to examine the effect of issuing the
Egyptian code of corporate governance on the extent of voluntary disclosure. To answer
the third question, the study formulated a number of hypotheses based on the proposed
theoretical framework, evidence from prior studies and the Egyptian environment. These
hypotheses have been tested in the empirical section using different statistical methods,
OLS; GLS; Tobit; and Quantile regressions. The following section summarises the results
of the study.
9.3 Findings of the study
In general the current study highlights the applicability of the political economy approach -
stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and political costs - and new institutional sociology
theory in emerging capital markets. The study indicates that isomorphism concept is
appropriate to study the voluntary disclosure practices in emerging capital markets
especially with unfamiliarity with new patterns and concepts of disclosure and corporate
governance.
306
Based on a sample of the 182 annual reports of the most active Egyptian listed companies
and a checklist of 46 voluntary disclosure items, the results support the expectation that the
level of voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital market with secretive culture is low.
However. the study found a gradual increase in the extent of total voluntary disclosure and
its categories over the examined period. It is also found that companies manage their
voluntary disclosure policy which is not a random practice but subject to certain
influences. The statistical results indicate no significant difference between the extent of
total voluntary disclosure over the four years. The same was concluded regarding the
different categories of voluntary disclosure. In addition we conclude that there is no effect
of issuing the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code in 2005 since the results of statistical
tests showed no significant differences between the extent of voluntary disclosure before
and after the code. In general, the findings indicate that there is room to improve the
transparency of the Egyptian capital market. the study highlights the possibility of
cooperation between the capital market authority and all interested parties to enhance
transparency by providing pattern of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance
practice. In this regard 'comply or explain' rule may be helpful.
The statistical results indicate that corporate governance characteristics do affect the extent
of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. Of the five board characteristics
examined in the current study, four variables were found to be associated with the level of
total voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports; three positively and one negatively.
Family members on the board, board size and the presence of foreign members on the
board were found to have positive significant association with the extent of total voluntary
disclosure. However, the percentage of non executive directors was found to be negatively
associated with total voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, the findings indicate that role
duality is not related to the extent of total voluntary disclosure.
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The findings suggest that ownership structure has a little effect on total voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports. The three aspects of ownership structure examined
in the current study were found to be insignificantly associated with the extent of total
voluntary disclosure, except governmental ownership that was marginally significant at the
level of 100/0. The results of regression models indicate a negative association; except
quantile regression; between block-holder ownership and voluntary disclosure but
insignificant. Also institutional ownership was not related to total voluntary disclosure.
Concerning firm characteristics, the findings support the evidence from the majority of
prior literature of the positive association between total voluntary disclosure and each of
firm size and cross listing. these results confirm to the validity of our checklist as a
research instrument. In addition, the findings indicate that profitability, auditor type and
gearing have positive Impact on the extent of total voluntary disclosure. However, industry
membership and liquidity were not related to total voluntary disclosure.
The study provides evidence that the determinants of voluntary disclosure vary among the
different categories. By employing the general model with each category of voluntary
disclosure, there was no single variable can explain the total voluntary disclosure and each
of the seven categories. The findings indicate that while block holder ownership and
industry membership were not related to total voluntary disclosure, they were found to be
negatively associated with corporate governance disclosure. However, the results prove
that board characteristics, in addition to other determinants, can explain the variation in the
extent of different categories of voluntary disclosure. In general, the study identified the
determinants of total voluntary disclosure and highlights the need to analyze the different
categories of voluntary disclosure.
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9.4 Contribution to the knowledge
The contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follow:
Theoretically The results indicate that disclosure theories that originating from developed
countries are applicable in emerging capital markets. Stakeholders, legitimacy and political
cost theories were able to explain the variations in the extent of voluntary disclosure in the
annual reports of the investigated companies in the current study. The study highlights the
importance of employing a wider theoretical framework; by encompassing several
disclosure theories; to get more explanation to the voluntary disclosure practices. In
addition it supports the notion of looking for theoretical explanations that considered being
relevant to the topic being studied. The study also indicates that the concept of
isomorphism can add to the theoretical explanation of voluntary disclosure especially with
the lack of disclosure pattern. Such concept may be helpful also with other forms of
voluntary disclosure.
Empirically The current study contributes to the disclosure literature and corporate
governance literature as follow:
• Providing evidence that companies manage their voluntary disclosure policy over
time whatever regulatory changes. Although there was increasing in the level of
voluntary disclosure over time the results indicate that there is no significant
differences among the four years or before and after the Egyptian code of corporate
governance. The researcher has traced the voluntary disclosure practices of
investigated companies over four years that witnessed a number of remarkable
initiatives.
• Providing evidence that the explanatory variables vary among the categories of
voluntary disclosure.
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••
Providing a new empirical evidence of the voluntary disclosure practices from
MENA region that has been subjected to few limited number of studies.
Providing up to date evidence of the association between board characteristics and
voluntary disclosure practices from an emerging capital market. Interestingly,
family member on the board has a positive influence on the voluntary disclosure
practices. This evidence is considered to be in contrast with the evidence from
emerging capital markets. However this is must be explained in the light of the
sample here is the most active companies.
• Providing checklist of voluntary disclosure items to the Egyptian capital market
which can be used by interested parties to rank companies or assess their voluntary
disclosure practices.
• The results of the study can be generalized to emerging capital markets in the
region of Middle East and North Africa, especially in countries that have similar
institutional and cultural factors.
9.5 Limitations of the study
Like all studies, the current study has some limitations that need to be acknowledged and
addressed when assessing the findings of the study. This section summarized these
limitations.
First, the study focuses only on the voluntary disclosure practices in corporate annual
reports. Corporate voluntary disclosure can be done through other media such as corporate
website and press release. Therefore the findings of this study must be interpreted in light
of this limitation; the extent and trend of voluntary disclosure in this study do not represent
the overall corporate voluntary disclosure practices. However, a number of practical
considerations justified choosing annual reports as a channel of corporate voluntary
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disclosure in the current study (presented in section 2.2.2). One of important considerations
is related to the time horizon of the study. The study is considered to be longitudinal since
it seeks to assess the voluntary disclosure over four years.
Second, the study developed self constructed checklist to measure the extent of voluntary
disclosure using the disclosure index technique. While a number of steps have been
followed to lessen subjectivity in selecting information items to be included in the
checklist (see section 5.5), it cannot be argued that the study is free from subjectivity. In
addition, the study use un- weighted index which implies equal importance of the selected
information items. However, the un-weighted approach seems to be appropriate and
justified for the current study that focuses on the annual report which is general purposes,
addresses total voluntary disclosure for all stakeholders not a specific type of information
or user groups, and covers more than one year (See section 5.6).
Third, another limitation of this study may be related to the research sample; the most
active non financial listed companies; which is not randomly selected. These companies
are expected to disclose more information voluntarily and to follow the best practices of
corporate governance. Consequently, caution must be taken about any attempt to
generalise the findings of the study beyond the study population. The results cannot be
assumed to be generalized to none traded or less actively companies. However, the most
active companies are well spread across sectors and represent a significant percentage of
trading value and market capitalization (see section 5.3). Therefore the findings of the
current study are considered to be important and helpful to the interested parties In
emerging capital markets in general and the Egyptian capital market in particular.
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Fourth, while the study focuses on board characteristics, other corporate governance
variables have been excluded from the current study due to data availability. For example,
the characteristics of audit committee and remuneration committee.
Finally. Although the current study use a multiparadigm approach to provide descriptive
analysis of voluntary disclosure practice over time in addition to identify its determinants,
it is mainly classified as a quantitative research. The qualitative methods were not
undertaken in the current study because it mainly aims to evaluate the extent of corporate
voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports and to test empirically the association
between voluntary disclosure and a number of explanatory variables. However, using
qualitative techniques, such as interviews and case studies, in addition to the quantitative
one may improve our understanding to the issue of voluntary disclosure.
9.6 Recommendations for future research
The findings and the limitations of the study recommend some research opportunities
related to disclosure literature. The following paragraphs present some suggestions for
future research.
First, the current study focused only on voluntary disclosure and concluded that corporate
governance characteristics are significant variables. Future research can investigate the
association between corporate governance characteristics and the level of compliance with
disclosure requirements. In this regard more variables can be added such as audit
committee and cross directorship. The relationship between voluntary and mandatory
disclosure would be addressed.
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Second. Future research can consider other channels of voluntary disclosure such as
corporate web site. In this regard the relationship between the extent of voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual report and corporate website would be examined. It may be
interesting to investigate if the both channels have the same explanatory variables.
Third. future research could consider employing different research paradigm that can
benefit from both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Triangulation can add more to
our understanding to voluntary disclosure and financial reporting in general.
Fourth, the results of the study call for more research about the disclosure policy of family
companies. In this regard future research could consider family ownership and compare
the quantity and quality of disclosure practices between family controlled companies and
nonfamily companies. It would be interesting if such comparison can be made using a
longitudinal study. A comparative study with other countries in the region with a
considerable amount of family companies would be fruitful.
Fifth, the current study covers one year after the Egyptian code of corporate governance
issued in 2005. Future research could reinvestigate the disclosure practice after allowing
some time for the companies to be more familiar with the best practices of corporate
governance.
Six As an alternative future research could consider a specific type of disclosure such risk, ,
management, environmental reporting, forward looking information and corporate
governance disclosure.
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Appendix 1: companies included in the sample
No. Company name No. Company name
1 AIC 33 Egyptian for Tourism Resorts
...,
EI Ezz Porcelain (Gemma) 34 Orascom hotel and development (OHD)
-
.,
EI Ezz Steel Rebars 35 Bisco Misr
-'
.+ Giza general contracting 36 Eastern Tobacco
'"
l\lisr Beni Suef Cement 37 Extracted Oils
6 Misr Cement (Qena) 38 Delta Sugar
~ National Cement 39 Egyptian International Pharmaceuticals(EIPICO)
8 Orascom Construction Industries (OCI) 40 Pfizer Egypt
9 Sinai Cement 41 Amoun
10 Suez Cement 42 EI kahera Housing
11 Torah Cement 43 EIShams housing
12 ASEC for Cement 44 Medinet Nasr Housing
13 Alexandria National Iron & Steel 45 United Housing & Development
1.+ Egyptian Iron & Steel 46 Six of October Development & Investment(SODIC)
15 EI Ezz Aldekhela Steel 47 Heliopolis Housing
16 South valley cement 48 Egyptian Media Production City
17 Abou Kir Fertilizers 49 East Delta flour mills
18 Egyptian Financial & Industrial 50 General Silos & Storage
19 I Vlisr Chemical Industries 51 Middle & West Delta flour Mills
i 20 Paint & Chemicals industries (Pachin) 52 Upper Egypt Flour Mills
21 Sidi Kerier Petrochemicals 53 North Cairo flour mills
If Samad Misr (Egyfrt) 54 Alexandria Mineral Oils......
23 Egptian Company for Mobile Services 55 Natural Gas & Mining Projects (Egypt gas)(MobiNiI)
24 Orascom Telecom Holding (OT) 56 Misr duty free shops
25 Vodafone Egypt Telecommunications 57 Arab Cotton Ginning
26 telecom Egypt 58 Arab Polvara Spinning & Weaving
27 Delta Industries (IDEAL) 59 Oriental Weavers
28 Egyptian Electrical Cables 60 EI Nasr Clothes & Textile (Kabo)
29 ELSWEDY CABLES 61 Nile Cotton Ginning
30 Misr Hotels (Hilton) 62 Alexandria Spinning & Weaving(SPINALEX)
31 Orascom Hotel holding (OHH) 63 Raya Holding for Technology
32 Orascom projects & tourist development 64 Canal Shipping Agencies(OPTD)
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This Code \\3S drafted by Dr. Ziad Bahaa EI Din, Chairman of the Egyptian General Authority
for Investment and Free Zones, with the support of Mr. Maged Shawky, Chairman of the Cairo
and Alexandria Stock Exchange. An opinion survey conducted by the Center for International
Private Enterprise (CIPE) contributed to preparation of the draft. Leaders in the local
accounting. auditing, and general business community were consulted throughout the drafting
process. which was conducted in light of the Corporate Governance Principles and Standards set
out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as codes recently
issued in selected countries, including South Africa, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Preparation
of the Code, including the drafting and comments processes, was supported by CIPE with the
generous support of the United States Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).
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Introduction
This set of guidelines relates to principles of corporate governance in Egypt. The phrase
"principles of corporate governance" is used to describe the rules, regulations, and procedures
that achieve the best protection of and balance between the interests of corporate managers,
shareholders, and other stakeholders.
These rules should be considered an addition to the corporate-related provisions stated under
various laws - especially the Law on Shareholding Joint Stock Companies, Partnerships, and
Limited Liabil ity Companies issued by virtue of Law #159/1981; the Capital Market Law issued
by virtue of La« #95/1992 and the executive regulations and decrees regarding their
implementation. Yet, what makes these rules unique and different from all others stated under
the abovementioned laws is that the rules governing corporate governance are neither mandatory
nor legally binding; rather, they promote and regulate responsible and transparent behavior in
managing corporations according to international best practices and means that strike
equilibrium between various party interests. These rules also have been drafted in a manner that
provides an ample explanation of the provisions. The explanation of the provisions will not use
the concise legislative phrasing style generally associated with legal documents.
Egyptian corporations and their shareholders should seek to abide by these rules and apply them
because the resulting benefits will be enjoyed not only by the complying corporations but will
also have a positive effect on the general investment environment. Further, a major responsibility
falls upon corporate external auditors and legal advisors to spur the corporate directors to abide
by these rules and to observe the extent to which they are achieved. Moreover, banks, other
financing institutions, and credit rating institutions should take the articles listed in the code into
consideration when doing business with or evaluating corporations to determine the extent to
which the provisions and content of these rules are upheld.
It should be expected that all those in charge of managing corporations, financial institutions,
professional societies, shareholders groups, and directors implement and promote the provisions
of this code; they should be expected to consider the implementation of these provisions an
indicator of success.
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1. Scope of Implementation
1.1. These guidelines are to be primarily implemented in joint-stock companies listed on the
stock exchange. especially those undergoing active trading operations, and financial institutions
in the form ofjoint stock companies; for those are the ones with ownership disbursed over
numerous shareholders and necessitate a definition of the relation between ownership and
management or are the ones that directly affect a vast majority. It is also applicable to companies
that use the banking systems as a major source of financing - in this case compliance with
corporate governance standards comes to support the rights of creditors. The rules have been
drafted in such a manner so as to apply to these corporations within the framework of the
provisions of the Law on Joint Stock Companies, Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies
(# 159/1981). the Capital Market Law (#95/1992), as well as the rules governing the listing,
ongoing listing and de-listing of financial securities from the Cairo and Alexandria Stock
Exchange (CASE) and other decrees and laws to be mentioned throughout this document. Thus,
any reference to the terms "corporation" or "corporations" in the guidelines and standards shall
indicate the corporations listed in the CASE, in addition to the financial institutions in the form
ofjoint stock companies even if not listed in CASE, specifically: banks, insurance companies,
real estate financing companies, finance leasing houses, and corporations working in the field of
securities, as well as companies that obtain major financing from the banking sector.
1.2. Due to the general importance of the standards governing corporate governance for all
corporations, other forms of corporations may be considered candidates for listing on the CASE
or offered for public trading, thus indicating that the corporate governance standards listed in this
document should be adopted in some form. These standards may be interpreted in a more
abridged manner the extent to which they may be implemented in closely-controlled joint stock
companies, followed by limited liability companies and, finally, partnerships. Although this
method does not fit under the scope of standards governing corporate governance in other
countries where their scope is limited to financial institutions and joint stock companies listed on
the stock exchange, it is significant in Egypt: out of the total number of Egyptian joint stock
companies, no more than 2.50/0 are listed in the CASE, further a limited number of those listed
undergo active circulation.
1.3. From another point of view, the development of the Egyptian economy, especially the
stock exchange, in recent years indicates that numerous closely-controlled joint stock companies
will find their way to being listed on CASE. Thus, shareholders and management of these
companies should adopt and adhere to the standards governing corporate governance as a
preparatory phase to being listed, as proper qualification for public subscription, or for stock
listing. As such, shareholders, corporations, creditors, and corporation staff in general bear
interest in stimulating and monitoring the compliance of all forms of corporations to these
standards to the greatest extent possible.
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1.4. The above relates to the understanding that implementing corporate governance in the
right manner is not only limited to respecting a set of rules and interpreting it literally in a
restricted manner, but is also a culture and way of managing the relationship between owners of
the company, its directors, and its stakeholders. Hence the interest of the whole community
becomes more achievable when more people apply the code provisions.
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2. General Assembly
2.1. The general assembly is composed of all corporation shareholders pro-rata to the
percentage of shares held by each. Although the articles of association of a corporation may
stipulate that no shareholders possessing less than a specific percentage of shares may attend the
general assembly meeting, such a provision should be deemed an exception to the rule that
entitles all shareholders to attend the meeting unless their number exceeds the capacity by which
the corporation can provide a meeting place, in which case the stipulation may be resorted to; it
should also not be a means to exclude and overrule small shareholders.
') ') Shareholders should be encouraged to attend the corporation's general assembly meeting;
moreover, the meeting date and place should be set in a manner facilitating and encouraging their
attendance.
2.3. Each subject matter on the agenda of the ordinary or extraordinary general meeting is to
be accompanied by an adequate description in a manner enabling the shareholders to make their
decisions based upon the information furnished to them. Furnishing of the information should be
for the purpose of enabling shareholders to make their decisions in a sound and well-studied
manner and not just as a completion of meeting formalities.
2.4. The general assembly is managed in a manner allowing full and adequate disclosure for
information related to all items in the agenda to allow shareholders to express their opinions
based on adequate and full information.
2.5. Voting on general assembly decisions needs to be registered in absolute accuracy. In case
of disputes over the representation of some votes at the general assembly, voting on the validity
or annulment of the disputed votes should be made and presented later to the concerned
administrative or judicial party; meaning that the proceedings of the general assembly should
continue in any case.
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3. Board of Directors (BOD)
3.1. The BOD of a joint stock company assumes the role of managing its affairs based upon
authorization delegated by the general assembly; as a result, the final responsibility for the
company remains under the board even if it constitutes committees or authorizes other bodies or
individuals to undertake its operations.
3.2. Despite the fact that the BOD of a corporation is composed of representatives nominated
from among various groups of shareholders, whenever a member of the board is designated,
he/she must consider him/herself as a representative of all the shareholders and obliged to act in
the interest of the corporation and all shareholders and not just that of the group being
represented or having voted for the designation.
3.3. Egyptian laws stipulate that the BOD of a corporation shall be nominated for the purpose
of representing the shareholders and the formation of the board should be representative of
capital distribution. However, the rules governing voting enable the general assembly majority
group to designate the entire board via voting for each nominee separately; accordingly,
corporate governance necessitates that an accumulative system be adopted, in voting for BOD
members, or capital distribution should be considered in any other way, so that the final result
can be a reflection of the proportional representation of shareholders on the board. A
summarized curriculum vitae for each BOD nominee should be submitted to the shareholders
upon being called to vote for the board.
3.4. The BOD should include a majority of non-executive members with an appropriate mix
of skills, technical, or analytical experience that is of benefit to the board or corporation. Under
all circumstances, upon nomination of the non-executive board members, it must be observed
that the board member will be capable of allotting sufficient time and attention to his board
directorship and that it will not represent any conflict with his/her other interests.
3.5. Sufficient information and data on the corporation should be made available to new BOD
members upon their designation to familiarize them with all its general aspects, points of risks,
organizational structure, financial position, and everything that will enable them to assume their
responsibility to the fullest extent.
3.6. The BOD undertakes the designation of the chairperson and managing director; it is
preferred that the two posts not be held by the same person. Should joining the posts be
necessary, its reasons should be clarified in the corporation's annual report; further, a non-
executive vice chairperson should be appointed.
3.7. The BOD should closely monitor at all times the general status of the corporation and
must not entrust any other person with that responsibility.
3.8. The board should lay down the mechanisms and systems ensuring corporate respect for
the laws and regulations in force and compliance with the furnishing of essential information to
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shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders, which should all under any circumstance, be
based on objective standards.
3.9. Any entrustment made by the BOD of the corporation, be it to one of its members or to
any other. should be specified in title and term of validity and should include a date on which
attained results are to be presented to the board. The board should avoid delegating its authority
in any manner, as this leads to weakening of its role in the organization.
3.10. The BOD members are entitled to all information and data on the corporation at the time
and in the form specified by them.
3.11. The BOD members may seek an external advisory opinion on any corporation matter at
its own expense provided that the majority of members approve such an act; this will be subject
to the observance of the provisions averting contlict of interests stated under these provisions.
3.12. The corporation should reward its executive managers with financial remuneration in a
manner allowing for the attraction and maintenance of the best qualified elements in the market.
This is to be determined by forming a committee comprising mostly or wholly of the non-
executive BOD members who will have the authority of proposing the executive member's
financial remuneration and negotiating it with them in consultancy with the managing director;
the final decision will however be of the non-executive board members. Names of the committee
members will be revealed in the corporation's annual report; moreover, the head of the
committee should attend the annual general assembly to answer any questions posed by
shareholders on that matter.
3.13. Remuneration received by an executive BOD member should be disclosed including:
remuneration, allowances, real privileges, stock options, and any other element of financial
nature. Elements related to the performance of the corporation are always preferred to represent
the significant portion of the total financial remuneration so that the executive board member
will always be stimulated to improve his/her performance.
3.14. As for stock options in particular, consideration must be given not to incite the board on
taking decisions achieving only short-run corporate interests, but also to be related with
considerations that improve the corporate performance in the medium and long term.
3.15. A term of contract of an executive BOD member should not exceed three years unless for
a clear and defined purpose that is to be revealed in the corporation's general assembly.
3.16. The abovementioned committee referred to in Item 3.12 should recommend the
remuneration received by the non-executive BOD members provided that it is submitted to the
general assembly for approval. The remuneration paid to non-executi~e board members sho~ld
not significantly differ from one to another except if it is against specific tasks and work assigned
to them or against their membership in specific committees.
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3.17. The board should convene no less than once every three months. The number of
con\'entiol~sand tl~e names of the members who failed to attend the meetings of the board or its
sub-committees will be revealed in the corporation's annual report. Invitation to the meetings
should be done on dates, at places and according to arrangements that can allow for the members
to a~~nd; moreover, all information on any matter that will be submitted to the board or any
decision that should be made available to all Board members in advance of its meeting, unless
there is a specific case requiring speedy submission. In this instance, only executive members or
managers capable of amply explaining the matter and responding to member questions are to
attend the meeting. It is preferred that ballot-voting should only be exercised on urgent matters
requiring unanimous approval when regular meetings cannot be held.
3.18. The non-executive BOD members may meet with the managers of the corporation for
consultation on any of its affairs with or without the attendance of the executive members,
provided that they together coordinate the date of meeting and that they be informed on what will
be negotiated.
3.19. The board should regularly review the corporation's internal rules of procedures to ensure
their suitability and efficiency. The board is entitled to obtain all the financial and non-financial
information and reports on the performance of the corporation.
3.20. The board may constitute committees comprising BOD or other members to perform
particular tasks and for specific periods; these committees should be considered as means of
assisting the board in performing its functions and not as a mean for divesting its responsibilities
or transferring them to another body.
3.21. The process of forming the committees affiliated with the BOD should be done according
to general procedures established by the board, which should include: specifying the function of
the committee, its term of operation; authorities granted to it during such term and means of its
monitoring via the board. Unless otherwise specified under the decision to constitute the
committee, the committee should notify the board with absolute transparency of what functions it
undertakes, what results it culminates and the decisions it makes. The Board is to periodically
monitor the operation of the committees to ensure that it is undertaking the assigned tasks.
3.22. The Board is to constitute at minimum an audit committee consisting of a number of non-
executive board members. The audit committee shall be responsible for the oversight of the
internal audit department and the corporation's procedures.
3.23. It is recommended that the non-executive board members participate in the committees
formed by the board and that one of them acts as its chairman. Committees may seek the
assistance of external consultants in the performance of their functions at the expense of the
corporation. The corporation's annual report should include a brief presentation on each
committee's constitution, number of meetings, assigned functions, and accomplishments;
moreover, committee heads have to attend the corporation's general assembly meeting.
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3.2-+. The corporation's board of directors should have a corporate secretary designated upon
their approval to manage all board records, minutes, and books; as well as to attend all its
meetings unless otherwise requested as regards a particular subject matter. Members are entitled
to communicate with the secretary during inter-meeting intervals. Authorities necessary for the
secretary to assume relevant tasks must be approved by the board. It is preferred that the
functions of the Secretary not be limited to their traditional understanding set forth under the
Egyptian law as to simply attending assembly meetings and taking minutes, but rather extend to
being an ongoing link between board members, and board members and management; in
addition to being a source for any requested information.
3.25. The BOD is generally responsible for the corporation's risk management in accordance
with the nature of its activity, size and market in which it operates; moreover, the board assumes
the responsibility of laying down a strategy for identifying threats faced by the corporation,
means of dealing with them and the degree of operational risk exercised, all of which should be
clearly presented to the shareholders.
3.26 The board of directors should issue an annual report to be presented to the general
assembly. The annual report is in addition to other documentations required by law. The annual
report should specifically include:
• An overview on corporation's activities and its financial position.
• An overview on the corporation's next year's activities.
• Activities and results of the corporation's subsidiaries, if any.
• A briefing on the changes in the main capital structure of the corporation
• Degree of compliance with the guidelines and standards of the Egyptian
Code of Corporate Governance.
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4. Internal Audit Department
..L1. The corporation should have a sound system for internal audits that is established in a
cooperative effort between the board of directors and the corporation management. Failure to do
so will require the board to explain to the annual general assembly reasons for that failure. An
internal audit department shall be responsible for the implementation of this system.
-l.2. Internal audit should be managed by a full-time senior level manager who reports directly
to the managing director. The internal audit manager maintains the right to communicate and
consult directly with the chairman of the board and attends all internal audit committee meetings.
-l.3. Designation, renewal, removal and determination of financial remuneration of the
internal audit manager are to be by a decision taken by the managing director subject to the
approval of the audit committee.
-l.4. The internal audit manager should have necessary authorities that enable him/her to fully
assume the functions of the post.
-l.S. The internal audit manager should report on quarterly basis to the chairman ofthe board
and to the audit committee. The report should include the degree of compliance of the company
with the laws and rules that regulate its activity and its compliance with the rules of corporate
governance.
4.6. Defining the objectives, functions, and authorities of the internal audit department, as
well as the name of its manager and his assistants should be issued in a clear and detailed report
to be written by the corporation's BOD.
4.7. The internal audit aims at laying down systems for evaluating the means, methods, and
procedures of risk management within the corporation and for soundly implementing the rules
governing corporate governance;
4.8. Internal audit mechanisms and procedures should be laid down based upon an overview
and study of the risks facing the corporation, provided that the opinions and reports of the board,
auditors and managers are sought and that the monitoring and evaluation processes are
periodically updated.
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5. External Auditor
5.1. The corporation should have an external auditor who is independent and does not have
any business relationship with the corporation.
5.2. The corporation's board of directors, upon the recommendation of the audit committee,
should nominate an external auditor who is efficient, has a good reputation, and appropriate
experience; his/her efficiency, experience, and abilities must be commensurate to the size of the
corporation, the nature of its operations, and its stakeholders.
5.3. The external auditor should be independent from the corporation and its board members.
He should not be a shareholder or a board member. He/she should be appointed by a general
assembly decision, during which his/her annual remunerations would be set.
5.4. The external auditor should attend the corporation's annual general assembly meeting.
J.J. The external auditor should comply with the Egyptian accounting standards and
regulations, in spirit and content.
5.6. The company should not contract the external auditor to carry out any additional tasks,
except upon the approval of the audit committee, subject that the additional task are not among
those that will be audited or assessed by the external auditor or be in conflict with his assignment
as an auditor. The external auditor's fees for the additional tasks should be relevant to his fees
for external auditing, and should not represent a significant percentage of his fees as an external
auditor to ensure his independence. In all cases, these additional tasks should be presented to the
first general assembly of the corporation.
5.7. The external auditor should be independent and unbiased. He/she should be protected
against the intervention of the board of directors. The board of directors should not be in a
position to control the decision to continue his/her assignment or to decide his/her remuneration.
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6. Audit Committee
6.1. An audit committee to be set up comprising at least three non-executive board members.
At least one of its members should have financial and accounting expertise. If the number of
non-executives on the board of directors is less than three, one or more members may be
appointed from outside the corporation.
6.2. In addition to the functions mentioned in this code, the audit committee will perform the
following functions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Evaluate the efficiency of the financial manager and other major staff of
the financial department.
Review the internal audit system and submit a report including its
recommendations.
Review financial statements before submission to the board of directors,
and include its recommendations in a report.
Review the accounting policies and include its recommendations in a
report.
Review the audit plan with the external auditor and provide its
recommendations.
Review the comments of the external auditor and follow up with
corrective measures.
•
•
Assess the qualifications, performance, and independence of the external
auditor; nominate external auditor and determine his fees.
Approve assigning additional tasks to external auditor and decide his fees
for additional tasks.
• Review the plan of the internal audit department and assess its efficiency
and capacity.
• Review the reports of the internal audit department, ~he feedback of the
management regarding these reports, and the corrective measures.
6.3. Audit committee should meet periodically at least on quarterly basis. The meeting
should have a specific agenda.
6.4. The corporation should facilitate the tasks of the audit committee including the
approval to solicit expertise, if necessary.
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7. Disclosure of Social Policies
7.1. The corporation must reveal to the shareholders, the dealing public, and its staff the
policies regarding its social, environmental, occupational health and safety, and other policies
at least once per year.
7.'2. Declared policies should be clear and not misleading, they should include what the
corporation intends to undertake as regards: the development and changes in the number and
training of employees and social welfare schemes whether within the corporation or in its
surrounding environment. As for health and environmental policies, they have to conform to
the enforced Egyptian laws and regulations and should aim to protect the welfare of the staff
and the surrounding environment. Moreover, they should be sustainable in the long term.
7.3. The corporation, its surrounding environment and the suppliers and clients dealing with it
should be correlated based upon credibility, care to attain common interests and the revealing
of policies and intentions; this should be done in such a manner that does not conflict with the
duty of the corporation, its staff and its managers to maintain confidentiality of financial and
commercial information.
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8. Avoiding Conflict of Interest
8.1. Each corporation should have written rules and regulations known by the BOD members,
administration, managers, and staff on the prevention of conflict of interest and should include
the provisions stated in this regard.
8.2. BOD members, managers, and staff are prohibited to deal in the shares of the corporation
for a certain period of time prior to the declaration of the results of its financial activity or prior
to the declaration of any other information of effective financial nature. It is also prohibited to
deal in the shares of the corporation after sudden incidents which have an impact on the
activities of the corporation or its financial position until these changes are disclosed to the
public. All of the above should be done while observing the enforced provisions of the law
and the enforced rules governing listing, circulation, and disclosure.
8.3. The corporation, in conjunction with its staff and dealers, should lay down the rules
governing its occupational behavior. These include:
• Rules governing dealing with the corporation whether for buying, selling or
additional activities;
• Delegated authorities;
• Means of declaring new policies;
• Safety and health standards adopted;
• Sound occupational standards for dealings among staff and managers and between
them and those outside the corporation.
8.4. The corporation should create an internal system for monitoring the implementation of
the rules governing its occupational behavior.
8.5. In its dealings with suppliers, the corporation should seek the nomination of those at the
same occupational and ethical levels observed by the corporation.
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9. Corporate Governance Rules for Other Corporations
These rules mainly address the companies listed on the stock exchange, financial institutions,
and companies that are financed primarily through the banking sector. However, as mentioned
above. corporate governance applies to all corporations as it balances the different interests and
creates a new corporate culture. Hence, the more the degree of compliance with the provisions of
the code. the more the interests of the society, the partners, and the shareholders are achieved.
Non-traded shareholding companies or family business and limited liability corporations should
take into consideration, in the best of their capacity, compliance with these rules.
Sole proprietorship companies should consider complying with those provisions that avoid
conflict of interests, establish internal audit systems, protect the independence of legal and
financial advisors and financial auditors, and ensure the disclosure of social policies.
In all cases. if non-traded shareholding companies, family corporations, limited liability
companies. or sole proprietorship companies do not have the capacity to comply with corporate
governance rules, they should seek less costly alternatives that meet their financial and
managerial capacity while ensuring that these alternatives lead to the same results that are
addressed through the corporate governance rules.
